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2  Introduction 
 
1.1. The rise (and fall?) of CO2 emissions trading schemes 
The Rio Conference in 1992 is generally considered to be the start of a global effort to 
combat atmospheric climate change. A total of 172 governments participated in the 
conference that was held in Rio de Janeiro.  A key result of the conference was that the 
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) treaty was agreed 
upon. The treaty had the objective to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. Specific limits on GHGs were not mentioned in the treaty, but it provided a 
framework for further negotiations. The parties to the UNFCCC returned to the negotiation 
table a total of 20 times between 1995 and 2004 at so-called Conferences of Parties. Despite 
those years of negotiations and growing evidence for the human role in atmospheric climate 
change (IPCC, 1990, 2007, 2013), there is currently no effective worldwide agreement on 
either a target or an instrument to curb GHG emissions.  
The Kyoto Protocol came closest to being a comprehensive set of legally binding 
targets for GHG reduction. The protocol stipulated GHG reduction targets for 41 nations, to 
be achieved by 2012. For most other parties to the UNFCCC no reduction target was set 
because they were considered to be developing countries. The United States of America 
(USA) refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and, as such, had no legally binding reduction 
target. As the end of 2012 neared, the negotiations over a renewed commitment period 
beyond 2012 proved difficult. Large emitters like the USA, Russia and China did not commit 
to reduction targets while many other countries wanted to hold on to their status as developing 
country. Finally, after lengthy negotiations, a renewed less ambitious commitment until 2020 
was agreed upon, with fewer nations backing the commitment. However, based on the process 
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over the last 20 years, a truly global effort to combat atmospheric climate change is not likely 
to be reached easily if at all. 
Throughout the negotiation process, the European Union (EU) remained a strong 
supporter of stringent global GHG emission reduction targets. The stance of the EU was no 
surprise. In fact, the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed in 1992 by all EU member states, 
included the objective that EU policy on the environment should contribute to the promotion 
of measures at the international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems (Sbragia, 1998).   
In absence of a unified global effort, the EU chose to lead by example by introducing 
ambitious energy and climate related targets in 2009. The objectives, known as the “20-20-
20” targets, were to reduce CO2 emissions (-20%), increase the share of renewables (+20%) 
and improve energy efficiency (+20%) in Europe by 2020.  
As a means to achieve the CO2 emissions reduction target, the EU pioneered the 
introduction of a CO2 emissions trading scheme in 2005. The scheme is officially called the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and is considered to be Europe’s 
flagship instrument in its efforts to curb GHG emissions (Delbeke, 2006; Convery, 2009). The 
scheme caps the CO2 emissions of a large range of energy-intensive sectors, including the 
electricity, steel, oil, gas and cement sectors across Europe. Although emissions trading 
schemes had been introduced before in Europe and elsewhere to combat SOX and NOX 
emissions, the EU ETS was the first emission trading scheme focussed on CO2 emission 
reduction. 
The leading example of the EU gathered a following, as currently 14 other ETSs have 
been launched around the world. Also, 3 ETSs are scheduled to be launched and 14 others are 
currently considered (ICAP, 2014). Cumulatively, all 15 operational ETSs now cover 
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approximately 9% of the annual global anthropogenic (i.e. man-made) CO2 emissions (World 
Bank, 2014). The EU ETS remains by far the largest ETS in the world. For an overview of all 
ETSs that were operational in 2014, see Box 1. 
Although Europe has successfully taken a leading role in the combat to curb GHG 
emissions (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007), the performance of the EU ETS has fallen far 
below prior expectations of legislators and others. In 2008, three and a half years after its 
introduction, the EU ETS carbon price peaked at around €35. Since then, the price has fallen 
to levels below €3 in early 2013. The European Commission (EC, 2013, 2014a) noted that the 
EU ETS is currently too weak to seriously incentivize investments in CO2 abatement 
technologies. The weak performance of Europe’s flagship instrument undermines Europe’s 
leading role in the effort to curb GHG emissions and may halt the, so far, growing popularity 
of emission trading schemes around the world. 
In line with its pro-active stance towards GHG abatement, the European Commission 
has voiced its ambition to introduce measures to improve the performance of the EU ETS. In 
fact, without a credible incentive for investments in CO2 abatement technologies in the short 
and medium term, the European Commission expects that it will become harder to reach long-
term CO2 emission reduction targets in a cost-effective manner (EC, 2014a).  
The position of the European Commission points to multiple policy objectives. Apart 
from the objective to cap emissions of energy intensive sectors below a target level, which the 
EU has already accomplished by introducing the EU ETS, the European Commission is also 
concerned about the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS. Dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS 
refers to its impact on the rate of investment in CO2 abatement technology over time. If the 
investment rate is low for a long time, infrastructure for and experience with the deployment 
of abatement technology is not developed, both of which have the potential to reduce the  
501077-L-bw-Mulder
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Box 1: Emissions trading around the world in 2014 
 
15 ETSs are currently in force around the globe. An overview, including all data 
sources, is provided in the table below. Note that the EU ETS is by far the largest ETS, 
covering 1,925 MtCO2, which is equal to 45% of all anthropogenic CO2 emissions in the 
participating nations. The remaining 55% is emitted by sectors that fall outside the scope of 
the EU ETS, such as households, small businesses, forestry, road transport, buildings, waste 
handling and agriculture. 
Note that other GHGs, such as N2O and CH4, are also often included in the schemes. 
Compared to CO2, the emission level of these other gasses is relatively small in absolute 
terms (MtCO2), although their role with respect to climate change cannot be neglected. CO2 
emissions are responsible for approximately 77% of anthropogenic climate change, while 
CH4 (14%) and N2O (8%) play smaller yet significant roles as well (IPCC, 2007). As the 
table shows, ETSs are currently primarily geared towards reducing CO2 emissions. 
 













































































































EU ETS 1,925 45 X X  X     X  8 
New Zealand 38 50  X X  X  X  X X 1 
RGGI 91 20 X          3 
Tokyo 14 20      X     82 
Switzerland 5 10 X     X   X  19 
California 161 35 X X       X X 10 
Quebec 23 30 X X       X X 9 
Kazakhstan 142 50 X X   X   X   1 
Shenzhen 58 38 X X    X     10 
Shanghai 149 50  X  X X      4 
Beijing 94 50 X X    X     8 
Guangdong 256 42 X X         9 
Tianjin 129 60 X X    X     3 
Chongqing 92 38 X          3 
Hubei 162 35 X X         3 
Sources: ICAP, 2014; World Bank, 2014; *Rounded price in 2014, Kazakhstanian price level 
taken from www.tbc.kz. 
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The ETSs are scattered around the globe geographically. Two are located in the 
United States of America (California and the RGGI). The RGGI is a cooperative scheme 
between nine states in the USA (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont). Seven schemes are located in 
China (Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, Tianjin, Chongqing and Hubei), while 
Canada (in Quebec), Kazakhstan, Switzerland and Japan (in Tokyo) also govern an ETS. 
China has voiced the ambition to introduce a national ETS (Reuters, 2014). In 
preparation to such a national scheme, China considers its seven city-level ETSs as pilot 
programs. If a national ETS is introduced in China, its size (in MtCO2 of covered emissions) 
is likely to easily surpass the size of the EU ETS. Total CO2 emissions in China were 
estimated at 10,300 MtCO2 in 2013 (PBL, 2014). Assuming that a national Chinese ETS 
would have an equally large coverage of the EU ETS (45% of total CO2 emissions), the 
Chinese ETS would be 2.4 times as large as the EU ETS. 
The sectors that are most frequently covered by an ETS are the electricity sector and 
the industry. These sectors are particularly well suited for an ETS because they consist out of 
large stationary sources of CO2. The large and stationary nature of emitters implies that 
monitoring and abatement of CO2 emissions is relatively easy. The sectoral category Industry 
typically refers to CO2 emitting installations in the oil, gas, cement, iron, steel and paper 
industry (although not all of them are covered by each ETS that is said to cover the industry 
in Table 1.1).  
In the final column of Table 1.1 the rounded level of the ETS-driven market price in 
2014 is shown. The observed prices are all at or below €10, with the exchanges of Tokyo 
(€82) and Switzerland (€19) as notable exceptions. The high CO2 price in Tokyo is partly 
explained by illiquidity in the market. Because few allowances are traded, the price does not 
necessarily reflect the economic fundamentals of that market. This reasoning also holds for 
the Swiss ETS (€19) as it is a rather minute and, thereby, illiquid market. Policymakers in the 
EU and Switzerland are looking at the possibility to link the Swiss ETS to the EU ETS. In 
that event, the Swiss market would become much more liquid, allowing the price to converge 
with the CO2 price of the EU ETS. However, so far, no agreement has been reached. 
abatement costs of technologies (Wright, 1936; Rapping, 1965; Duke and Kammen, 1999; 
Grübler et al., 1999; Junginger et al., 2010). Reduced abatement costs usually imply that the 
long-term emission reduction target can be reached at a lower societal cost. Therefore, the 
European Commission also wants to ensure that the EU ETS continuously provides a credible 
incentive for investments in CO2 abatement technologies in Europe. So far, this second 
objective has not been achieved. 
EU legislators now face the difficult task to design and find political consensus for 
measures that can revitalize the EU ETS. Finding political consensus is a complicated task 
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given the large geographical and sectoral scope of the EU ETS, and the large number of (often 
conflicting) interests that stakeholders may have. Against this background, it is crucial for 
policymakers to have a deep understanding of the drivers behind the performance of the EU 
ETS. Such understanding, for that matter, is valuable for both policymakers in Europe, as well 
as legislators around the world that are governing or considering the introduction of an ETS.  
The analysis in this research project is intended to provide that deeper understanding 
regarding the performance drivers of the EU ETS. We zoom in on CO2 emissions trading 
within the EU ETS1 and develop a dynamic stochastic simulation model to uncover which 
factors drive the performance of the EU ETS. Also, we examine which policy responses are 
best suited to improve its performance. 
In Section 1.2 of this introduction we explain the key principles and mechanisms 
through which an ETS operates to reduce CO2 emissions. In Section 1.3, we examine the 
performance of the EU ETS so far in more detail. Subsequently, in Section 1.4, we present the 
research questions of this thesis. Finally, in Sections 1.5–1.8 provide overviews of Chapters 2-
5 respectively. 
1.2. CO2 emissions trading: internalizing an externality 
An ETS is an instrument that, via trade in emission allowances, puts a price tag on the 
act of emitting CO2 into the atmosphere.2 By putting a price tag on emitting CO2, an ETS 
forces firms and other economic agents to take CO2 emissions into account while making 
operational and investment decisions. In absence of a price tag, emitting CO2 is free, while 
                                                 
1 As shown in Table 1.1, current ETSs are mainly geared towards reducing CO2 emissions, although other GHG gasses are 
also to some extent covered by the ETSs that are currently in force. In the remainder of this thesis, we focus exclusively on 
CO2 emissions trading and ignore other GHGs. Because the analysis of climatic effects is outside the scope of this thesis and 
because the volume of other GHG gasses is relatively small in absolute terms, this simplification can be made without a 
significant loss of detail. 
2 The description in this section is equally valid for other GHGs, but, in line with the rest of the thesis, we focus exclusively 
on CO2 emissions. 
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society at large does face the potential dangers of anthropogenic climate change. These 
dangers include rising sea levels and intensified extreme weather conditions, such as 
floodings, hurricanes and/or extreme drought (IPCC, 1990, 2007, 2013).  
In economic terms, an ETS internalizes an externality (Freeman et al., 1992). The 
externality is the cost that the society faces from anthropogenic CO2 emissions. The 
externality is internalized into the decision making of firms and other economic agents via the 
costs that are incurred to obtain emission allowances. 
The construction of an ETS can be divided into three steps: setting a cap on emissions, 
choosing an allowance allocation mechanism and, finally, enabling trade in emission 
allowances. Each of these steps will now be discussed on more detail. 
First, legislators have to set a cap on emissions. European legislators have set a 
reduction target for energy intensive sectors of -21% for 2020, compared to the reference year 
2005. In line with this target, the overall cap (i.e. the total number of emission allowances that 
was to be distributed) was determined. A single EU ETS emission allowance provides the 
holder with the right to emit one metric tonne of CO2 into the atmosphere. In turn, emitters 
have to surrender (i.e. hand in) an allowance for every tonne of CO2 that they emit. If a firm 
fails to surrender an allowance for a tonne of CO2 that is emitted, a high fine is incurred. By 
reducing the number of allowances that are issued over time, the EU ultimately forces firms to 
reduce their emissions, in line with the emission reduction target.  
Second, legislators have to decide how to allocate the emission allowances to emitters. 
EU legislators use three allocation mechanisms: grandfathering, benchmarking and 
auctioning. Under grandfathering, allowances are allocated free of charge to emitters based on 
their historic emission level. Grandfathering was used until 2012 as the EU ETS allocation 
mechanism. Starting in 2013, the EU switched to free allocation via benchmarking. Under 
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benchmarking, the amount that is allocated to an emitter is based on a product-level 
performance benchmark. A product-level performance benchmark reflects the average CO2 
emissions output of the 10% best performing installations in the EU to produce a specific 
product. Emitters with outdated production technology thus do not receive sufficient free 
allowances to cover their emission output, while best-of-class installations receive (more 
than) full compensation for free. In this manner, the allocation mechanism rewards efficient 
technology. Parallel to the introduction of benchmarking, auctions have also been introduced 
in 2013. On auctions, allowances are sold to the highest bidder. The auction revenue goes to 
the member-state governments in the EU. Whether a sector can obtain allowances for free via 
benchmarking, or has to pay for allowances via auctioning, depends on the extent to which an 
ETS sector faces international competition from countries without comparable climate 
legislation. The greater the international competition, the greater the proportion of allowances 
that are allocated for free. In that manner, the allocation mechanism minimizes the distorting 
impact of the EU ETS on the international level-playing-field. 
 Finally, once allowances are allocated, emission allowances can be traded via 
exchanges. Firms that hold more allowances than they require to cover their emissions, are 
allowed to sell them to other firms that do not have sufficient allowances to cover theirs. Also, 
via trade, firms that lack low-cost options to reduce their own emission level can buy 
emission allowances from other firms that do have low cost CO2 abatement opportunities 
available. In this manner, at least theoretically, the market-based approach ensures that the 
emission reduction target may be met while the lowest-cost CO2 abatement opportunities are 
utilized to do so. 
Note that an ETS does not necessarily internalize all of the costs that are associated to 
the climate change externality. The extent to which the costs of the externality are reflected in 
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the CO2 price depends in part on the emission reduction target that is set by the governing 
authority. The more ambitious the emission reduction target, the less allowances are 
distributed, the higher the CO2 price, and the more costs are internalized by firms under the 
ETS. 
1.3. The EU ETS: origins and performance so far 
Initially, in line with its tradition, the European Union was mainly focussed on 
regulatory approaches to curb CO2 emissions, as opposed to market-based approaches such as 
the ETS. The EU gradually changed its stance towards a market-based approach and became a 
CO2 emissions trading pioneer. However, so far, the performance of the EU ETS has fallen 
far below prior expectations. 
 
In 1991, the Environment Commissioner of the European Commission, Carlo Ripa di 
Meana, announced a proposal to introduce a combination of a tax on the CO2 content of fuels, 
and a tax on all non-renewable forms of energy (notably nuclear power). The two components 
would be combined in equal proportions. For example, half of the tax on a barrel of oil would 
be related to its carbon content and half to the energy component. The tax was intended to be 
introduced in stages, starting in 1993. The initial level was intended to be $3 per barrel of oil 
and would then be increased by $1 annually to reach a level of $10 in 2000 (EC, 1991; 
Pearson and Smith, 1991).  
The proposal was eventually rejected, mainly due to opposition by the United 
Kingdom. To this day, introduction of a tax at the European level remains controversial 
because fiscal policy is often considered to be the responsibility of individual member states 
within the EU. After the proposal was rejected, the European Commission encouraged 
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individual member states to introduce national taxes on a product-by-product basis (EC, 
1996).  
The EU advocated a norm where domestic policy changes were considered as the only 
legitimate mechanism to reduce domestic emissions (Cass, 2005). During the Kyoto 
negotiations in 1997, the USA pushed for the adoption of international emissions trading. The 
EU was suspicious of that idea, seeing it as an illegitimate manner to avoid domestic 
responsibilities. The eventual compromise text of the Kyoto Protocol did include the 
possibility of creating an international emissions trading system3 that would come into force 
in 2008 (Cass, 2005). In the years following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, the European 
Commission repeatedly pointed out that ‘ … the best preparation for the Community and its 
member states might be to develop their own emission trading experience (EC, 1998, 1999, 
2000). The EU fully adopted emissions trading by passing two directives (EC, 2003, 2004). 
The directives outlined the design of the EU ETS as it would become operational on the 1st of 
January 2005. 
Clearly, the stance of the EU had changed. This change is generally attributed to a 
process of policy learning that drew from experiences of the USA in its Acid Rain Program 
(Damro and Luaces-Mendes, 2003; Damro et al., 2008; Cass, 2005). In the Acid Rain 
Program, the USA has successfully implemented an emissions trading scheme to curb SOX 
emissions, a major precursor of acid rain (Ellerman et al., 2000).  
Several other factors played a role in the popularization of an ETS. First, an ETS 
accommodated to the need of international organizations and business lobbies (Damro and 
Luaces-Mendes, 2003). Businesses generally favoured emissions trading over regulatory 
                                                 
3 The Kyoto emissions trading scheme is fundamentally different from the EU ETS. Under the Kyoto emissions trading 
scheme allowances can be earned after emission reduction has been achieved on a project basis. The earned allowances can 
subsequently be traded and/or used to offset emissions. The Kyoto emissions trading scheme thus awards investments in CO2 
abatement technology, while anyone that meets a set of regulatory requirements can apply to receive the allowance. In 
contrast, the EU ETS penalizes the emissions of a specific group of emitters. 
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approached because emissions trading would create a tradable asset, while a tax would extract 
revenue from firms without adding any compensating value (Grubb et al., 1999). Secondly, a 
pan-European ETS would create a level playing field within the EU in line with its internal 
market objective (Convery, 2009). Thirdly, an ETS would still allow the EU to commit to 
strong emission reduction targets. Finally, an ETS can accommodate to stark differences 
between individual member-states within the EU via its allowance allocation mechanism. 
These differences between member-states are best illustrated by the EU burden-
sharing agreement that was agreed upon in 1996. The burden-sharing agreement is shown in 
Table 1.2 and answers the question of “who should do what” within the EU to reach its Kyoto 
commitment. By taking into account the concerns of individual member states, each member 
state was assigned a reduction target, such that the overall Kyoto reduction target of 8% 
would be achieved in 2012. This differentiation was made for various reasons, among them 
emission objectives of member-states, special treatment of cohesion countries,4 economic 
restructuring (particularly in Germany and the UK) and national policies in energy and 
industrial sectors (Damro and Luaces-Mendes, 2003).  
                                                 
4 Cohesion Countries are EU member states whose per capita gross national income is less than 90 % of the EU average. 
Table 1.2: Burden sharing in the EU 
Member state % share of EU GHG emissions in 1990 % reduction target in 2012 
compared to 1990 
Austria 1.7 -13.0 
Belgium 3.2 -7.5 
Denmark 1.7 -21.0 
Finland 1.7 0.0 
France 14.7 0.0 
Germany 27.7 -21.0 
Greece 2.4 +25.0 
Ireland 1.3 +13.0 
Italy 12.5 -6.5 
Luxembourg 0.3 -28.0 
Netherlands 4.8 -6.0 
Portugal 1.6 +27.0 
Spain 7.0 +15.0 
Sweden 1.6 +4.0 
United Kingdom 17.9 -12.5 
Total 100.0 -8.0 
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To divide the overall EU ETS allowance cap between the member states, the burden-
sharing agreement was an important input (i.e. member states with more stringent reduction 
targets were awarded relatively less emission allowances).  
The precise member state cap and manner of allocation was described in a National 
Allocation Plan (NAP) that was drafted by each member state (member states were also 
forced to keep registers to monitor, verify and report on the compliance of emitters). Three 
months after delivery of a NAP to the European Commission, the commission would reject 
(in which case the NAP would have to be revised) or accept it (EC, 2003). Acceptance or 
rejection depended to a large extent on whether the reported emission and allocation levels in 
the NAP were in line with the projected emission levels in reality. Despite this procedure, and 
because projecting the real emission level before the launch of the EU ETS was difficult, the 
accepted NAPs led to allowance allocation levels that were significantly above the eventual 
emission levels in the first operational years of the EU ETS. However, in the design of the EU 
ETS, legislators had accounted for the possibility of unforeseen issues by designating Phase I 
of the EU ETS (2005-2007) as a trial period. The trial period allowed legislators to introduce 
amendments to the EU ETS Directives and NAPs, and thereby start Phase II (in 2008) with an 
improved design and adjusted allowance supply levels. 
One of the crucial differences between Phase I (2005-2007) and Phase II (2008-2012) 
was that banking of allowances was first allowed in Phase II. Previously, in Phase I, 
allowances that were allocated in a specific year could not be transferred to the next year. 
Allowances thus effectively had an expiration date, and consequently, their value would 
gradually fall to €0 as the expiration date neared. Starting in 2008 allowances no longer had 
an expiration date and would thus keep their value. This improved the tradability of 
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allowances, but also meant that surpluses of allowances now had the potential to build up over 
time. 
 Shortly after the start of Phase II of the EU ETS in 2008, an economic downturn lead 
to a 11.6% fall in the emission level of emitters under the EU ETS (EC, 2010). Reinforced by 
the ability to bank emission allowances, the price of EU ETS emission allowances (officially 
termed European Union Allowances, or EUA) took a strong hit, falling from approximately 
€35 in July 2008 to around €8 in early 2009 (see Figure 1.1). 
 The EU ETS carbon price never recovered to the price levels that were witnessed in 
the first year of Phase II, and even fell below €3 in early 2013. Whereas European industry 
officials were initially concerned that the CO2 price would become too high, undermining 
their competitiveness in international markets (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006), European 
legislators are now primarily concerned that the CO2 price is too low to have a meaningful 
impact on operational and investment decisions within the industry (EC, 2013, 2014a).  
In the remainder of this research the terms CO2 price, EUA price, allowance price and 
Figure 1.1: Historical price of EUAs in € per allowance from January 2008 to July 2012 
Source: European Environmental Agency, http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/eua-future-prices-200820132012. Note that the 
EUA price has fluctuated between approximately €3 and €7 since July 2012 until early 2015, http://www.eex.com.  
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carbon price will be used interchangeably to refer to the EU ETS-based EUA price per metric 
tonne of CO2, unless specifically stated otherwise. 
Currently, the EU ETS is in Phase III (2013-2020), with Phase IV starting in 2021. 
Significant structural changes to its design could therefore be implemented now, but would 
most likely enter into effect at the start of Phase IV at the earliest. With several years 
remaining until then, this leaves some room to design policies that could help to reach the 
dynamic efficiency objective of European legislators. The key question that remains is which 
type of amendments is most effective to obtain a credible incentive for investment in CO2 
abatement technology via the EU ETS. In this thesis, we intend to provide a deeper insight 
into the performance drivers of the EU ETS. Those insights could ultimately assist 
policymakers to bring the performance of the EU ETS in line with the policy objectives of the 
EU. 
1.4. Analysing the performance drivers of the EU ETS 
In this thesis, we examine the performance drivers of the EU ETS. Specifically, we 
zoom in on two relevant issues and their associated streams of literature: 
1) To what extent do potential investors in a set of abatement technologies called 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) face extra investment uncertainty when they are 
forced to comply with the EU ETS and dependent on a volatile allowance price to 
have a profitable business case? We focus on CCS because its large scale deployment 
is often considered to be among the most critical solutions to reach stringent CO2 
emission reduction targets towards 2050 (Pacala and Socolow, 2004; IPCC, 2005; 
Haszeldine, 2009; EC, 2009b; IEA, 2010, 2011). So, if potential investors in CCS face 
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too much investment uncertainty under the EU ETS, the deployment of a potentially 
critical abatement technology is unlikely to materialize; 
2) To what extent is the impact of the EU ETS on investment behaviour affected by 
the interaction with other climate and energy related instruments that are currently in 
place around Europe? In recent years, EU member states have introduced a large 
number of instruments alongside the EU ETS that also, directly or indirectly, are 
meant to affect the CO2 emission level (EEA, 2011a; Lundberg et al., 2012; IPCC, 
2013). Examples are instruments that promote the use of renewable electricity 
generation technologies or energy efficiency measures. Many of these instruments 
tend to depreciate the EU ETS allowance price (Interact, 2003; Harrison et al., 2005; 
Sorrell et al., 2009; Alberola, 2014) and therefore may be an important driver behind 
the regularly observed low allowance prices. In that manner, instruments that operate 
in parallel to the EU ETS may strongly influence investment behaviour around Europe 
and, thereby, the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS. So far, however, it has remained 
unclear how large the role of such adverse policy interaction between the EU ETS and 
other instruments has been exactly.  
 
Both themes, the investment potential for CCS under the EU ETS (e.g. Stangeland 
2007; Odenberger et al., 2008; Broek et al., 2010; Odenberger and Johnsson, 2010; Broek et 
al., 2011; IEA, 2011; Strachan et al., 2011), as well as the interactions of the EU ETS with 
other instruments (e.g. Conrad and Kohn, 1996; Morthorst, 2001, 2003; Amundsen and 
Mortensen, 2001; Jensen and Skytte, 2003; Hindsberger et al., 2003; Rathmann, 2007; Del 
Rio, 2009), have been confronted in the academic literature before. However, we argue that 
these issues have been inadequately dealt with because (1) the ETS is often superficially 
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modelled, to the extent that it operates as either a de-facto CO2 tax or as a simple annual 
emission quota (disregarding the ability of firms to bank allowances), and (2) because the 
essential element of stochastics (i.e. uncertainty) is missing. Existing modelling efforts 
therefore do not accurately reflect the dynamic design and functioning of the EU ETS. 
Assessing the performance of the EU ETS on the basis of such methods may therefore lead to 
inaccurate or even biased results. 
To assess the impact of the EU ETS on investment behaviour, key design elements of 
the EU ETS are inputs to our model (notably the supply of allowances, the stochastic nature 
of the demand for allowances and the ability to bank allowances); the CO2 price is an 
endogenous model variable, and investment levels in CO2 abatement technologies are model 
output. In this manner, we are able to assess to what extent the existing design of the EU ETS 
will enable investments in abatement technologies over time. On top of that, we test the 
impact of amendments to the EU ETS Directive on the CO2 price and investment levels. 
Because the demand for allowances is modelled stochastically, the CO2 price exhibits 
a volatile pattern over time in our model. The volatile nature of the CO2 price is also 
represented in existing literature. However, this is often done by exogenously generating a 
stochastic CO2 price via a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). This approach can be 
extremely useful to determine, among others, at which level of the CO2 price a technology is 
expected to become a profitable investment option (EPRI, 1999; Rothwell, 2006; Laurikka 
and Koljonen, 2006; Blyth et al., 2007). However, because this approach relies on an 
exogenously determined allowance price (which is not linked to the supply, demand and 
banking of emission allowances) these existing studies do not reveal whether the current, or 
amended, design of the ETS will drive such investments.  
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Our approach does enable us to answer these questions, related to the dynamic 
efficiency of the current EU ETS design. To see why the explicit modelling of the allowance 
supply regime, the banking provision and stochastic demand patterns are so important when 
examining investment rates via the EU ETS, consider a downward demand shock that leads to 
the build-up of a stock of banked allowances. Once a stock of allowances has formed, it may 
take years or even decades before the stock is depleted, and its depreciating effect on the CO2 
price has disappeared. The combination of uncertain allowance demand and the banking 
provision can thereby lead to pathways regarding the level of the CO2 price and thus the 
investment behaviour of firms that strongly diverge from policy expectations and intentions. 
Static and deterministic models do not capture these pathways. In this thesis, we do capture 
these pathways because we employ stochastics over a simulation window that runs from 2008 
to 2030. Finally, our stochastic approach has the advantage over traditional approaches that a 
direct link can be established between a specific design of the EU ETS and the likelihood of a 
specific outcome. This means that we can provide probability distributions for each of the 
variables that are endogenous to, or output of, the model. 
In the next four sections of this introduction, we provide extended summaries of 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. In the remainder of this section, we provide a very brief overview of 
those chapters. In Chapter 2 we develop a dynamic stochastic simulation model of the EU 
ETS and assess to what extent potential investors in CCS face extra investment uncertainty 
via the EU ETS allowance price. We test to what extent amendments to the design of the EU 
ETS affect the potential for and uncertainty of investments in CCS. The results can help 
policymakers to develop a more goal-oriented policy design, specifically in light of the 
concerns regarding the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS (EC, 2013, 2014a). In Chapters 3 
and 4, we apply the dynamic stochastic simulation model to more complex policy settings. 
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Specifically, in Chapter 3, we test under which circumstances the EU ETS could become 
redundant under the influence of instruments that operate in parallel to the EU ETS and 
adversely affect the ability of the EU ETS to incentivize investments in CO2 abatement 
technologies. We distinguish between two different classes of parallel instruments and assess 
which type of parallel instrument undermines the performance of the EU ETS the most. The 
analysis can help policymakers to weigh more accurately the potential costs that are involved 
when introducing parallel instruments, i.e. in terms of reduced strength of the EU ETS 
incentive. The insights may be used to eventually introduce measures that ensure that the 
impact of the EU ETS on investment behaviour cannot be marginalized due to such parallel 
instruments. In Chapter 4, we perform a detailed case study on policy interaction between the 
EU ETS and two parallel instruments in the German power sector to better understand to what 
extent the current ETS carbon price is influenced by specific instruments that are currently in 
force. To perform the analysis, the dynamic stochastic simulation model of the EU ETS is 
extended with a module that captures the German power sector and the two German parallel 
instruments in a detailed manner. Both the development of this model extension and its 
application are covered in Chapter 4. The case study shows to what extent the current 
performance of the EU ETS is undermined by these two instruments in the German power 
sector. The results show that the combined impact of two German parallel instruments on the 
performance of the EU ETS is significant and suggest that parallel instruments across the 
whole of Europe are to a large extent responsible for the currently observed weak 
performance of the EU ETS. The study provides direction for policymakers interested in 
stimulating the influence of the EU ETS on abatement activity with or without amendments to 
the design of the EU ETS itself. 
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1.5. Chapter 2 – Stochastic simulation of CO2 emissions 
trading in Europe: will the EU ETS drive investments in 
CCS? 
In Chapter 2, we examine the investment potential under the EU ETS for the set of 
CO2 abatement technologies that is known under their collective name as Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS). The characteristic that all types of CCS share is that they enable operators in 
energy intensive sectors to separate CO2 from other waste gasses and to safely transport it to a 
storage facility. Such a storage facility is typically an empty gas reservoir or saline aquiver in 
the deep underground. 
Apart from a few demonstration projects, CCS is currently not deployed on a 
commercial scale. Studies do show, however, that CCS offers a large technical potential for 
CO2 abatement. Pacala and Socolow (2004) argue that CCS has the potential to account for 
1/7th of the required global abatement efforts necessary to prevent the most devastating 
consequences of anthropogenic climate change. The deployment of CCS could, in fact, be 
critical in order to be able to reach deep emission cuts towards 2050 (IPCC, 2005; Metz and 
de Coninck, 2007; EC, 2009b; IEA, 2010, 2011). More importantly, if CCS is deployed in a 
timely and structural manner, its deployment cost can decrease significantly. Thereby, CCS 
can not only contribute substantially to achieving long-term emission targets, but it also does 
so at substantially lower cost compared to a scenario without CCS (e.g. Finnon, 2012; Riahi et 
al., 2004). The question that remains is whether the EU ETS will be able to offer an economic 
incentive that is strong and stable enough to structurally drive the deployment of CCS. 
 If the carbon price is sufficiently high and stable, CCS projects can materialize, 
whereas the deployment and development of CCS may come to a standstill if the carbon price 
remains low and/or is volatile. Even is CCS becomes economically viable, other factors, that 
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we have not explicitly modelled, may still block the deployment of CCS. Such factors include 
societal acceptance (Alphen et al., 2007; Huijts et al., 2007) policy, technological or 
infrastructural obstacles (Stigson et al., 2012). Nevertheless, economic viability is a minimum 
requirement for deployment to occur. We test how the current design of the EU ETS, as well 
as some amendments to its design, affect the economic scope for deployment of different 
types of CCS until 2030. 
In the context of the EU ETS, macro-economic growth uncertainty may translate into 
significant investment uncertainty for investors in CCS. If the economic growth rate remains 
below the historic average until 2030, very little investments in CO2 abatement technology 
may be required to remain below the EU ETS allowance cap. The relatively sluggish 
economy will lead to a relatively low production and CO2 emission level, making additional 
investment in CO2 abatement technologies less necessary. Alternatively, if the economic 
growth rate is above the historic average until 2030, the rising production levels add to the 
existing need to invest in CO2 abatement technologies, possibly providing sufficient support 
for significant deployment of CCS.  
Operators of other technologies than CCS will equally be confronted with this type of 
investment uncertainty, but CCS provides a particularly relevant case given its large capital 
expenditure requirements, long lead-times and its potentially crucial role towards achieving 
long-term emission reduction goals.    
We perform a Monte Carlo analysis with our newly developed simulation model of the 
EU ETS in which the allowance price is an endogenous model parameter. We account for 
macro-economic growth uncertainty by stochastically sampling the annual growth rate of the 
business-as-usual CO2 emission level of EU ETS sectors (emissions in non-EU ETS sectors 
are outside the scope of this research). We take into account that firms across Europe pursue 
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different allowance banking strategies given that they have imperfect foresight, and 
heterogeneous investment opportunities. 
Our findings suggest that the EU ETS incentive is too unpredictable to drive the 
deployment of CCS in a structural manner. Under current regulation, the total scope for CCS 
technologies is forecasted to average around 85 MtCO2/yr by 2030 based on their average 
deployment costs, with a standard deviation of 70 MtCO2/yr. The standard deviation around 
the scope for CCS is not reduced, and may even increase, if the allowance supply is restricted. 
This suggests that allowance supply restrictions are unlikely to enable investments in CCS on 
the basis of the EU ETS allowance price alone. If policymakers are interested in strengthening 
the EU ETS, to the extent that it may drive investments in technologies with such high lead 
times and capital requirements, amendments to the EU ETS Directive should aim at reducing 
the uncertainty of the allowance price.  
1.6. Chapter 3 – Interaction between EU instruments and 
member-state instruments: the end of CO2 emissions 
trading in Europe? 
In this chapter, we introduce the reader to the strand of literature that examines policy 
interaction between emission trading schemes and instruments that are introduced in parallel 
to such schemes. Alongside the EU ETS, many other parallel instruments have been 
introduced which are also meant to affects the CO2 emission level. Thereby, however, they 
also interact with the impact of the EU ETS on the emission level and investment behaviour. 
Notable examples of parallel instruments are feed-in tariffs that stimulate the deployment of 
renewables, or subsidies/mandates for biomass co-firing. Yet many other instruments are 
deployed at the international, national, regional and local level. 
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Parallel instruments can have benefits for the national government that introduces the 
instrument, such as employment benefits or stability of electricity supply (Sorrell and Sijm, 
2003; Bennear and Stavins, 2007). However, with respect to CO2 abatement, parallel 
instruments are direct substitutes for the EU ETS. The abatement achieved through parallel 
instruments generally reduces the demand for EU ETS emission allowances (either directly or 
indirectly) and lowers the CO2 price. The lowered CO2 price subsequently reduces the amount 
of abatement that is triggered elsewhere in Europe via the EU ETS. Building on this logic, the 
aggregate impact of all parallel instruments across Europe could significantly lower the CO2 
price and hurt the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS through this impact. In this chapter, we 
determine how sensitive the performance of the EU ETS is to the introduction of parallel 
instruments. Specifically, we zoom in on the conditions that would force the EU ETS into 
redundancy, i.e. driving the carbon price down to €0. 
Stochastic analysis shows that redundancy of the EU ETS is certain if the parallel 
instruments trigger more abatement than 45 MtCO2/yr. If parallel instruments trigger more 
abatement than 20 MtCO2/yr, redundancy of the EU ETS depends on the economic growth 
rate in Europe. The lower the economic growth rate the greater the likelihood of ETS 
redundancy. The actual threshold levels for EU ETS redundancy can be significantly below 
the reported thresholds if either policymakers or firms lack full commitment to the EU ETS. 
The commitment of policymakers may weaken if the CO2 price is low, but not yet zero. This 
may lead them to pull the plug on the scheme, or at least suggest doing so, thereby affecting 
expectations to that end in the market. Similarly, firms may lose faith in the scheme and start 
dumping the emission allowances that they hold on stock. Such behavioural influences, that 
we have not modelled, may drive the price down to zero even if the impact of parallel 
instruments is below the 20 MtCO2/yr threshold. If policymakers prioritize a strong impact of 
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the EU ETS on investment behaviour of firms under the scheme, the results suggest that they 
should refrain from introducing parallel instruments if the carbon price is already weak. 
In our analysis, we differentiate between two types of parallel instruments. Type 1 
parallel instruments are aimed at ETS sectors and effectively reduce the carbon intensity of 
production in those sectors (e.g. a biomass co-firing mandate). Type 2 instruments are aimed 
at non-ETS sectors and lower the production levels in ETS sectors (e.g. instruments that 
promote households to install solar panels reduce the need for centralized electricity, the 
production of which falls under the EU ETS). The results show that Type 2 instruments lead 
to a stronger depreciation of the EU ETS carbon price than Type 1 instruments. This can be 
explained by the fact that Type 2 instruments lead to burden shifting between sectors: 
investments by non-ETS sectors effectively reduce the need for ETS sectors to invest in CO2 
abatement technologies. 
The results can help policymakers to weigh more accurately the potential costs that are 
involved when considering the introducing of either of the two types in terms of reduced 
strength of the EU ETS incentive. 
1.7. Chapter 4 – The EU ETS in the policy mix: measuring 
the impact of instruments in the German power sector on 
the performance of the EU ETS 
In Chapter 3, we analysed to what extent the EU ETS performance depends on the 
impact of parallel instruments that are in force alongside. We found that the collective impact 
of parallel instruments could, theoretically, force the EU ETS carbon price permanently down 
to €0. In reality, the EU ETS carbon price has so far remained on average very low and far 
below prior expectations. Therefore, it seems a logical next step to try to better understand the 
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impact of parallel instruments on the current performance of the EU ETS. This is true, the 
more so because their role has remained rather unclear so far.  
To quantify this effect more precisely, in Chapter 4, we zoom in on a specific real-life 
case study. We examine how sensitive the EU ETS CO2 price is to the introduction of two 
parallel instruments with substantial scope that have been in force in Germany alongside the 
EU ETS for several years, and still are. Specifically, we examine the interaction effects 
between the EU ETS and the German Feed-In Tariffs (FITs) and the German Nuclear Phase 
Out (NPO). Both instruments primarily work via the power sector. 
We choose to focus on these instruments for three reasons. First, the German power 
sector is the largest national power sector within the EU ETS, covering about 15% of all 
emissions under the EU ETS. Second, these instruments are expected to have a considerable 
effect on the CO2 emission output of the German power sector. Finally, it is impossible to 
accurately model the underlying factors that determine the impact of all parallel instruments 
that are in force today across Europe. So, apart from the two parallel instruments that are 
modelled explicitly, the impact of other parallel instruments is covered in a stylized manner. 
Rathmann (2007), Abrell and Weigt (2008) and Traber and Kemfert (2009, 2012), 
have performed similar case study analyses, but have done so with a static model and thus a 
more simple representation of the EU ETS. A first disadvantage of that more simple approach 
is that it disregards the effect that the banking provision has on the EU ETS impact. Via 
banking, firms can, for instance, offset a short position in one year with surpluses from 
previous years. This can have a pervasive impact on the EU ETS effectiveness. Models of the 
EU ETS should therefore account for the cumulative supply and demand of allowances over 
an extended period of time to more accurately assess the time profiles regarding the need for 
CO2 abatement activity and the level of the carbon price. A second backdrop of the static 
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models is that the effect of parallel instruments on the carbon price may be temporary, or at 
least be of a different magnitude over time. Such dynamics cannot be accurately captured in a 
static model. 
We extend the dynamic stochastic simulation model of the EU ETS, which was 
developed in Chapter 2, with a module that provides a detailed representation of the German 
power sector and the FITs and NPO. Apart from the stochasticity that was already present in 
the original model, the following variables are now also stochastically sampled: German 
electricity demand growth, fuel price changes of five fuels, on- and off-shore wind power and 
solar irradiance levels. The stochastic approach ensures that we do not make implicit 
technological choices by fixing important input parameters to a certain level. The module 
accounts for 22 different electricity generation technologies. Based on this detailed model 
configuration, we are able to draw a more complete and accurate picture of the impact of the 
German FITs and NPO on the performance of the EU ETS.  
We find that the combined impact of FITs and the NPO on the EU ETS leaves the 
overall emission level in Europe unchanged, yet depreciates the EU ETS carbon price with an 
average of €5 (-14%) in 2030. Given that all 30 countries under the EU ETS have 
implemented a much wider range of additional parallel instruments, the results suggest that 
parallel instruments in general are a prominent driver behind the relatively low carbon prices 
witnessed. In fact, with a rough estimation, we estimate that the carbon price is €20, or 50%, 
below the 2030 level that it would have reached in absence of parallel instruments across the 
EU. For a detailed methodological description we refer to the chapter itself. Complete 
redundancy of the EU ETS under the weight of parallel instruments seems unlikely, although 
such a scenario cannot be ruled out if the economic growth rates remain low while fuel prices 
favour low-carbon alternatives. We suggest that a reduction in the number of policy targets, 
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alongside the target to reduce CO2 emissions, is necessary to ensure that the EU ETS can 
structurally drive investment behaviour across Europe. Alternatively, the policy targets that 
interfere the strongest with the performance of the EU ETS, such as targets regarding the 
deployment level of renewables, could be set to a less ambitious level.  
1.8. Chapter 5 – Epilogue 
In the epilogue, we summarize and reflect on the main findings of this study. Also, we 
discuss recent proposals by European policymakers to amend the current design of the EU 
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2.1. Introduction 
Various studies suggest that Europe cannot achieve the 2050 greenhouse gas emission 
reduction targets without serious investment in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) (IPCC, 
2005; EC, 2009b; IEA, 2010, 2011). Given the lead-times to bring CCS to technological 
maturity, it therefore seems important to initiate serious CCS investments in pilot- and demo-
projects at relatively short notice. This requires an effective incentive system. Although, 
incentives are currently primarily focused on subsidies, it seems plausible that in further 
maturity stages subsidizing the wider application of CCS will become unsustainable as this 
would require too many public resources. Making CCS a mandatory technology also seems 
unlikely given the non-market nature of such a measure. Essentially CO2 emission penalties 
therefore remain as a key incentive to trigger CCS investments.  
The only system that has tried to introduce such a CO2 penalty on a European scale so 
far is the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), which allocates emission allowances to 
installations and enables trading of these so that a  market-based allowance price results. 
However, this price is uncertain given its dependence on volatile allowance demand from 
carbon emitting installations, which also has an impact on the return and timing of 
investments in abatement technologies, such as CCS. Consequently, the magnitude of 
allowance demand volatility could make or break the effectiveness of the EU ETS as a serious 
trigger for CCS deployment. In this study, we assess the extent to which allowance demand 
volatility leads to carbon price uncertainty and how this affects the scope for and timing of 
investments in CCS under the EU ETS.  
Several techno-economic studies have tried to assess the potential role of CCS as a 
carbon abatement option in the energy system (see e.g. Stangeland, 2007; Odenberger et al., 
2008; Broek et al., 2010; Odenberger and Johnsson, 2010; Broek et al., 2011; IEA, 2011; 
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Strachan et al., 2011). These studies, however, are deterministic, i.e. they do not explicitly 
take into account to what extent year-on-year allowance demand and carbon price volatility 
affects investment behaviour vis-à-vis CCS technology. In fact, the studies typically rely on 
assumed linearly rising or constant carbon prices. Secondly, linearly decreasing emission caps 
are used to infer the need for abatement over time, thereby solely focusing on allowance 
supply levels and ignoring the ability to bank allowances if they are in surplus. In reality, the 
need for abatement (i.e. the scarcity of allowances) is ultimately determined by the interaction 
between demand and supply of allowances and banking of surplus allowances from earlier 
periods. Most studies disregard these interactions. Both methodological aspects, deterministic 
modelling and neglected interaction between the drivers of allowance scarcity, have in 
common that they create an overly optimistic scenario with respect to the stability and 
predictability of the EU ETS incentive mechanism, and thus its ability to effectively drive 
investments in capital intensity technologies with a long lead-time.  
Therefore, in this study, we present a novel simulation methodology to assess the 
effectiveness of the EU ETS to trigger CCS deployment. We employ a model that does 
include interaction between the key drivers of an emissions trading scheme, including 
stochastic allowance demand volatility and allowance banking behaviour given heterogeneous 
firm-level carbon price expectations and investment opportunities. By means of a Monte 
Carlo simulation, confidence intervals are obtained regarding the forecasted long-term carbon 
price development and the deployment levels of various types of CCS. The model aims at 
presenting the potential impact of the CO2 penalty via the EU ETS on CCS investment in a 
more realistic perspective. Note that other factors that also may slow down CCS deployment, 
such as societal acceptance problems (Alphen et al., 2007; Huijts et al., 2007). Also, 
technological and infrastructural obstacles may slow down or halt deployment (Stigson et al., 
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2012). None of these factors have been explicitly included in the analysis. This reinforces our 
point that much of the analysis in the literature is likely to be based on overly optimistic 
scenarios regarding CCS deployment. 
2.2. Methodology 
Modelling CCS investment is commonly based on exogenously introducing incentives 
in the models.  In other words, EU ETS allowance prices are taken as given and then 
introduced into the investment equation while feedbacks to the EU ETS allowance price are 
disregarded. For example, in reality, the economic growth rates as well as investments in CO2 
abatement technologies affect the demand for EU ETS allowances, and thereby the EU ETS 
allowance price. We have chosen to make such feedback loops endogenous in our model by 
introducing a new concept called the Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (FCPI). This 
indicator represents the theoretical long-term equilibrium EU ETS allowance price as derived 
from the model. The FCPI does not include the impact of short-term allowance price 
disruptions based for example on speculation, but it is rather based on the interaction between 
the following four fundamental drivers of the carbon price: allowance supply, allowance 
demand, allowance banking and the opportunity costs of abatement technologies that firms 
under the EU ETS are facing.  
The FCPI trajectory can be interpreted as a long-term carbon price forecast, because 
the actual market price for carbon allowances is expected to converge to the FCPI. To 
understand this, we consider a situation where the market price for allowances is considerably 
higher than the FCPI (e.g. due to speculation). This would trigger extra abatement activity and 
a reduction of demand beyond the equilibrium point, leading to a surplus of allowances. The 
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surplus would put downward pressure on the carbon price and lead to convergence of the 
market price towards the FCPI.  
In this model, a merit order of abatement options is assumed whereby the lowest-cost 
options are applied first. With a cumulatively increasing level of allowance scarcity over time, 
a growing number of abatement technologies will be applied.5 The crucial questions in this 
study are thus: 
- when are various types of CCS expected to become part of the mix of abatement 
options, 
- what is the required scale of deployment of these types of CCS in order to comply 
with EU ETS regulation and, most importantly,  
- how uncertain are these forecasts?  
The uncertainty of the forecasts is of particular importance because investors will be 
unlikely to invest in a technology if its long-term viability is highly uncertain. This is 
especially true for CCS, as it involves high capital requirements, long lead times and complex 
infrastructural planning. 
2.2.1. The fundamental drivers of the FCPI 
The first fundamental driver of the FCPI is carbon allowance supply, for which 
allowance allocation policy is crucial. An allowance represents the right to emit one tonne of 
CO2 into the atmosphere and the total number of allowances that is issued to firms per year is 
capped. Furthermore, European legislation requires that the cap is annually reduced over time 
in a linear fashion (EC, 2009a), thereby forcing the overall emission level downwards.  
                                                 
5 Disinvestments (e.g. following a drop in the allowance price) are not included in the analysis.  
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However, a lower cap does not necessarily mean that firms are forced to immediately 
invest in abatement technologies as suggested in various papers that apply constant economic 
growth rates (see e.g., Odenberger and Johnsson, 2010). Recessions could lead to a reduction 
of the demand for allowances that is larger than the reduction of the cap, allowing firms 
across Europe to build-up reserves of banked allowances for later use.  
Therefore, it is also important to explicitly incorporate allowance demand as the 
second fundamental driver of the FCPI into the model.  Not only does this make the 
investment decision-making process much more explicit, but it also enables a relatively 
simple introduction of stochastics in the model. 
Allowance banking is the third driver of the FCPI. If allowances are scarce in any year, 
previously banked allowances can provide an additional source of allowance supply, thereby 
reducing the immediate need for carbon abatement. In our model, we introduce a new 
approach to allowance banking behaviour based on the assumption that companies across 
Europe have heterogeneous carbon price expectations (because they operate under imperfect 
information) and investment opportunities. 
The opportunity cost of abatement faced by firms under the scheme is the fourth driver 
of the FCPI. The opportunity costs are expressed as marginal abatement cost of the next 
available technology, whereby technologies are ranked according to a merit-order whereby 
the lowest-cost abatement opportunities applied first followed by more expensive 
technologies, until demand and supply return to equilibrium. The marginal cost of the last 
technology that is applied equals the equilibrium FCPI. 
By simulating this investment process on a year-to-year basis, and applying stochastic 
modelling to account for allowance demand uncertainty, confidence intervals of the FCPI and 
CCS deployment rates are calculated based on 2,000 Monte Carlo model runs. 
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Obviously, more factors driving CCS investment behaviour can be distinguished than 
covered in this model. Some of these drivers are in fact very hard to model at all because of 
their qualitative nature, although they can still be important in actual decision making. 
Examples are societal acceptance of elements of the CCS value-chain (notably storage), 
unexpected variation in technological learning rates, transaction costs due to organizational 
and administrative hurdles. All these factors have not explicitly been taken into account in the 
modelling, but all, except for positive learning rate surprises, tend to slow down CCS 
deployment. 
The allowance supply regime assumed in this research reflects current ETS legislation 
and is therefore exogenous. The simulation starts in 2008, as firms were allowed to bank 
surplus ETS allowances for the first time in this year while 2030 is the horizon year for our 
simulation.  The components of the allowance supply and the associated input values over 
time are presented in Section 2.2.2. Allowance demand and all of its components follow in 
Section 2.2.3. Subsequently, the algorithm that is applied to model allowance banking is 
presented in Section 2.2.4. Key input assumptions of the merit-order abatement cost curve and 
the algorithm of the technology selection process are laid out in Section 2.2.5. 
2.2.2. Allowance supply 
The unit of analysis for allowance supply is the total number of issued allowances (in 
MtCO2 equivalent) in year ݐ by the regulator of the EU ETS. Allowances are supplied to the 
market through various mechanisms. The total supply of allowances in Phase II and III can be 
expressed by: 
 
ܣܵ௧ ൌ ሺܥ௧ିଵ െ ܣܴ௧ሻߝ ൅ ܫܰܧܴ௧ ൅ ܮܦ௧ ൅ ͵ͲͲ௧  ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ  (2.1) 
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The values for ܣܵ௧ are shown in the last row of Table 2.1. Below follows a detailed 
outline of the various sources of allowance supply, based on European legislation.  
ܥ௧ିଵ is the official EU ETS cap of all 30 countries6 combined at ݐ െ ͳ. ܣܴ௧ represents 
the annual reduction of the cap in year ݐ. The first term is multiplied by ߝ, which is equal to 
0.95 during Phase II (2008-2012) and III (2013-2020) of the EU ETS, and equal to 1 for the 
period after 2020. We hereby take into account that 5% of the overall cap during Phase II and 
III is reserved in the New Entrants Reserve (NER) for new installations that enter the EU 
ETS. ܫܰܧܴ௧ represents the flow of allowances from the New Entrants Reserve to new 
entrants in year ݐ. ܮܦ௧ represents the flow of allowances obtained via the Linking Directive in 
year ݐ and ͵ͲͲ௧ represents the flow of allowances auctioned via the NER300 program in year 
ݐ. Each of these parameters will now be explained in more detail. The values of all input 
parameters over time are shown in Table 2.1. 
During Phase II the annual cap (ܥ௧) is equivalent to 2,083 MtCO2. Starting in Phase III 
(2013-2020) the cap will be linearly reduced over time. ܣܴ௧ represents this annual reduction 
of the cap (see row three in Table 2.1). The EU ETS directive states that the annual reduction 
is linear, calculated from the mid-point of Phase II (2008-2012), and equal to 1.74% of the 
average allowance cap between 2008 and 2012 (EC, 2009a). Because the reduction of the cap 
has started in 2013, but is calculated from the mid-point of Phase II (end of 2010), ܣܴ௧ is 
three times higher in 2013 (compared to later years) to make up for the fact that the cap 
remained constant throughout the last two years of Phase II. 
Stocks of and flows out of the NER are shown in row four (ܰܧܴ௦௧௢௖௞) and five 
(ܫܰܧܴ௧) of Table 2.1 respectively. Note that stock figures in the table represent the level of 
stock by the end of each respective year. ETS legislation states that any remainders in the 
                                                 
6 The 27 EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Croatia entered the EU in July 2013, and started 
participating in the EU ETS from the 1st of January of 2014 but was not considered in this analysis. 
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reserve by the end of Phase II can be auctioned or cancelled by the respective national 
governments holding the remainder. Assuming that national governments maximize their own 
welfare, we assume that any remaining allowances in the reserve are auctioned by each 
respective government controlling the left-over. That implies a total flow (ܫܰܧܴ௧) equivalent 
to 420 MtCO2 out of the reserve during 2012 and a depleted stock (ܰܧܴ௦௧௢௖௞) by the end of 
2012. The total flow in 2012 consists of 60 MtCO2 of allowances that we estimate to be 
issued to new installations and 360 MtCO2 worth of allowances that are left over in the 
reserve to be auctioned during 2012. 
The size of the Phase III NER is equal to 739 MtCO2 (5% of the Phase III cap). 
However, European policy makers have set aside 300 MtCO2 worth of allowances from this 
Phase III NER in a separate ‘NER300 program’ that starts already in 2008. Allowances in the 
NER300 program were set aside to be auctioned to firms already covered by the scheme, 
instead of being allocated to new entrants. The auction revenues are earmarked to support 
CCS demonstration projects and development of renewable energy technologies (EC, 2009a). 
Allowances reserved in the NER300 program were auctioned between 2011 and early 2013 
Table 2.1: Input parameters for allowance demand in MtCO2 during Phase II and IIIa 
  Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V 
t ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17 ‘18 ‘19 ‘20 ‘21 ‘22 ‘23 ‘24 ‘25 ‘26 ‘27 ‘28 ‘29 ‘30 
Ct  2,083 2,083 2,083 2,083 2,083 1,974 1,938 1,902 1,866 1,829 1,793 1,757 1,721 1,684 1,648 1,612 1,576 1,539 1,503 1,467 1,431 1,394 1,358 
ARt 0 0 0 0 0 109 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
NERstock 521 501 461 420 0 384 329 274 219 165 110 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INERt 0 20 40 40 420 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
300stock 300 300 300 280 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
300t 0 0 0 20 240 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LDt 82 82 137 254 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
AS t 2,061 2,081 2,156 2,294 2,754 2,085 2,010 1,976 1,941 1,907 1,873 1,838 1,804 1,799 1,762 1,726 1,690 1,654 1,617 1,581 1,545 1,509 1,472 
aThe Phase III NER is 5% (739 MtCO2) of the cap; all numbers are rounded and may not add up 
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until complete depletion of the stock.7 This is shown in row six (͵ͲͲ௦௧௢௖௞) and seven (͵ͲͲ௧) 
in Table 2.1 for the stock of and flow out of the NER300, respectively. 
Controlling for the NER300, 439 MtCO2 worth of allowances are still left in the Phase 
III NER at the start of 2013. This remainder is expected to be issued evenly (55 MtCO2 per 
annum) over the remaining years of Phase III. So at the end of 2013, the NEW stock equals 
439 - 55 = 384 MtCO2 (see ܰܧܴ௦௧௢௖௞ in Table 2.1). 
The final source of allowances that is present in Equation 2.1 is the Linking Directive 
(ܮܦ௧), which stipulates that installations are allowed to obtain CDM (Clean Development 
Mechanism) allowances on top of the official EU ETS cap. ܮܦ௧ represents the flow of 
allowances obtained via the Linking Directive in year ݐ. The amount of allowances obtained 
through this mechanism is limited to a theoretical maximum of 13.3% of the EU ETS cap in 
year ݐ during Phase II and to a total of 1,584 MtCO2 between 2008 and 2020 (Graus et al., 
2009). In 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, the realized number of obtained allowances was 82, 82, 
137 and 254 MtCO2 respectively. The remaining potential (an additional 1,029 MtCO2 can be 
obtained until the maximum of 13.3% is reached) is assumed to be used evenly over the 
remainder of Phase II and Phase III. Furthermore, the Linking Directive is assumed to be 
continued at the same rate after 2020 in the Base Case scenario. The effect of a possible 
discontinuation after 2020 is tested in Section 2.3.3. 
2.2.3. Allowance demand 
Total demand for allowances at the beginning of year ݐ, can be written as: 
 
ܣܦ௧ ൌ ሺܣܦ௧ିଵ െ ܶܣ௧ିଵ െ ܴܦ௧ିଵሻሺͳ ൅ ܧܩ௧ሻ ൅ ܴܦ௧ ൅ ܰܧ௧        ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ  (2.2) 
                                                 
7 The monetization of allowances from the NER300 program is undertaken by the European Investment Bank. A timeline of 
the monetization process is available on the project website: www.ner300.com. 
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The total demand for allowances in year ݐ is determined by the total allowance 
demand at the beginning of the previous year (ܣܦ௧ିଵ), reduced by the total level of abatement 
(ܶܣ௧ିଵ) and residual demand (ܴܦ௧ିଵ) in the previous  year. Residual demand can be positive 
if firms fail to surrender sufficient allowances to cover their emissions, otherwise ܴܦ௧ is equal 
to 0. Following the EU ETS directive (EC, 2009a), firms incur a non-compliance penalty of 
100 euros per tonne of CO2 if they fail to surrender sufficient allowances. On top of that 
penalty, non-compliant firms are obliged to buy (and surrender) extra allowances in the next 
year in order to cover these emissions. In our model, the extra demand for allowances is 
called ‘residual demand’, ܴܦ௧ is an endogenous model parameter that can be positive if the 
need for abatement potential and/or banked allowances is greater than the potential/stock 
available in any year of the simulation. 
ܴܦ௧ିଵ is subtracted from the total demand in the previous year (ܣܦ௧ିଵ) in Equation 
2.2 because it is not structural; it is a consequence of compliance failure in year ݐ െ ʹ. The 
structural demand from the previous year is multiplied by a growth factor (ͳ ൅ ܧܩ௧), where 
the latter term (ܧܩ௧) is a stochastically sampled percentage growth of emissions in year ݐ. 
Finally, the total demand for allowance is determined by adding residual demand at ݐ (ܴܦ௧) 
and the demand of new entrants to the EU ETS (ܰܧ௧). 
In 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, the aggregate allowance demand under the EU 
ETS (ܣܦ௧) was equal to 2,118, 1,873, 1,934, 1,898 and 1,786 MtCO2, respectively. These 
values are used as exogenous inputs. For subsequent years, the level of emissions is simulated 
based on Equation 2.2.  
The parameter ܧܩ௧ captures the stochastically simulated market level volatility of 
allowance demand. The parameter is sampled in each year of the simulation from a normal 
distribution with a mean of 0.33% and a standard deviation of 2.08%. The mean of the 
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distribution is based on the projected average growth of emissions in EU ETS sectors until 
2030. We assume a mean emissions growth of 0.33% based on World Energy Outlook 
estimates (IEA, 2009) and the GHG abatement studies by McKinsey (Enkvist and Naucler, 
2009; Enkvist et al., 2010).8 The standard deviation is based on the historical standard 
deviation of industry level emissions, which was 2.08% for European industrial sectors 
between 1990 and 2008 (EEA, 2011b).  
In 2009, emissions under the EU ETS decreased by more than 10% (EEA, 2011b) 
following the worldwide financial crisis that started in late 2008. This steep drop in emissions 
contrasts sharply with otherwise fairly stable emissions levels. Due to the severity and 
uniqueness of the economic crisis that followed, this observation was excluded when 
calculating the historical standard deviation in industrial carbon emissions. However, the 
impact of another crisis year with a similar magnitude is tested as a separate scenario in 
Section 2.3.3. 
ܰܧ௧ is equal to the added CO2 emissions from new entrants to the EU ETS, which 
primarily replace old installations that are decommissioned (Lewis, 2008). As a result, ܰܧ௧ is 
not equal to the number of issued allowances from the NER (indicated by ܫܰܧܴ௧, see Table 
2.1 for the input values). Instead we assume that9  
 
ܰܧ௧ ൌ ͳ ͵ൗ ܫܰܧܴ௧    ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ     (2.3) 
 
Finally, ܶܣ௧ିଵ represents the total abatement efforts in the previous year through the 
deployment of abatement technologies in MtCO2. Obviously, we account for these abatement 
                                                 
8 This is a scenario where abatement levers are assumed to be implemented at the historical pace thereby controlling for a 
ramp-up in abatement efforts following the introduction of the EU ETS. 
9 This holds with an exception for 2012, where ܰܧݐ ൌ  ሺܫܰܧܴ௧Ȃ ͵͸Ͳሻ.  360 MtCO2 represents the leftover in the Phase II 
NER and is auctioned without any new installations entering the scheme. 
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efforts to calculate the demand for allowances in year ݐ. ܶܣ௧ିଵ is an endogenous model 
parameter and will be further specified in Section 2.2.5. 
2.2.4. Allowance banking 
Allowance demand is subtracted from allowance supply to arrive at the gross 
allowance surplus in year ݐ: 
 
ܩܣܵ௧ ൌ ܣܵ௧ െ ܣܦ௧                     ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ   (2.4) 
 
Positive values imply a surplus, while negative values imply a shortage of allowances 
in year ݐ. A surplus is added to the existing reserve of banked allowances (ܤܣ௧) while a 
shortage would lead to usage of banked allowances and a reduction of the reserve. That is: 
 
ܫ݂ܩܣܵ௧ ൒ Ͳݐ݄݁݊ܤܣ௧ାଵ ൌ ܤܣ௧ ൅ ܩܣܵ௧       ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ          (2.5.1) 
ܫ݂ܩܣܵ௧ ൏ Ͳݐ݄݁݊ܤܣ௧ାଵ ൌ ܤܣ௧ െ ܷܤܣ௧            ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ          (2.5.2)
    
If the market is in surplus, the change in the stock of banked allowances is equal to the 
gross allowance surplus (ܩܣܵ௧). Alternatively, in case of allowance scarcity, the stock is 
reduced by the number of used banked allowances at ݐ (ܷܤܣ௧). How we determine ܷܤܣ௧ will 
be explained below. At the start of the simulation in 2008, there are no allowances in the 
reserve (ܤܣ௧ୀଶ଴଴଼ ൌ Ͳ). Of course, the amount of used banked allowances is no larger than 
the (negative) gross allowance surplus, hence ܷܤܣ௧ ൑ ȁܩܣܵ௧ȁ. 
By controlling for the usage of banked allowances, we arrive at the net allowance 
surplus (ܰܣܵ௧) that determines the abatement in year ݐ: 
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ܫ݂ܩܣܵ௧ ൏ Ͳݐ݄݁݊ܰܣܵ௧ ൌ ܩܣܵ௧ ൅ ܷܤܣ௧ ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ            (2.6.1) 
ܫ݂ܩܣܵ௧ ൒ Ͳݐ݄݁݊ܰܣܵ௧ ൌ Ͳ   ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                     (2.6.2) 
 
If the market for allowances is in surplus (ܩܣܵ௧ ൐ Ͳ), the level of abatement is 0, 
otherwise Equation 2.6.1 holds.  
In case of allowance scarcity, the gross allowance scarcity is equal to the sum of 
carbon abatement activity and the use of banked allowances in that year (ȁܩܣܵ௧ȁ ൌ ȁܰܣܵ௧ȁ ൅
ܷܤܣ௧). Carbon abatement and the use of banked allowances are substitutes regarding EU ETS 
compliance. Firms can comply with EU ETS regulation either by investing in CO2 abatement 
technologies, or by using banked allowances to cover their emissions. We determine the 
equilibrium between these two substitutes based on their relative cost. In the process, we find 
the equilibrium allowance price (ܨܥܲܫ௧). Below, we will explain this procedure in a detailed 
manner. 
An example of an equilibrium between CO2 abatement efforts and the use of banked 
allowances is shown in Figure 2.1 (for a randomly simulated year ݐ). The ݔ-axis shows that 
the gross allowance scarcity (ȁܩܣܵ௧ȁ) in this example is 88 MtCO2. In equilibrium, the sum of 
abatement efforts (ȁܰܣܵ௧ȁ) and the use of banked allowances (ܷܤܣ௧) covers the entire gross 
allowance surplus. The CO2 price is shown on the y-axis.  
The two curves (Demand for the Use of Banked Allowances and Supply of Abatement 
Technologies) depict the use of banked allowances and the relative cost of CO2 abatement 
respectively. Note that, if the CO2 price equals zero, both the amount of abatement (ȁܰܣܵ௧ȁ) 
and the use of banked allowances (ܷܤܣ௧) equal zero (ܷܤܣ௧ should be read from right to left 
on the x-axis, as indicated by the arrow). As the CO2 price increases, more abatement 
technologies become economically viable, and hence abatement efforts increase. Also, as the 
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CO2 price increases, more firms are willing to use their banked allowances. Demand for the 
use of banked allowances refers to the desire of the owner of the banked allowance to use it in 
order to comply with ETS regulation. Using a banked allowance becomes more interesting 
with a rising CO2 price because the alternative to using a banked allowance is buying 
allowances on the exchange against the going CO2 price. The equilibrium CO2 price (ܨܥܲܫ௧) 
is found where both curves intersect. The shapes and assumptions behind the two curves will 
now be described in more detail. 
The relative costs associated to CO2 abatement are represented by the Supply of 
Abatement Technologies curve. This curve shows at which allowance price a specific 
technology becomes available to investors as an economically viable investment option. 
Logically, the higher the ܨܥܲܫ (depicted on the ݕ-axis), the more technologies become 
economically viable, and the more firms are willing to invest in CO2 abatement. Note that, in 
the sampled year ݐ that is depicted in Figure 2.1, the lowest-cost abatement opportunities have 
a near-zero CO2 price level above which they become economically viable. This is because 
we have assigned a cost of €0.01 to abatement opportunities that, in the original data set, were 
estimated to be available at a negative cost. These negative-cost abatement opportunities 
represent technologies where the life-cycle savings outweigh the costs. Due to the usual lead-
times in investment in new technologies by firms and their acting only on no-regret options 
that they consider to be sustainable, we have assumed that firms will not immediately 
capitalize on these no-regret abatement opportunities but only when faced with allowance 
scarcity. We assign a marginally low positive CO2 price to reflect this assumption. Also, by 
eliminating negative cost levels in this manner, we ensure that the demand and supply curve 
will always intersect within the interval ሾͲǡ ܩܣܵ௧ሿ on the x-axis. Specifics on the abatement 
technologies data set are further described at the end of section 2.2.5. 
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The Demand for Use of Banked Allowances curve in Figure 2.1 depicts the relative 
cost of using banked allowances. In absence of empirical data to estimate the shape of the 
curve, we make some simplifying assumptions. First, the relationship between the CO2 price 
and the use of banked allowances is assumed to be linear. Second, at a CO2 price of zero, the 
use of banked allowances is also zero. Firms have an incentive to hold on to all of their 
banked allowances if the price is 0 euros per allowance because additional allowances can be 
bought via the exchange (if needed) against zero cost. By refraining from using banked 
allowances, a firm can fully benefit from potential upward movements in the CO2 price as the 
value of the portfolio of banked allowances would increase in that case. Third, if the CO2 
price equals the non-compliance penalty of 100 euros per allowance in year ݐ, emitters fully 
rely on banked allowances to comply with ETS regulation (note that the curve intercepts the 
ݕ-axis at a ܨܥܲܫ level of 100 euros).  
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We assume that the non-compliance penalty is viewed by emitters as the price ceiling. 
We do so because the non-compliance penalty has purposefully been set well above the 
anticipated CO2 market price to deter firms from non-compliance (i.e. to ensure that 
compliance with ETS regulation is always cheaper the penalty on non-compliance). Note that, 
in reality, the level of the non-compliance penalty may not necessarily act as hard price 
ceiling. This is because non-compliance also implies that firms have to buy additional 
allowances in the subsequent year to make up for the non-compliant behaviour (defined as 
residual demand in section 2.2.3). These additional costs, that depend on the future CO2 price 
level, could be considered as an integral part of the non-compliance penalty. We disregard 
this potential driver of the price ceiling for three reasons. First, these additional costs accrue 
only to those emitters that have been non-compliant (and not to the entire market). Second, 
inclusion of a forecast of the CO2 price would overly complicate the analysis. Third, if the 
market price approaches the current level of the non-compliance penalty, regulators are likely 
to respond by increasing the level of the non-compliance penalty. We assume that firms do 
not anticipate such regulatory adjustments. 
At intermediate levels of the allowance price, in between zero and the price ceiling, 
the usage of banked allowances depends on firm-level allowance price expectations and 
investment opportunities.  
We assume that across Europe firm-level price expectations and investment 
opportunities are heterogeneous. For example, some firms use (hold on to) their banked 
allowances at an intermediate level of the allowance price given their relatively low (high) 
price expectation or access to (lack of) alternative investment opportunities with a higher 
return. Logically, the number of firms that is willing to use banked allowances grows as the 
allowance price increases. 
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Formally, the Demand for the Use of Banked Allowances curve is defined as: 
 
ܫ݂ܩܣܵ௧ ൏ Ͳݐ݄݁݊ܨܥܲܫ௧ ൌ ܰܥ ௧ܲ ൅ ே஼௉೟ீ஺ௌ೟ ሺȁܩܣܵ௧ȁ െ ܷܤܣ௧ሻ  
݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                           (2.7.1) 
ܫ݂ܩܣܵ௧ ൒ Ͳݐ݄݁݊ܨܥܲܫ௧ ൌ Ͳ   ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ            (2.7.2) 
 
ܰܥ ௧ܲ is the non-compliance penalty and ሺܰܥ ௧ܲ ܩܣܵ௧Τ ሻ is the slope of the Demand for 
the Use of Banked Allowances curve. If the demand and supply for allowances result in a 
surplus in year ݐ (ܩܣܵ௧ ൒ Ͳ), no banked allowances are used and neither is there a need for 
abatement. Consequently, the allowance price falls to zero (ܨܥܲܫ௧ ൌ Ͳ).  
 
ܷܤܣ௧ ൌ ȁீ஺ௌ೟ȁே஼௉೟ ܨܥܲܫ௧                 (2.8) 
From equations 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 we find that the use of banked allowances in year ݐ 
(ܷܤܣ௧) depends on the gross allowance shortage, the non-compliance penalty and the 
equilibrium CO2 price in year ݐ.10 Note from Equation 2.7.2 that no banked allowances are 
used (ܷܤܣ௧ ൌ Ͳ) if that market for allowances is in surplus (ܩܣܵ௧ ൒ Ͳ). 
In Figure 2.1, we find in equilibrium that the amount of abatement in year ݐ equals 51 
MtCO2, the use of banked allowances equals 37 MtCO2 and the FCPI equals €43. While 
Figure 2.1 depicted a scenario with plentiful abatement opportunities and plentiful banked 
allowances, Figure 2.2 presents a scenario with limited technical abatement potential. The 
technical abatement potential that is available (38 MtCO2) is less than the gross scarcity of  
                                                 
10 Our linear approach in this study regarding the use of banked allowances is based on relatively simply assumptions 
regarding the banking strategies that firms apply. Among others, we have not explicitly considered the possibility of non-
linearity (e.g. a convex, concave or s-shaped curve (Allen, 1938)), dynamically changing carbon price expectations, the 
historical build-up of banked allowances and who holds the stock (e.g. emitters that hold reserves for compliance purposes 
versus investors that hold the allowances for speculative reasons (Neuhoff et al., 2012)). Further research in this regard could 
help to further improve the explanatory value of simulation results. Such an analysis, however, is outside the scope of this 
study. 
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Figure 2.2: Non-compliance, equilibrium with limited abatement potential 
 
Figure 2.3: Non-compliance, equilibrium with limited abatement potential and banked allowances 
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allowances (88 MtCO2). Therefore, a minimum of 50 MtCO2 of banked allowances is needed 
to bring the market back into equilibrium. In order to reach that equilibrium, bidding for  
allowances continues until the carbon price reaches €58. At that level, a sufficient number of 
firms with banked allowances are willing to sell these (51 MtCO2) for the market to clear. 
Another special case is depicted in Figure 2.3, with the market having both limited 
abatement potential and limited banked allowances. Compared to Figure 2.2, the gross 
scarcity of allowances and the amount of abatement remain unchanged at 88 MtCO2 and 37 
MtCO2, respectively. However, the use of banked allowances by firms is just 17 MtCO2, 
thereby depleting the stock. With no other options left11, firms are forced to pay the non-
compliance penalty of €100 for each tonne of CO2 emissions that is not covered by a 
surrendered carbon allowance. In case of non-compliance, the carbon price rises to the level 
of the penalty. 
 
Taking the possibility of non-compliance into account, we add a term to Equation 
2.6.1: 
 
ܫ݂ܩܣܵ௧ ൑ Ͳݐ݄݁݊ܰܣܵ௧ ൌ ܩܣܵ௧ ൅ ܷܤܣ௧ ൅ ܰܥ௧ ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ           (2.6.3) 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, apart from paying a penalty, European legislation 
states that firms are obliged to buy (and surrender) extra allowances in year ݐ ൅ ͳ to make up 
for any non-compliance in year ݐ.  
Therefore, 
 
                                                 
11 Lowering of the production volume and/or carbon leakage is not considered in this study. 
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ܴܦ௧ାଵ ൌ ܰܥ௧  ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ          (2.9) 
 
Legislators are likely to raise the non-compliance penalty once the carbon price 
approaches the current level of the penalty to discourage non-compliance. Therefore, we 
assume that the non-compliance penalty for the subsequent year is automatically increased by 
€5 each time the difference between the FCPI and the NCP is less than €10: 
 
ܫ݂ܰܥ ௧ܲିଵ െ ܨܥܲܫ௧ିଵ ൏ ͳͲݐ݄݁݊ܰܥ ௧ܲ ൌ ܰܥ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ͷ  ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ         (2.10.1) 
ܫ݂ܰܥ ௧ܲିଵ െ ܨܥܲܫ௧ିଵ ൒ ͳͲݐ݄݁݊ܰܥ ௧ܲ ൌ ܰܥ ௧ܲିଵ     ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ         (2.10.2) 
2.2.5. Deployment of abatement technologies 
Given a need for abatement at ݐ (ܰܣܵ௧ ൏ Ͳ), the lowest-cost abatement opportunities 
are applied first, and others follow in merit-order, to minimize the overall costs of 
deployment. This linear optimization problem thus resembles a ‘knapsack problem,’ where 
each technology has an equal weight (1 tCO2) but a varying value (marginal cost per tonne 
abated). The mathematical specification then becomes: 
 
݉݅݊σ ܯܣܥ௧௞ܦܥ௧௞ݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐݐ݋ σ ܦܥ௧௞ ൌ ȁܰܣܵ௧ȁݓ݄݁ݎ݁ܦܥ௧௞ א ሼͲǡͳǡ ǥ ǡ ܶܣܥ௧௞ሽ଻଼௞ୀଵ଻଼௞ୀଵ    
݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                    (2.11) 
Here, ܯܣܥ௧௞
 
is the marginal abatement cost and ܦܥ௧௞
 
is the deployed capacity of 
technology ݇ at ݐ. A total of 78 abatement technologies are included. The deployable capacity 
of each technology is limited by ܶܣܥ௧௞, the total abatement capacity of technology ݇ at ݐ. The 
scope for a specific technology ݇ in year ݐ will be evaluated based on: 
 
ܶܦܥ௧௞ ൌ σ ܦܥ௦௞௧௦ୀଶ଴଴଼   ݂݋ݎ݇ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡ͹ͺሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ             (2.12) 
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Here, ܶܦܥ௧௞ is the cumulatively deployed capacity of technology ݇ since the start of 
the simulation. Total abatement across all technologies in year ݐ alone (ܶܣ௧, see also Equation 
2.2) is equal to the cumulatively deployed capacity of all individual technologies at ݐ: 
 
ܶܣ௧ ൌ σ ܦܥ௧௞଻଼௞ୀଵ    ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ               (2.13) 
 
Data on the abatement capacities and marginal costs of technologies across EU ETS 
sectors in the 27 EU-members were taken from the global GHG abatement studies by 
McKinsey (Enkvist and Naucler, 2009; Enkvist et al., 2010). This dataset was used because of 
its geographical and multi-sector scope which matches the coverage of the EU ETS. The data 
is based on the original study in 2009 and was updated in 2010 to reflect higher fossil fuel 
prices and post-crisis expectations with respect to economic growth and the associated 
‘business-as-usual’ emission levels. Marginal costs have been calculated assuming an upward 
trending oil price reaching 110 dollars per barrel in 2030 and an 8% interest rate to reflect 
private sector financing rates. The marginal costs have been converted to 2010 prices. All of 
the identified abatement potential from the power, cement, chemicals, petroleum & gas and 
iron & steel sectors is included in the study. 
As far as the data is concerned, background information on the applied methods 
(Enkvist and Naucler, 2009) and recent updates and worldwide cost and capacity estimates 
(Enkvist et al., 2010) can be found in the original reports.  
 
2.3. Results 
The Base Case simulation results are presented in Section 2.3.1. The sensitivity of the 
results to key assumptions and currently proposed adjustments to ETS regulation is tested in 
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Section 2.3.3. Special attention is assigned to the effect of macro-economic allowance 
demand shocks (double-dip) on the results.  
 
2.3.1. The Base Case 
The confidence interval of the FCPI is given in Figure 2.4. Key statistics regarding the 
ETS are summarized in Table 2.2. Next to the FCPI, these statistics include the cumulative 
amount of abatement incentivized under the EU ETS, the emission level under the scheme 
(ܣܦ௧ െ ܴܦ௧) and the stock of banked allowances (ܤܣ௧).  
In the first year of the simulation (2008), the market experienced a shortage of 
allowances which is reflected by a carbon allowance price of €31 (see Figure 2.4). The 
development of the FCPI resembles the pattern of the actual allowance market price 
development which peaked around €31 in 2008. By the end of 2008, the allowance price had 
dropped steeply as a result of the worldwide financial crisis. Carbon emissions dropped by 
more than 10% in 2009 (EC, 2010) which led to a build-up of allowances in later years (see 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6). 
On average, until 2016, a surplus of allowances (ܩܣܵ௧) is expected, after which the 
market is forecasted to experience allowance shortages until 2030. The confidence interval is 
shown in Figure 2.5. 
Table 2.2: Simulation statistics (rounded) – Base Case 
Output Parameter / t 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Mean Overall Abatement (MtCO2/yr) 58 59 219 384 601 
Mean Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€)* 0 1 31 45 38 
Mean Total Emissions under the EU ETS (MtCO2) * 1,934 1,870 1,882 1,737 1,552 
Banked Allowances (MtCO2) * 431 2,326 2,347 2,184 1,976 
* See Figures 2.4, 2.6 and 2.7 for the confidence intervals 
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Figure 2.4: Fundamental EUA price – Base Case  
 
 
Figure 2.5: Annual gross allowance balance (in MtCO2) – Base Case 
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Figure 2.6: Stock of banked allowances – Base Case 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Emission level under the EU ETS (in MtCO2/yr) – Base Case 
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The allowance surplus trajectory is reflected by the FCPI which is €0 in 2010, 
increases to €1 five years later and steeply climbs in subsequent years. As visualized in Figure 
2.4, the price is forecasted to peak at an average of €45 in 2025 and subsequently to fall back 
to €38 in 2030.  
The downward trend between 2025 and 2030 is the result of a larger availability of 
abatement potential combined with declining marginal abatement costs due to technological 
learning and a rising oil price. On average, 601 MtCO2 of abatement is expected to be 
triggered by the EU ETS by 2030. However, as Figure 2.8 shows, there is considerable 
uncertainty around this number because the emissions growth rate (ܧܩ௧) is uncertain (in part 
driven by uncertain economic growth prospects). The standard deviation is 141 MtCO2 and 
the lower and upper bound of the 80% confidence interval are 424 and 784 MtCO2 
respectively. In general, firms under the scheme thus face considerable investment uncertainty 
towards 2030.  
Figure 2.8: Forecasted total abatement triggered by EU ETS until 2030 – Base Case  
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2.3.2. CCS deployment 
Given the range of types of CCS and sectors in which it can be deployed, the scope for 
CCS in the Base Case is analysed at three different aggregation levels. Firstly, we look at the 
total deployment of CCS across all technology types ݇ of all sectors combined in year ݐ. 
Secondly, we analyse the totals per sector. Finally, we analyse the deployment level of each 
individual CCS technology type ݇. 
2.3.2.1. TOTAL DEPLOYMENT OF CCS 
Whereas the FCPI shows a downward trend from 2025 onwards, the total average 
scope for CCS progressively grows over time (see Figure 2.9). On average, 83 MtCO2/yr of 
CCS abatement capacity is expected to be required across all sectors under the EU ETS by 
2030. The ‘total CCS requirement’ frequency distribution for 2030, displayed in Figure 2.10, 
is skewed to the right (skewness = 0.91) and has “thick” tails (kurtosis = 3.19). The median is 
58 MtCO2/yr which is lower than the average, indicating that the deployment rate is likely to 
be significantly below the average. 
2.3.2.2. SECTORAL DEPLOYMENT OF CCS 
As far as the CCS deployment at a sectoral level is concerned, Table 2.3 shows that on 
average 67 MtCO2/yr of CCS-based abatement is forecasted to be deployed in 2030 in the 
power sector, 14 MtCO2/yr in the iron & steel sector, and 2 MtCO2/yr in the chemicals sector, 
while in the petroleum & gas and the cement sectors no abatement potential is found. The 
associated confidence intervals are positively skewed, i.e. most of the observations lie below 
reported means for 2030. In fact, regarding the cement, petroleum & gas and chemicals 
sectors, Table 2.4 shows a 90% probability that the CCS deployment levels in these sectors 
will have values below 0 MtCO2/yr, 0 MtCO2/yr and 3 MtCO2/yr respectively. 
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Figure 2.9: Total deployment of CCS in 2030 (in MtCO2/yr) – Base Case 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Total cumulative deployment of CCS (in MtCO2/yr) – Base Case 
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Table 2.3: CCS deployment at a sectoral level in MtCO2/yr (rounded) – Base Case 
CCS requirement to comply with EU ETS regulation 
2020 2025 2030 
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Skewness Kurtosis 
Cement Sector CCS requirement 0 0 0 0 0 1 22.25 533.21 
Chemicals Sector CCS requirement 0 0 1 3 2 4 5.26 35.30 
Iron & Steel Sector CCS requirement 0 0 9 12 14 18 1.12 3.33 
Petroleum & Gas CCS requirement 0 0 0 1 0 2 10.23 117.70 
Power Sector CCS requirement 0 1 8 7 67 50 0.65 2.22 
Total CCS requirement 0 1 17 21 83 68 0.91 3.19 
 
Although the average deployment level is highest in the power sector, its standard 
deviation is also the highest (see Table 2.3). Furthermore, the kurtosis statistic indicates that 
the power sector probability distribution is the flattest. This indicates that investment 
uncertainty is most pronounced in the power sector. 
2.3.2.3. CCS DEPLOYMENT BY TECHNOLOGY TYPE 
Table 2.5 outlines the forecasted scope for CCS deployment by technology type. In 
2020, no deployment of CCS is expected, possibly with the exception of newly built gas-fired 
power plants although their deployment is in any case little and likely to be zero. In 2025, the 
increased scarcity of allowances leads to higher average deployment levels in the power, 
Table 2.4: Percentiles of deployment in 2030 in MtCO2/yr (rounded) – Base Case 
Percentile 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Cement Sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
Chemicals Sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 42 
Iron & Steel Sector 0 0 0 0 0 14 17 33 38 76 
Petroleum & Gas Sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 
Power Sector 14 28 28 38 52 69 94 120 152 235 
Total requirement 14 28 29 39 58 86 117 149 191 397 
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chemical, iron & steel sectors, with the cement sector being a notable exception. The highest 
deployment levels are found for newly built and retrofitted coal-fired power plants, as well as 
for newly built and retrofitted plants in the iron & steel sector. By 2030, a similar but more 
pronounced pattern is visible as a result of continued average allowance shortages and 
decreasing marginal costs of deployment. 
2.3.2.4. THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY 
The standard deviations in Tables 2.3 and 2.5 reveal that the macro-level uncertainty, 
originating from allowance demand volatility, has a considerable impact on the scope for 
Table 2.5: CCS Deployment differentiated by type in MtCO2/yr (rounded) – Base Case 
Technology / t 2020 2025 2030 
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Skewness Kurtosis 
Cement - Post Combustion new build 0 0 0 0 0 0 15.16 257.07 
Cement - Post Combustion retrofit 0 0 0 0 0 0 25.76 664.67 
Chemicals – Ammonia new build 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.81 38.91 
Chemicals – Ammonia retrofit 0 0 0 1 0 1 5.31 35.70 
Chemicals – Direct energy new build 0 0 0 0 1 1 3.84 22.66 
Chemicals – Direct energy retrofit 0 0 1 3 1 3 5.27 34.21 
Iron & Steel – CCS new build 0 0 3 3 8 9 0.75 2.42 
Iron & Steel – CCS retrofit 0 0 6 9 6 10 1.49 4.13 
Petroleum & Gas – Downstream CCS 0 0 0 1 0 2 10.23 117.70 
Power – Biomass CCS new build 0 0 0 0 0 2 24.31 611.30 
Power – Coal CCS new build 0 0 2 4 38 43 0.88 2.30 
Power – Coal CCS new build with Enhanced Oil 
Recovery (EOR) 0 0 1 0 5 1 -2.90 10.31 
Power – Coal CCS retrofit 0 0 4 2 19 6 -2.26 6.79 
Power – Gas CCS new build 0 1 0 1 0 1 2.25 6.13 
Power – Gas CCS new build with EOR 0 0 0 0 7 4 -0.70 1.60 
Power – Gas CCS retrofit 0 0 0 0 0 0 21.24 511.57 
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CCS. Sources of uncertainty, besides allowance demand volatility, have not been taken into 
account. As a result, the confidence intervals are an indication of the ability of the ETS to 
drive investments in abatement technologies: the larger the confidence interval, the greater the 
investment uncertainty for investors and the lower the abatement impact of the ETS.  
2.3.3. Sensitivity Analysis  
In this section, the sensitivity of the results to key assumptions and currently proposed 
adjustments to ETS regulation is tested and compared to the base case (Scenario 1.0).   
First of all, the stock of banked allowances that has been built up since 2008 is likely 
to have an impact on the scope for CCS. Banked allowances provide degrees of freedom to 
the industry, and thus may reduce the need for immediate abatement. Scenario 1.1 tests the 
case in which no CDM credits are allowed after 2020 (ܮܦ௧ ൌ Ͳ after 2020, see Equation 2.1). 
In Scenario 1.2, the potential effect of a much more stringent allowance allocation 
regime is tested. An amendment to that end, e.g. implying an increased linear reduction rate of 
2.25% per annum (up from 1.74%) starting in 2013, was proposed by the European 
Parliament Environment Commission in December 2011. If the amendment were to be 
accepted, it would lead to reduced allowance supply until 2030 by approximately 2.2 billion 
allowances. 
In Scenario 1.3, we test a scenario assuming that only 50% of the nuclear power potential is 
available (ͳ ʹൗ ܶܣܥ௧௞ୀ௡௨௖௟௘௔௥, see Equation 2.11). In the wake of the Fukushima meltdown in 
March 2011, public and political support for nuclear energy production has decreased. As a 
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Table 2.6: Summary sensitivity analysis  
Scenario Output Parameter 2020 2025 2030 2030∆ 
1.0: Base Case 
(The Base Case) 
Mean Cumulative Abatement (MtCO2) 219 385 601 - 
Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€) 31 45 38 - 
Mean/Median CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 / 0 17 / 6 83 / 58 - 
Stdev CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 1 21 68 - 
Probability of non-compliance (%) 0 0 0 - 
1.1: BC EG + No CDM after 2020 
(The Base Case economic growth 
assumptions, but no CDM linking after 2020) 
Mean Cumulative Abatement (MtCO2) 218 465 705 +104 
Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€) 31 60 46 +8 
Mean/Median CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 / 0 37 / 41 135 / 133 +52/+75 
Stdev CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 1 27 80 +12 
Probability of non-compliance (%) 0 0 1 +1 
1.2: BC EG + EP Amendment 
(The Base Case economic growth 
assumptions, but -2.25% linear cap reduction) 
Mean Cumulative Abatement (MtCO2) 283 484 767 +166 
Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€) 47 63 54 +16 
Mean/Median CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 1 / 0 41 / 48 175 / 187 +92/+129 
Stdev CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 3 28 77 +9 
Probability of non-compliance (%) 0 0 3 +3 
1.3: BC EG + Low Nuclear Potential 
(The Base Case economic growth 
assumptions, 50% of nuclear potential) 
Mean Cumulative Abatement (MtCO2) 211 372 591 -10 
Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€) 35 49 43 +5 
Mean/Median CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 / 0 22 / 13 109 / 101 +26/+43 
Stdev CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 2 24 76 +8 
Probability of non-compliance (%) 0 0 0 +0 
1.4: BC EG + No CDM + EP Compromise + 
Low Nuclear Potential 
(BC EG + compromise on ETS correction + 
other restrictions in Scenarios 1.1 & 1.3) 
Mean Cumulative Abatement (MtCO2) 245 497 775 +174 
Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€) 44 69 58 +20 
Mean/Median CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 1 / 0 58 / 59 213 / 214 +130/+156 
Stdev CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 2 26 79 +11 
Probability of non-compliance (%) 0 1 7 +7 
2.0: Double Dip 
(Carbon output falls by 7% in 2013 following 
a big economic shock) 
Mean Cumulative Abatement (MtCO2) 138 297 503 -98 
Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€) 14 30 31 -7 
Mean/Median CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 / 0 5 / 5 43 / 28 -40/-30 
Stdev CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 9 46 -22 
Probability of non-compliance (%) 0 0 0 +0 
2.1: DD EG + No CDM after 2020 
(Double Dip economic growth assumptions 
and no CDM linking after 2020) 
Mean Cumulative Abatement (MtCO2) 137 387 601 +0 
Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€) 14 47 39 +1 
Mean/Median CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 / 0 16 / 6 81 / 61 -2/+3 
Stdev CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 18 63 -5 
Probability of non-compliance (%) 0 0 0 +0 
2.2: DD EG + EP Amendment 
(Double Dip economic growth assumptions 
and -2.25% linear cap reduction) 
Mean Cumulative Abatement (MtCO2) 209 407 669 +68 
Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€) 28 52 48 +10 
Mean/Median CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 / 0 19 / 14 121 / 123 +38/+65 
Stdev CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 19 69 +1 
Probability of non-compliance (%) 0 0 0 +0 
2.3: DD EG + Low Nuclear Potential 
(Double Dip economic growth assumptions 
and 50% of nuclear potential) 
Mean Cumulative Abatement (MtCO2) 138 297 502 -99 
Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€) 17 36 37 -1 
Mean/Median CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 / 0 8 / 5 66 / 38 -17/-20 
Stdev CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 12 59 -9 
Probability of non-compliance (%) 0 0 0 +0 
2.4: DD EG + EP Compromise + No CDM + 
Low Nuclear Potential 
(DD EG + compromise on ETS correction and 
other restrictions from Scenario 2.1 & 2.3) 
Mean Cumulative Abatement (MtCO2) 170 428 679 +78 
Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (€) 24 60 51 +13 
Mean/Median CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 / 0 34 / 36 158 / 172 +75/+114 
Stdev CCS requirement (MtCO2/yr) 0 25 69 +1 
Probability of non-compliance (%) 0 0 0 +0 
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Finally, a combination of all measures is tested in Scenario 1.4. However, because we 
consider the 2.25% linear reduction of the allowance cap (that was tested in Scenario 1.2) to 
be ambitious and therefore likely to face serious political opposition on the European level as 
well as the member-state level, it is replaced by a political compromise alternative. The 
compromise entails an increased linear reduction rate of 2% per annum (up from 1.74%) 
starting in 2013. Scenario 1.4 thus combines a strong reduction of allowance allocation and a 
reduction of a prominent abatement alternative to CCS.  
All scenarios have been tested twice. The second round of Scenarios (2.0 to 2.4) 
assumes that the economy ends up in an economic ‘double-dip’ in 2014. A ‘double dip’ here 
means that we assume that the emission level falls by 7% in 2014 and will recover by a 2% 
increase in 2015. This pattern resembles the 2009-2010 period. Emissions under the EU ETS 
dropped by more than 11% in 2009 following the financial and economic crisis that initiated 
in late 2008 (EC, 2010) and recovered around 3% one year later (EC, 2011). The fall and 
slight recovery of the emission level over the 2009-2010 period was already accounted for in 
the Base Case. By assuming a similar, yet slightly less pronounces emission growth pattern 
over the years 2014-2015, we implicitly account for the possibility of another economic shock 
that leads to a net fall in the emission output.   
Table 2.6 shows that the scope for CCS increases substantially if allowance supply is 
restricted. As the same time, lower availability of nuclear power generation drives up average 
marginal abatement costs (€43 in 2030) and the average requirement for CCS (109 
MtCO2/yr). The combination of all restrictions (in Scenario 1.4) increases the mean CCS 
requirement in 2030 to 213 MtCO2/yr, up from 83 MtCO2/yr in the Base Case. The standard 
deviation of CCS requirement increases strongly in Scenarios 1.1-1.4 compared to the Base 
Case, which signals an increase in underlying uncertainty of CCS deployment. The latter 
501077-L-bw-Mulder
62  Will the EU ETS drive investments in CCS? 
 
increase can be explained by the fact that firms which hold a relatively expensive CCS 
potential and previously did not have to consider an investment, now face investment 
uncertainty under a tightened cap.  
In Scenarios 1.2 and 1.4, the probability of non-compliance increases from 0% in the 
Base Case to a modest 3 and 7 percent respectively.  
Scenarios 2.0-2.4 show that the impact of allowance supply restrictions on the FCPI 
and the requirement of CCS can be largely undone by assuming a short ‘double-dip’ during 
2014-2015.  
 
The standard deviations of CCS requirement are lower in Scenarios 2.0-2.3, because 
the ‘double-dip’ lowers the probability that medium to high-cost CCS alternatives will be 
activated by the EU ETS, or that firms will be forced into non-compliance. 
Figure 2.11: Total deployment of CCS in 2030 (in MtCO2/yr) – Scenario 1.4 
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Scenario 1.4 provides the largest scope for CCS. The probability distribution of the 
total level of deployment according to this scenario is shown in Figure 2.11, with an average 
deployment level of 213 MtCO2/yr. Furthermore, the peak on the outer-right of the 
distribution in Figure 2.11 shows that there is a 7% probability of full deployment. Full 
deployment of all available abatement technology is linked to non-compliance. Non-
compliance results when the allowance supply regime is so strongly restricted that firms lack 
sufficient abatement opportunities or banked allowances to comply with ETS regulation 
(hence all abatement capacity that is available is deployed). The peak thus signals that the 
simulated ETS regime may seriously constrain the firms that are covered by the scheme. In 
reality, firms may also choose to lower their production levels, or move their production 
facilities to a less regulated country. Such responses are not modelled here, yet they would 
anyhow imply that firms would be under significant stress via the EU ETS.  
2.4. Discussion 
Direct comparison of the results presented above with forecasted CCS deployment 
rates in other studies (e.g. Odenberger et al., 2008; Broek et al., 2010; Odenberger and 
Johnson, 2010; Broek et al., 2011; IEA, 2011) is difficult, due to the large differences in 
approach and assumptions, as well as in geographical, sectoral and technical scope. However, 
the results in the previous section seem to suggest, on average, a smaller scope for CCS across 
all sectors until 2030 than found in the above studies. For example, Odenberger et al. (2008) 
projected a 2030 CCS deployment rate of approximately 300 MtCO2/yr in the electricity 
sector in Northern Europe alone (Germany, UK, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway), 
while Broek et al. (2010) estimated a capture rate of approximately 95 MtCO2 per annum in 
the Netherlands by 2030 (about 40 MtCO2/yr of which was to be imported from German and 
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Belgian sources). Moreover, in our study, CCS deployment is expected to fall short of the 
IEA estimates for industrial sectors (excluding the power sector). In their BLUE Map 
scenario, IEA (2011) expects that by 2030 a deployment of roughly 100 MtCO2/yr will be 
required in OECD Europe, while we find a deployment in industrial sectors of around 16 
MtCO2/yr. 
More importantly, the results in this study indicate that a simple average, or 
deterministically determined, deployment rate provides a biased perspective on the future 
scope for CCS in Europe. Averages do not reveal the inherent uncertainty for CCS which is 
related to Europe’s key incentive mechanism: the EU ETS. Marginal or no CCS deployment 
is possible in case of low future economic growth, while maximum deployment is also 
possible if firms are forced into non-compliance. These results underline how the interaction 
between EU ETS fundamentals ultimately drives the carbon price and CCS deployment, 
leaving investors with a rather uncertain investment perspective. 
Therefore, if CCS is to be a key abatement technology in Europe, policymakers should 
focus on making the EU ETS more robust against allowance demand uncertainty. By 
introducing measures to stabilize or smooth allowance demand over time, single-digit carbon 
prices, as well as non-compliance, can possibly be avoided, thereby providing some level of 
certainty to investors. Furthermore, although it has been outside the scope of this study, the 
benefits of improved investment certainty will likely accrue to all firms under the scheme, and 
will not be limited to those considering investments in CCS. In any case, under the current EU 
ETS regime, waiting for the carbon price to temporarily reach the required level to trigger 
deployment does not seem to be a viable long-term strategy.  
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2.5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
So far, most modelling work on CCS deployment seems to have a positive bias 
towards the effectiveness of the EU ETS as a driver for deployment. The reasons for that are 
that most CCS-based economic modelling uses a deterministic approach and disregards 
interactions between technology deployment and incentives.  Furthermore, qualitative 
obstacles to the introduction of CCS, such as societal acceptance issues, organizational 
complexities or other societal factors that may slow down learning rates, are often neglected.  
In this study, we have tried to take the CCS deployment analysis one step further by 
designing a stochastic, interactive model of the EU ETS system. Such a model enables us to 
simulate CCS deployment in the period until 2030 under a number of assumed EU ETS policy 
regimes and macro-economic conditions.  
The results show that the considerable investment uncertainty under the EU ETS 
makes it doubtful that the EU ETS is as efficient in driving abatement investments as it is 
often assumed to be. This is particularly important as investments in CCS technology involve 
high sunk costs, lead times and an operational lifetime that often spans multiple decades. 
Therefore, in order to efficiently plan such investments, investors generally are rather 
sensitive to the level of certainty market incentives can provide them with about patterns of 
future CO2 penalties. Simulations based on our model suggest that the EU ETS cannot offer 
that certainty as future ETS allowance prices are volatile and highly responsive to parameter 
changes. This problem especially applies to the power sector, which faces the highest levels 
of uncertainty regarding required deployment levels of CCS under the EU ETS. 
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that priority should be given to measures 
that could make the scheme more robust against economic and policy uncertainty. Current 
proposals primarily focus on trying to increase overall levels of allowance prices by limiting 
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the supply of allowances in one way or another. Our results show that on average EU ETS 
allowance prices may tend to increase within a couple of years, albeit consistently with 
extremely high levels of uncertainty. To illustrate the latter, a single-year serious12 overall 
economic setback in Europe will largely undo the emission reduction impact of a fairly 
‘aggressive’ policy mix that significantly reduces the allowance allocation levels.  
Our results also show that the fundamental problem with the EU ETS effectiveness in 
enhancing abatement investment is its inherent uncertainty on both the long and short term 
with regard to the need for abatement and the level of the carbon price.13 Reducing such 
uncertainty is not easy but would anyhow require measures that try to stabilize the CO2 price 
and demand for allowances, rather than interfering with the allowance allocation regime.  
                                                 
12 I.e. a one year drop in emission levels by 7%. Note that the emission reduction in 2009 was about 11%. 
13 In fact, our results suggest that the current fundamental non-scarcity of EU ETS allowances will turn into a scarcity 
situation within a limited number of years, from then on driving up the EU ETS prices to still volatile but higher price levels. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Member states of the European Union have chosen to cap CO2 emissions from 
installations of a large number of energy-intensive sectors via the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme to ensure that collective long-term emissions-reduction goals are achieved. 
Theoretically, the market-based character of the EU ETS should guarantee that the emission 
target is achieved in a least-cost manner. However, such a least-cost solution is possible only 
if outside interference with the allocation via the EU ETS market scheme is avoided 
(Böhringer et al., 2008). Interestingly, European policy makers themselves are likely to be a 
source of outside interference by introducing many instruments for CO2 abatement on a 
national, or even regional and local, level alongside the EU ETS. Many of those parallel 
instruments are introduced in pursuit of domestic energy and climate targets (EEA, 2011a; 
Lundberg et al., 2012). Examples include power-plant performance benchmarks, feed-in 
tariffs for renewables, and biomass co-firing mandates. Parallel instruments can have local 
benefits for the national government that introduces the instrument, such as employment 
benefits or stability of electricity supply (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; Bennear and Stavins, 2007). 
However, with respect to carbon abatement, parallel instruments are direct substitutes for the 
EU ETS. The abatement achieved through parallel instruments reduces the demand for EU 
ETS carbon allowances and lowers the carbon price, thereby reducing the amount of 
abatement that is triggered by the EU ETS. Building on this logic, the aggregate impact of all 
parallel instruments across Europe could significantly lower the carbon allowance price and 
increase the societal costs associated with CO2 abatement. At an extreme, parallel instruments 
could make the EU ETS completely redundant, permanently driving the CO2 allowance price 
down to zero. 
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Since 2005, the EU ETS carbon price has generally been rather low and volatile. The 
weak performance of the EU ETS is typically attributed to negative and/or stagnating 
economic growth since 2008, in combination with a too generous allowance allocation 
regime. The potential role of parallel instruments is not well understood in this context. Yet 
such knowledge is needed in order to formulate the right policy response, e.g. if policy 
makers are interested in strengthening the EU ETS. In fact, greater knowledge of the effects 
of multiple parallel instruments on the performance of the EU ETS can be part of the solution 
to raise its effectiveness. As long as policy makers are unaware of the costs associated with 
parallel instruments in the form of reduced ETS performance, they may be inclined to spend 
more than the socially optimal amount on parallel instruments alongside the EU ETS. Closing 
this information gap could be an important step toward a more cost-efficient and goal-oriented 
CO2 mitigation policy design. 
Although a deep understanding of the effect of the whole range of parallel instruments 
on the performance of an emissions trading scheme can be highly valuable to policy makers, 
the focus of existing literature has been largely limited to interactions between an ETS and a 
single other parallel instrument. Studying the aggregate effect of multiple parallel instruments 
would allow for a more comprehensive sensitivity analysis of the EU ETS and would 
obviously represent a more realistic policy setting. In this chapter, the intention is to add to 
the literature by empirically examining the performance of the EU ETS within a policy setting 
with multiple parallel instruments. As will be explained in more detail below, we aim to 
provide benchmarks to policy makers that can be used to assess the potential adverse effect of 
proposed parallel instruments on the performance of the EU ETS. 
In the analysis, we distinguish between two broad categories of parallel instruments: 
Type 1 and Type 2 instruments. Both types lead to a reduction of emissions in ETS sectors, 
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but they do so in different ways. Type 1 parallel instruments are defined as instruments that 
provide ETS sectors with incentives to adopt low-carbon technology. Thereby, Type 1 
incentives lower the carbon intensity of production in ETS sectors. An example of a Type 1 
instrument is a subsidy to invest in biomass co-firing in existing coal-fired power plants. Type 
2 instruments are defined as instruments that provide incentives to non-ETS sectors (e.g. 
households) to lower their demand for products from ETS sectors. In that manner, Type 2 
instruments lower the required production level in ETS sectors and the associated CO2 
emissions. Two examples of Type 2 instruments are incentives for deployment of 
decentralized renewable electricity generation capacity and subsidies to improve the energy 
efficiency of households. Both Type 1 and Type 2 instruments have been introduced on a 
relatively large scale across Europe. A few examples of both types of instruments that are 
currently in force are provided in Table 3.1. All the examples in the table have been 
introduced since 2008. 
To study the effect of both, Type 1 and Type 2, instruments on indicators of the 
performance of the EU ETS, we use the dynamic stochastic simulation model of the EU ETS 
that was developed in Chapter 2. The model incorporates year-to-year economic growth 
uncertainty. The performance of the EU ETS is known to be highly dependent on economic 
growth rates: high economic growth rates force firms to invest heavily in CO2 abatement to 
remain below the CO2 allowance cap and provide upward pressure for the carbon price, 
whereas the carbon price and the need to invest in CO2 abatement is significantly lower if 
economic growth rates fall below average. Incorporating both parallel instruments and 
economic growth uncertainty into the analysis makes it possible to examine their relative 
importance. 
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We put particular emphasis on assessing under what conditions the EU ETS becomes 
redundant, as this redundancy provides a clear benchmark for policy makers. EU ETS 
redundancy is defined here as a situation in which parallel instruments trigger enough 
abatement activity to permanently (at least until the end of our modelling horizon) drive the 
EU ETS carbon price to zero. If it is assumed that policy makers have knowledge about the 
expected local abatement effects of a proposed parallel instrument, the threshold level enables 
policy makers to assess the relative EU-ETS-undermining effect of the proposed parallel 
instrument. In that manner, policy makers are better informed about the potential cost and 
impact of their national policy initiatives alongside the EU ETS. 
Table 3.1: Examples of Type 1 and Type 2 instruments that reduce ETS sector emissions since 2008 
across Europe 
Type 1 Type 2 
Instruments aimed at ETS sectors: reduce carbon intensity of 
production in ETS sectors 
Instruments aimed at non-ETS sectors: reduce production levels 
in ETS sectors 
Austria (2012) Ökostromverordnung – FITs for biomass co-firing 
(0.0612 EUR/kWh). 
Austria (2012) Ökostromverordnung – FITs for renewable energy. 
Netherlands (2009) Agreement on energy efficiency for ETS companies 
(MEE) – Negotiated agreement that forces ETS firm 
to aim for energy efficiency improvement. 
Netherlands (2011) SDE+  - Provides a feed-in subsidy to installations 
according to generation costs on a first come first 
served basis. 
Germany (2012) CHP Agreement with Industry – Agreement between 
German Government and the industrial sector to 
improve energy efficiency in the industrial sector. 
Objective: raise energy efficiency by 1.3% annually. 
Germany 
(2011/2012) 
2011 – Energy Efficiency Fund – Fund of more 
than €100 million to promote energy efficiency 
across end-use sectors. 
2012 - Up to 30% financial allowance for 
investments in cross sectional technology that 
increases energy efficiency (e.g. heat pumps and 
air-conditioning). 
2012 - Amendment of EEG – Feed-In Tariffs (FITs) 
for non-ETS renewables. 
Italy (2008) Decree on Implementation of EU Energy Services 
Directive – Includes setting up a White Certificate 
Scheme in the energy industry. 
Italy (2012) Ministerial Decree – Incentives for increased 
energy efficiency in existing buildings, totalling 
€200mln in subsidies. 
Poland (2008) Long-term Programme for Promotion of Biofuels or 
Other Renewable Fuels – Provides support for 
biomass co-firing through arrangements that improve 
cost-effectiveness of biomass supply-chain.  
Poland (2011) Energy Efficiency Act – Introduces a White 
Certificate Scheme imposed on utility companies 




2008 - Management System of Intensive Energy 
Consumption – Binding energy audits for energy 
intensive facilities (>500 toe/yr) with a 6-8 year 
interval. Facility operators have to set energy and 
carbon intensity targets. After approval by 
government, penalties can be issued for missing the 
target. 
2010 - Implementation of CHP Directive – Provides 
financial remuneration for high efficiency and 
renewable based electricity generation in CHP plants.  
Portugal (2010/2013) 2010 - Tax Deduction for Efficient Equipment – 
Tax deductions on investments in efficient 
equipment that improve the thermal performance of 
buildings. 
2013 – Feed-in tariffs for micro and mini generation 
for 2013 – Includes feed-in tariff for mini 
(<3.68kW) and micro (3.68-20 kW) solar PV for 15 
years: first 8 years 0.196 EUR/kWh, following 7 
years 0.165 EUR/kWh.  
Spain (2008) Voluntary Agreements 2008-2012 – Promotes 
adoption of energy saving measures by industry. 
Financing lines are available, with preferential 
treatment for formally committed firms. 
Spain (2013) PIMA SOL – program to promote GHG reduction 
in the tourism sectors via, amongst others, reduced 
energy consumption. 
Sweden (2010) Energy Audit for Companies – provides support for 
50% of costs of an energy audit for companies using 
more than 500 MWh/yr. Measures follow a few years 
later. 
Sweden (2010) Government subsidies for Local Energy Efficiency 
Measures - ~€11 million annually for local 
municipalities and county councils to undertake 
energy efficiency measures. 
UK (2010) National Renewable Energy Action Plan – Includes 
Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROC) to 
subsidize biomass-co-firing. 
UK (2010) CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme – Targets large 
private and public sector organisations and caps 
their emissions. 
Source: IEA Policies and Measures Database (http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/) 
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3.2. Literature review 
The study of interacting policy instruments has its roots in the work of Tinbergen 
(1952, 1956), who formulated general rules for the controllability of an economic system. He 
coined the rule that the number of independent instruments must equal the number of 
independent targets in order for a solution to exist. Theil (1954, 1956, 1964) extended the 
work of Tinbergen to other situations, including those in which the number of instruments is 
lower than the number of targets. The analysis in this chapter concerns the reverse situation: 
an over-determined system with more instruments than targets. On top of that, multiple 
governments govern the instruments, while the EU ETS is an instrument shared by all thirty-
one governments. Over-determined systems have many solutions, although such a solution 
may be hard, if not impossible, to attain in practice. Finding a solution requires strong 
coordination by a central planner. That planner should set all excess instruments at arbitrary 
fixed values, while having full information regarding the relations (or lack thereof) among 
instruments, targets, and the response behaviour of the private sector. Without a social planner 
or full information, a solution becomes indeterminate and uncontrollable for all governments 
involved (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2011; Acocella et al., 2012). 
A set of interacting instruments and targets can become so complex that retaining 
control over them becomes an issue in itself for policy makers (Wildavsky, 1979). Majone 
(1989) defines policy space as a set of policies that are so closely interrelated that it is not 
possible to give useful descriptions of one of them or to make analytic statements about one 
of them without taking the others into account. Majone builds on Wildavsky’s work by 
pointing out that policy makers tend to lose control over the policy space over time. As the 
number of policies grows relative to the size of the policy space, policies logically become 
more interdependent and interfere with other policies. At an extreme, new programs and 
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institutional arrangements may be required to prevent or reduce the unwanted consequences 
of a congested policy space. 
Bye and Bruvoll (2008) suggest that policy development in the energy and 
environmental domain has already resulted into an over-congested policy space. Concluding 
that little is known about the aggregate effect of environmental instruments, they call for 
coordination and simplification of policy tools before new instruments are added to the policy 
space. 
To the extent that policy interactions have been analysed within the environmental 
domain, the primary focus has been on interactions between an emissions trading scheme and 
a scheme that supports the deployment of renewable electricity technologies. Much of this 
work has focused: on the expected changes in the prices (Boots, 2003; Rathmann, 2007) and 
on the supply of electricity (Anandarajah and Strachan, 2010), on welfare implications 
(Böhringer et al., 2008), on the CO2 price (Hindsberger et al., 2003), and on levels of CO2 
emissions (Morthorst, 2003). See Del Rio (2007) for a review of the literature. Fewer authors 
have considered highly congested policy spaces, although such analyses would probably help 
to uncover and avoid unintentional consequences of congestion. In what follows, we will 
highlight some notable papers in which a more congested policy space has been considered. 
Oikonomou and Jepma (2008) designed a qualitative framework to identify potential 
interactions between combinations of various climate policy instruments. Their framework 
builds on, and summarizes, interactions that have been identified in previous literature, 
departing from findings of the INTERACT project (Interact, 2003). The framework helps 
policy makers to classify potential positive and negative interactions between sets of 
instruments. Kautto et al. (2012), using the existing literature and interviews with experts, 
analysed changes in the use of biomass as a result of the introduction of the EU ETS and its 
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interactions with parallel instruments in seven EU countries. Although Kautto et al. (2012) 
had difficulty attributing observed effects to specific instruments, they noted that the EU ETS 
probably had amplified the effects of existing policies. In some cases the introduction of the 
EU ETS triggered the introduction of additional “balancing measures” to offset biomass price 
effects. Sorrell and Sijm (2003) and Bennear and Stavins (2007) identified situations in which 
combinations of environmental instruments can be justified. Sorrell and Sijm (2003) argued 
that combinations of instruments can usefully coexist if they lead to an improvement of the 
static or dynamic efficiency of a trading scheme, or if they deliver other valuable policy 
objectives. Bennear and Stavins (2007) noted that multiple instruments can be justified if 
there have been multiple market failures, or if an exogenous constraint cannot be removed. 
Although the use of multiple instruments can have benefits, it remains unclear when 
such combinations can lead to a loss of control by policy makers. However, one can safely 
assume that instruments are never introduced by policy makers with the intent to be 
redundant. If instruments become redundant unintentionally, it indicates that policy makers 
have lost control over the policy space, as Majone (1989) and Wildavsky (1979) suggested. 
De Jonghe et al. (2009) analysed the possibility of redundancy of an emissions trading 
scheme, albeit in a stylized theoretical setting with one parallel instrument. Employing a 
welfare-optimization model, they showed that if a renewables quota14 is set above a threshold 
level alongside an emissions trading scheme, the CO2 allowance price falls to zero and the 
ETS becomes redundant. These results, which are in line with what Hindsberger et al. (2003) 
have found,15 seem to suggest that if policy makers set their renewables quota below a 
                                                 
14 The renewables quota is enforced through a ‘green certificate’ scheme. The threshold levels depends on the stringency of 
the emissions trading scheme. 
15 Hindsberger et al. (2003) examine a situation in which an international emissions trading scheme partly overlaps 
geographically with an international scheme of ‘tradable green certificates’ to stimulate the deployment of renewable energy 
in the Baltic Sea region. They find that the carbon price approaches zero if the renewable energy target is set sufficiently 
high. 
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threshold level, the ETS will produce a positive carbon price and contribute to carbon 
abatement, but this is not necessarily true in an international setting. That is, even if a national 
government sets a relatively low renewables quota, actions by other national governments 
across Europe could still drive the EU ETS beyond the threshold level and into redundancy. 
In fact, the introduction of a renewables quota in one country could actively trigger other 
governments to implement additional instruments in response to the depreciated carbon price. 
If such dynamics between policy-making authorities are disregarded, the probability that an 
ETS becomes redundant is therefore likely to be underestimated. 
The likelihood of EU ETS redundancy is even greater once we take multiple sectors 
into account. The EU ETS covers many countries and industrial sectors and therefore interacts 
with a wide range of energy-related and climate-related instruments. An ETS even interacts 
with instruments in sectors that are not covered by the scheme (Interact, 2003). Despite these 
facts, literature in the field (Conrad and Kohn, 1996; Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001; 
Morthorst, 2001, 2003; Hindsberger et al., 2003; Jensen and Skytte, 2003; Rathmann, 2007; 
Del Rio, 2009) not only seldom considers interaction between ETS and non-ETS sectors, but 
also often focuses exclusively on the electricity sector. 
General-equilibrium models that cover multiple sectors typically model an emissions 
trading scheme that is modelled too simply to fully assess the adverse effects of parallel 
instruments (Morris et al., 2010; Abrell and Weigt, 2008; Pizer, 2002). Allowance banking 
behaviour and the stochastic nature of both economic growth and CO2 allowance demand are 
typically not accounted for. These factors are, however, rather important to obtain a full 
understanding of the effect of introducing parallel instruments alongside an emissions trading 
scheme (Rathmann, 2007). In this chapter, we take the above-mentioned factors into account. 
That is, we analyse policy interaction in an international setting, with parallel instruments in 
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both ETS and non-ETS sectors. Also, we apply a model that accounts for important design 
features of the EU ETS, such as the ability to bank allowances and the role of stochastic 
allowance demand patterns. The model thereby reflects current EU ETS regulation. By that 
model specification, we aim to provide a more complete analysis of the sensitivity of the EU 
ETS to the introduction of parallel instruments. Specifically, we define threshold levels 
beyond which redundancy of the EU ETS is to be expected, assuming that knowing these 
threshold levels will help to better understand the real impact of their policies considered. 
3.3. Methodology 
In this section, we describe the ETS model and the manner in which parallel 
instruments have been introduced into it. We build on the stochastic simulation model of the 
EU ETS described in Chapter 2. After a short summary of the original model, we offer a 
detailed description of the approach used to introduce Type 1 and Type 2 instruments into the 
model. 
3.3.1.  The stochastic EU ETS simulation model 
The model of the EU ETS outlined in Figure 3.1 simulates the fundamentals of the EU 
ETS, including annual abatement activity in various sectors and a forecast of the long-term 
carbon price (which we call the Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator). How the FCPI is 
calculated will be explained. The model runs from 2008 (the start of Phase II of the EU ETS) 
to 2030. The supply of allowances mirrors the current regime for allocating annual 
allowances. The demand for allowances is equal to business-as-usual emissions reduced by 
abatement that is triggered by the EU ETS. Abatement triggered by other instruments will be 
added to the model in a later subsection. Realized demand levels since 2008 are exogenous 
input to the model. Starting in 2013, the business-as-usual growth in emission is sampled 
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from a distribution via a Monte Carlo procedure. The distribution is based on historical 
growth rates of European industrial emissions between 1990 and 2008 (EEA, 2011b). 
If the supply of allowances surpasses demand, the surplus is banked for use in future 
years, because allowances do not expire. We assume that if the demand for allowances 
surpasses the supply, firms have three options available to comply with ETS regulation: 
investing in carbon abatement, using previously banked allowances, and paying the non-
compliance penalty.16 Paying the non-compliance penalty is treated as the option of last 
resort: firms will pay the non-compliance penalty only if no other banked allowances or 
abatement opportunities are available. In case of non-compliance, the FCPI equals the current 
non-compliance penalty of €100 per tonne of CO2. Also, any remaining abatement potential 
and banked allowances will be utilized. In any other case, firms must choose between using 
banked allowances and investing in carbon abatement. Therefore, the extent to which firms 
choose either of the two options depends on their relative cost. An example is illustrated in 
Figure 3.2, which shows the equilibrium between abatement and use of banked allowances in 
a random year ݐ. In that year, the overall scarcity of allowances equals 88 MtCO2 and is 
                                                 
16 Carbon leakage to non-EU member countries is not included in the model. 
Figure 3.1: The original EU ETS model 
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shown on the x axis. In equilibrium, the amount of abatement equals 51 MtCO2, the use of 
banked allowances equals 37 MtCO2, and the FCPI equals €43.  
Note that we assume that firms make a minimum effort to comply with ETS regulation 
in order not to extract too many resources from their core business. This can be seen in Figure 
3.2, as more abatement potential is available at the same marginal costs yet not all potential is 
used. 
The curve representing supply of abatement technologies is the merit-order abatement 
curve. All abatement opportunities are ordered according to their relative marginal cost in 
euros per metric tonne abated.  
The curve representing the demand for the use of banked allowances rests on the 
following assumptions: assume that the willingness to use banked allowances by firms at any 
time depends on firm-level carbon-price expectations and investment opportunities. Assume 
Figure 3.2: Abatement and use of banked allowances in randomly simulated year t 
 
501077-L-bw-Mulder
Chapter  3   81 
 
 
also that firm-level carbon-price expectations and investment opportunities across Europe are 
heterogeneous, given that the population of firms under the EU ETS is highly diverse and 
operates under imperfect information. For example, some firms supply (hold on to) their 
banked allowances if the carbon price is 30 euro per tonne given their relatively low (high) 
price expectation in the future or access to (lack of) alternative investment opportunities with 
a higher expected return. Logically, the share of firms that is willing to supply their banked 
allowances increases as the carbon price goes up, as all firms are assumed to hold on to their 
banked allowances if the carbon price equals zero euro per tonne, while all firms are willing 
to supply their banked allowances if the market price equals the price ceiling (the non-
compliance penalty). The curve representing the demand for the use of banked allowances is 
formed by assuming a linear relationship between these two extremes. 
The equilibrium between the supply of abatement technologies and the demand for the 
use of banked allowances in a year determines the equilibrium FCPI in that year. The 
forecasted FCPI can be interpreted as a long-term forecast of the carbon price because the 
actual market price for carbon allowances is expected to converge to the FCPI. To understand 
why, consider a situation where the market price for allowances is considerably higher than 
the forecasted FCPI (e.g. due to speculation). This would trigger extra abatement activity and 
a reduction of demand below the equilibrium point, leading to a surplus of allowances. The 
surplus would put downward pressure on the carbon price, leading to convergence of the 
market price towards the FCPI. 
Because allowance demand is uncertain, and because deployment of abatement 
technologies alters the shape of the merit order, a stochastic year-to-year carbon price pattern 
is formed. For an in-depth description of the model, see Chapter 2. 
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3.3.2. Introducing parallel instruments 
The simulation window runs from 2008 to 2030. Within that window, we assume that 
parallel instruments are in place between 2013 and 2030. 
3.3.2.1. TYPE 1 INSTRUMENTS 
Type 1 parallel instruments are defined as instruments that lower the carbon intensity 
of production in ETS sectors. The common feature of these instruments is that they speed up 
investments in abatement technologies within ETS sectors. Introducing Type 1 instruments 
would affect the EU ETS, and thus would affect the ETS model, in two ways. First, allowance 
demand and scarcity would be reduced by the amount of abatement achieved with Type 1 
instruments. Second, technologies from the merit order are used to achieve this reduction, so 
that this abatement potential is no longer available in future periods, thereby changing the 
shape of the merit order in Figure 3.2. 
It is not possible to individually model all the Type 1 instruments that are in operation 
today. Instead, we propose a method to determine their aggregate effect on the functioning of 
the EU ETS. We assume that their collective impact ranges from 0 and 30 MtCO2 of new 
abatement per year, as all relevant simulation results fall within that range.17 
We run all possible scenarios within that range with increments of 1 MtCO2. For each 
of these 31 scenarios the impact remains constant over time. Also, we assume in all scenarios 
that Type 1 instruments trigger deployment of all technologies in the merit order. For 
example, if Type 1 instruments are assumed to trigger a total of 10 MtCO2 of new abatement 
per annum, the abatement potential of all technologies in the merit order is reduced 
proportionally until a reduction in emissions of 10 MtCO2 is achieved. By reducing the 
                                                 
17 Emissions in ETS sectors were 1,898 MtCO
2
 in 2012. Therefore, the tested range (0–30 MtCO
2
/yr) is equivalent to 
abatement between 0 and 1.6 percent per annum. 
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abatement potential proportionately, we attempt to mirror the wide range of instruments that 
are in place today across industries, technologies, and abatement costs.18 
Mathematically, the implications are rather straightforward. Allowance demand in 
now adjusted for the effect of Type 1 instruments: 
 
ܣܦ௧௡௘௪ ൌ ܣܦ௧௢௥௜௚௜௡௔௟ െ ܶͳ௧  ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ     (3.1) 
 
Here, ܣܦ௧௢௥௜௚௜௡௔௟ is allowance demand in year ݐ as specified in the original model (see 
Equation 2.2 in Chapter 2). ܶͳ௧ is the reduction in demand through Type 1 instruments in 
year ݐ in MtCO2. If we subtract ܶͳ௧ from ܣܦ௧௢௥௜௚௜௡௔௟ we arrive at the new allowance demand 
in year ݐ, ܣܦ௧௡௘௪. 







   ݂݋ݎ݇ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡ ݊ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ    (3.2) 
 
where ߨ௧௜  is a measure of the relative abundance of abatement technology ݇ at ݐ, 
ܶܣܥ௧௞ǡ௢௥௜௚௜௡௔௟ is the total abatement capacity of technology ݇ at ݐ (in MtCO2) as defined in the 
original model, and the denominator defines the cumulative capacity of all ݊ abatement 
technologies that are available at ݐ, and 
 
                                                 
18 For example, Europe is attempting to stimulate a relatively expensive technology such as CO
2
 capture and storage through 
subsidies while efficiency improvements (which typically have a low marginal cost) also receive support via a wide range of 
European programs in line with the 20–20–20 targets for 2020 (EP, 2010). 
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ܶܣܥ௧௞ǡ௡௘௪ ൌ ܶܣܥ௧௞ǡ௢௥௜௚௜௡௔௟ െ ߨ௧௞ܶͳ௧  ݂݋ݎ݇ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡ ݊ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ  (3.3) 
 
where ܶܣܥ௧
௞ǡ௡௘௪ is the total remaining abatement capacity of technology ݇ in year ݐ; 
that is, the original abatement capacity of technology ݇ is diminished by ߨ௧௞ܶͳ௧, as that 
proportion is assumed to be deployed through Type 1 instruments). 
3.3.2.2. TYPE 2 INSTRUMENTS 
Type 2 instruments are defined as instruments that reduce the production levels in ETS 
sectors. Type 2 instruments are primarily found in non-ETS end-use sectors. Introducing Type 
2 instruments would affect the EU ETS only by reducing allowance demand in ETS sectors, 
because firms in these sectors face lower demand for their end products. 
Similar to Type 1 instruments, we assume that the collective impact of Type 2 
instruments reduces the emission level by between 0 and 30 MtCO2 per annum. We run all 31 
scenarios within that range with increments of 1 MtCO2, while the impact remains constant 
over time per scenario. 
Mathematically, incorporating Type 2 instruments requires adding one more term to 
Equation 3.1: 
 
ܣܦ௧௡௘௪ ൌ ܣܦ௧௢௥௜௚௜௡௔௟ െ ܶͳ௧ െ ܶʹ௧  ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ     (3.4) 
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Figure 3.3: Fundamental EUA price – Neutral Scenario 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Stock of banked Allowances - Neutral Scenario 
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3.4. Results 
As a reference, we first present results from the Neutral Scenario. In the Neutral 
Scenario, the ETS is the only instrument triggering carbon abatement activity; the annual 
impact of Type 1 and Type 2 instruments is thus 0 MtCO2. In subsequent sections we examine 
the sensitivity of the carbon price and the emission level and the probability that the EU ETS 
will become redundant. 
In practice, both Type 1 and Type 2 instruments operate in a parallel fashion alongside 
the EU ETS. Therefore, every possible quantitative combination of Type 1 and Type 2 
instruments within the specified range (0–30 MtCO2/yr) is tested. As a result, we run a total of 
961 (31 u 31) scenarios and present results from all scenarios in three-dimensional plots. 
3.4.1. The Neutral Scenario 
Figure 3.3 shows that the forecasted FCPI is equal to about €35 in 2008 but plummets 
in subsequent years because allowances are in oversupply in those years, primarily as a result 
of the financial and economic crisis. In absence of speculation, the price falls to zero. Around 
2015, the mean FCPI quickly increases again, up to about €50 in 2025. In the last five years of 
the simulation, the FCPI decreases slightly as a result of technological learning, higher prices 
for fossil fuel, and greater availability of abatement technologies. Because allowance demand 
is uncertain, there is significant uncertainty around the forecasted equilibrium level of the 
FCPI, as reflected by the 80 percent confidence interval in Figure 3.3. The effect of the 
financial and economic crisis is also clearly reflected in Figure 3.4, which depicts the overall 
stock of banked allowances over time. Because no end date has been specified for the EU 
ETS, and allowances do not expire, a positive stock of allowances remains at the end of the 
simulation. The stock quickly builds up after 2008, and is then gradually reduced over time 
towards a mean of 2,000 MtCO2 worth of allowances in 2030. In case of unusually strong 
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Figure 3.5: Emissions under the EU ETS (in MtCO2/yr)—Neutral Scenario 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Effect of Type 1 and Type 2 instruments on the mean FCPI in 2030 
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Figure 3.7: Mean and median FCPI with 0 and 20 MtCO2 impact of Type 1 (Type 2 remains 0) 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Mean and median FCPI with 0 and 20 MtCO2 impact of Type 2 (Type 1 remains 0) 
501077-L-bw-Mulder
Chapter  3   89 
 
 
economic growth between 2013 and 2030, a stock level below 1,500 MtCO2 also remains a 
possibility. 
 The level of emissions is depicted in Figure 3.5. Again, the effect of the economic 
crisis is clearly visible between 2008 and 2012. As a result, the emissions level has room to 
rebound until 2017. After 2017, the reduced supply of allowances forces firms to invest in 
carbon abatement, driving the emission level downward. 
3.4.2. Effect of parallel instruments on carbon price 
We present the mean and median forecasts of the FCPI that were obtained in all 
simulated scenarios to assess the impact of parallel instruments on the strength of the carbon 
price signal. Recall from Chapter 2 that the depicted mean FCPI has limited value as a 
forecast of the actual carbon price because the market price is inherently uncertain and 
dependent on assumptions regarding the availability and marginal costs of specific 
technologies. 
The forecasted mean FCPIs in 2030 for all scenarios are shown in Figure 3.6. The 
impact levels of Type 1 and Type 2 instruments (in MtCO2/yr) are shown on the ݔ and ݕ axes 
respectively, with the mean FCPI shown on the ݖ axis. The Neutral Scenario FCPI level in 
2030 is €42 (see also Figure 3.3). The FCPI is responsive to both the introduction of Type 1 
and Type 2 instruments. As the combined impact of both types of instruments approaches 30 
MtCO2/yr, the mean FCPI approaches zero. 
Whereas Figure 3.6 depicts the case for 2030, Figures 3.7 and 3.8 reveal that the FCPI 
is significantly lower in earlier years as well under the influence of parallel instruments. Two 
scenarios are depicted in each graph: the Neutral Scenario and a scenario with 20 MtCO2 of 
abatement via Type 1 (Figure 3.7) or Type 2 (Figure 3.8) instruments. 
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The medians in Figures 3.7 and 3.8 reveal that the probability distribution of the FCPI 
becomes positively skewed once parallel instruments are in effect. The medians effectively 
show that the carbon price is already likely to approach zero if the annual impact of parallel 
instruments is 20 MtCO2/yr.  
When Figures 3.7 and 3.8 are compared with respect to the forecasted carbon price in 
the 20 MtCO2/yr scenarios, a lower mean FCPI can be seen in the latter figure, indicating that 
the carbon price is more sensitive to Type 2 instruments over time. The stronger carbon price 
sensitivity to Type 2 instruments can be explained by burden shifting between ETS and non- 
ETS sectors. To see why, consider that Type 2 instruments encourage non-ETS firms to 
pursue investments that reduce emissions in ETS sectors. Type 2 instruments thereby reduce 
the need for ETS firms to invest in carbon abatement themselves to stay below the emission 
allowance cap. The reduced pressure on ETS firms is reflected by a lower carbon price, as 
ETS firms can comply with EU ETS regulation without having to invest in some of the more 
costly abatement technologies. Type 1 instruments, however, encourage ETS firms to invest 
in carbon abatement, just as the EU ETS does. Therefore, Type 1 instruments do not shift the 
abatement burden from ETS sectors to non-ETS sectors. Consequently the carbon price is 
higher in Figure 3.7 than in Figure 3.8.19 
3.4.3. Effect of parallel instruments on achieved emission level 
In this subsection, we present the mean forecasted emission levels within EU ETS 
sectors in 2030. Changes to this expected value following the introduction of parallel 
                                                 
19 Although Type 1 instruments do not shift the abatement burden from ETS firms to non-ETS firms, Type 1 instruments 
may shift part of the financial burden to the government if a Type 1 instrument consists of public financial assistance (e.g. 
subsidies). However, in this study we limit the analysis to the overall effect of parallel instruments on the performance of the 
EU ETS (notably the carbon price); the financing structure of individual investments is outside the scope of this research. 
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instruments reveal to what extent Type 1 and Type 2 instruments provide additional emission 
reduction alongside the EU ETS. 
Figure 3.9 shows that a distinction can be made between scenarios with a relatively 
low impact level of parallel instruments and scenarios with a relatively high impact level of 
parallel instruments, although the exact threshold level that divides these two classes is hard 
to determine from Figure 3.9 alone. Whereas the former class of scenarios does not seem to 
have any significant influence on the emission level, the latter class of scenarios has a strong 
downward effect on the mean emission level. The two classes of scenarios will be described 
and discussed separately; the threshold level will be determined and discussed in more detail 
below.  
Note that the emission level attained in the Neutral Scenario is sufficient to comply 
with EU ETS emission targets. Any emission reduction beyond that level, e.g. as a result of 
Figure 3.9: Emissions within ETS sectors in 2030 
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the introduction of parallel instruments, effectively means that governments are overshooting 
the EU emission target. Pursuing such an abatement strategy seems ill-advised because 
overshooting the target burdens European economies with unnecessarily high cost, and 
possible loss of competitiveness. If European policy makers are committed to achieving 
emission reduction beyond the current target level anyway, lowering the EU ETS allowance 
cap would be a more straightforward way to achieve that goal. 
3.4.3.1. SCENARIOS WITH A RELATIVELY LOW IMPACT OF PARALLEL INSTRUMENTS 
If the gross impact via parallel instruments is relatively low, all abatement via parallel 
instruments is offset via the EU ETS. This occurs because the depreciated carbon price 
reduces abatement activity in ETS sectors to which the parallel instruments do not apply. For 
example, Type 1 instruments may speed up abatement activity in the power sector, which 
relieves the pressure on other ETS sectors (e.g. the steel or cement sector) to abate CO2 and 
stay below the allowance cap. The net effect is that the emission level remains unchanged. 
However, such offset of abatement activity via the EU ETS does not have to occur 
instantaneously. Parallel instruments typically have opposing effects on the emission level 
over time. As will be explained below, parallel instruments tend to speed up abatement 
activity in the short run but to slow it down in the long run. As a result of this intertemporal 
effect, the forecasted emission level in 2030 can be slightly below the Neutral Scenario level, 
even if the annual impact is very small. In practice, the small impact on the emission level can 
be explained by three factors.20 First, construction lead times regarding abatement technology 
can delay the response in emissions output, despite an instantaneous response of the carbon 
price. Second, imperfect information on the emissions trading market could lead to a delayed  
                                                 
20 The first two factors are not modeled here; the third factor is accounted for in the simulation and will be discussed in more 
detail. 
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Figure 3.10: Abatement and use of banked allowances without parallel instruments in a random year t 
 
Figure 3.11: Effect of parallel instruments on abatement and use of banked allowances t 
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downward response of the carbon price. Imperfect information relates to unawareness or the 
inability of market participants to have full information regarding the future effect of 
instruments that are introduced by governing bodies across Europe.  
A third possible factor relates to the reduced option value of carbon allowances once 
parallel instruments depreciate the carbon price. To see why, consider the example illustrated 
in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. 
In Figure 3.10, the overall scarcity (88 MtCO2) is divided between abatement (51 
MtCO2) and use of banked allowances (37 MtCO2), resulting in a carbon price of €43. 
Alternatively, if we assume that Type 1 and Type 2 instruments contribute 20 MtCO2 to 
abatement efforts in that same year (as depicted in Figure 3.11), industries under the EU ETS 
are not required to use as many banked allowances, or to invest in abatement, to comply with 
EU ETS regulation. 
The carbon price then falls to €40 and abatement activity via the EU ETS is reduced to 
around 42 MtCO2, while the use of banked allowances is reduced to 26 MtCO2. If we 
compare the scenarios in Figures 3.10 and 3.11, overall abatement efforts are higher in the 
latter scenario, as parallel instruments and the EU ETS trigger a total of 62 MtCO2 (42 + 20 
MtCO2) whereas only 51 MtCO2 is abated in the former scenario. 
The boost in abatement activity in the latter scenario can be attributed to our 
assumption that firms have unchanged long-term carbon price expectations.21 Because firms 
do not lower their long-term carbon price expectations, they have an incentive to hold on to 
their banked allowances as soon as the carbon price falls. In the end, they anticipate a higher 
option value in the future. Long-term carbon price expectations may remain unchanged  
                                                 
21 The ‘demand for the use of banked allowances’ curve still intersects the ݕ-axis at €100 euro per tonne. 
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because firms view parallel instruments as temporary (e.g. subsidies), assuming that the EU 
ETS remains the main instrument of European climate policy in the long term. 
If we relax the above assumption, the intertemporal effect on emissions may disappear 
or even change sign. An example of a scenario with relaxed assumptions is shown in Figure  
3.12. Now, the most optimistic firms under the EU ETS anticipate a long-term carbon price of 
€60 (instead of €100 as in the previous scenarios). As a result, abatement via the EU ETS and 
parallel instruments totals 46 MtCO2 (–5 MtCO2 relative to the scenario in Figure 3.10) and 
the use of banked allowances equals 42 MtCO2 (+5 MtCO2). This result indicates that, in 
addition to a temporary speedup, a temporary slowdown of abatement activity is also possible 
after the introduction of parallel instruments. 
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At the extreme, abatement activity via the EU ETS may come to a complete stop if 
ETS firms decide to dump their banked allowances. Such a scenario would become a 
possibility if ETS firms were to foresee the possibility of the EU ETS becoming redundant.  
All in all, the scenarios above show that behavioural responses of ETS firms are 
crucial in determining whether a temporary speedup or slowdown of abatement activity may 
occur. In practice, it is not well understood how heterogeneous carbon-price expectations and 
allowance-banking strategies are affected by the introduction of parallel instruments. 
Nevertheless, the modelling exercise provides insight into possible explanations for a short-
term speedup or slowdown in abatement activity. In our modelled scenarios we have assumed 
that long-term carbon price expectations remain constant. Thus, we have implicitly assumed 
that firms commit to the EU ETS and anticipate that European policy makers will do the 
same. 
 
Figure 3.13: Probability that the EU ETS will become redundant 
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3.4.3.2. SCENARIOS WITH A RELATIVELY HIGH IMPACT OF PARALLEL INSTRUMENTS 
In Figure 3.9, the mean emission level decreases steeply if the combined impact of 
parallel instruments is relatively high. This can be explained by a higher probability that the 
EU ETS will become redundant. We define EU ETS redundancy as scenarios in which the EU 
ETS does not trigger any abatement activity. In those scenarios, the carbon price is forced 
down to zero.  
The probability of EU ETS redundancy for each scenario is shown in Figure 3.13. As 
that figure shows, as long as the annual impact remains below 20 MtCO2, parallel instrument 
have too little impact to turn the EU ETS into a redundant scheme. If the annual impact of 
parallel instruments surpasses 20 MtCO2, the EU ETS is in danger of becoming a redundant 
scheme. If the annual impact rises further, the probability rises steeply. Obviously, once the 
EU ETS has become a redundant scheme, abatement that is achieved via parallel instruments 
will no longer be offset via the EU ETS. This explains why in Figure 3.9, the mean forecasted 
 Figure 3.14: Effect of parallel instruments on forecasted 2030 emission level as a function of the 
BAU-emissions growth rate 
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emission level starts to decline if the annual impact of parallel instruments surpasses 20 
MtCO2. 
Bear in mind that the numbers in Figure 3.9 are mean forecasts. If economic growth 
were to remain below the historic mean until 2030, less abatement would be required to 
remain below the EU ETS allowance cap. As a result, the EU ETS would also become 
redundant more easily. Figure 3.14 illustrates this phenomenon. It shows the forecasted 
emission level in 2030 as a function of the business-as-usual emissions growth rate between 
2012 and 2030 for both the neutral scenario and for a scenario with a total impact by parallel 
instruments of 30 MtCO2/yr. Regarding the latter scenario, the tail at the lower left shows that 
the impact of parallel instruments on the forecasted emission level increases significantly if 
economic growth is below the mean, which signals that the EU ETS has become redundant in 
these instances. At or above the mean economic growth rates, the forecasted emission level 
are also somewhat lower, but this can be attributed to a temporary boost in abatement activity 
and does not necessarily indicate that the EU ETS has become redundant. 
The results plotted in Figure 3.13 show that if the combined impact of parallel 
instruments surpasses 45 MtCO2 per annum, the EU ETS will undoubtedly become 
redundant. If the combined impact is in between 20 and 45 MtCO2 per annum, the future of 
the EU ETS is uncertain and hinges on economic growth rates in Europe. 
The above threshold levels can be considered high estimates for two reasons. First, 
redundancy is defined rather strictly (zero abatement via the EU ETS). Even if a small amount 
of abatement is triggered by the EU ETS until 2030, reflected by a positive albeit low carbon 
price, policy makers are unlikely to remain as supportive of the EU ETS as they are today. 
The examples in Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show that the carbon price is likely to be weak even if 
the combined impact of parallel instruments is just 20 MtCO2. Second, in all scenarios, the 
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long-term carbon price expectations by firms are assumed to be unaffected by parallel 
instruments. Thus, we assume that firms commit to the EU ETS unconditionally, and do not 
anticipate its redundancy. Yet, in practice, firms could lose faith in the future of the EU ETS 
and dump their stock of banked allowances. All in all, if policy makers and firms take 
positions that further undermine the strength of the scheme, the actual threshold levels for 
redundancy may lie significantly below the levels that we have established. 
3.5. Discussion 
The results presented above reveal that the role of the EU ETS can be severely 
weakened as the aggregate impact of parallel instruments gets to levels in the order of 20 
MtCO2/yr. Note that 20 MtCO2 is equal to only a 1 percent reduction of annual emissions 
under the EU ETS. To compare, the EU ETS allowance cap is currently reduced by 1.74 
percent per annum, and set to become 2.2 percent starting in 2021 (EC, 2014b).  Thus, even if 
the impact of parallel instruments were to be far below the intended reduction of the 
emissions cap, the EU ETS could be weakened to the extent that redundancy could become a 
real option, especially if some firms or policy makers were to lose their commitment to the 
scheme. 
The factor that explains this phenomenon is the uncertainty of future economic growth 
and allowance demand: if economic growth stagnates, the chances of EU ETS redundancy 
increase sharply. 
In previous studies of the redundancy of an ETS, stochastic demand patterns were not 
incorporated in the analysis. Also, the aggregate impact of multiple parallel instruments, as 
opposed to just one or two instruments, was largely overlooked. Especially the combination of 
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these two factors, however, seems to put the effectiveness of an emissions trading scheme in a 
less optimistic perspective. 
The threshold levels that were determined here offer European policy makers further 
tools for evaluating and controlling EU ETS performance. Rather than banning the use of 
parallel instruments, EU member states could introduce a cap on the use of parallel 
instruments based on these threshold levels. That is, a cap (in MtCO2 of abatement achieved 
per annum) could be set on the maximum allowed use of parallel instruments in each member 
state. In that manner, the total impact of parallel instruments could remain well below the 
threshold level. Although its implementation is unlikely to be an easy exercise, a ‘cap on 
parallel instruments’ would have two advantages. First, it would ensure that the economic and 
competitive advantages of cooperation via the EU ETS would be reaped, as (possibly 
unintentional) lower effectiveness of even redundancy of the EU ETS would be avoided. 
Second, the cap would stimulate national governments to introduce only those parallel 
instruments that would offer the greatest local benefits. In that manner, local governments 
would be forced to allocate public resources in a more cost-efficient manner, and would make 
them aware of adverse interactions between the EU ETS and parallel instruments. 
It would be valuable to examine whether a cap on parallel instruments is compatible 
with a policy setting with multiple energy and climate targets. More specifically, if the use of 
parallel instruments were to be restricted, stringent renewables and energy efficiency targets 
might become unachievable. It also could imply that policy makers would first have to lower 
the EU ETS allowance cap before allowing for a higher cap on the use of parallel instruments. 
Alternatively, policy makers could set less ambitious national renewables and energy 
efficiency targets. In either case, a cap on parallel instruments would give policy makers an 
incentive to design a more coherent policy setting in which adverse interactions would be 
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reduced to a minimum and public resources would be used in a cost-efficient manner. In the 
process, also a loss of control could be avoided. 
As long as a cap on the use of parallel instruments is not in place, the results suggest 
that policy makers should be careful with the introduction of parallel instruments alongside 
the EU ETS if the scheme is intended to play an important role as an incentive for the 
deployment of CO2 abatement technologies. Aggressively passing and implementing non-EU 
ETS instruments while carbon prices are already low could moreover block an upward trend 
in the carbon price and ultimately lead to the redundancy of the EU ETS. 
3.6. Conclusion 
The results show that if the aggregate abatement impact of parallel instruments 
alongside the EU ETS is below approximately 20 MtCO2/yr, the forecasted mean emission 
level remains unaffected. This occurs because all abatement via parallel instruments is offset 
via the EU ETS. 
The forecasted emission level does decrease significantly if the aggregate impact of 
parallel instruments surpasses the level of 20 MtCO2/yr. This can be explained by a greater 
probability that the EU ETS will become redundant, i.e. if the scheme fails to trigger any 
abatement between 2013 and 2030. If the combined impact of parallel instruments is in 
between 20 and 45 MtCO2/yr, the future real impact of the EU ETS is uncertain, and hinges 
on the overall economic growth rates in Europe. The lower the average rate of economic 
growth, the greater the likelihood that the EU ETS becomes redundant. The model results 
suggest that redundancy of the EU ETS is certain if the combined impact of parallel 
instruments surpasses 45 MtCO2 per annum. We have multiple reasons to believe that in 
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reality these estimates are conservative, and that the actual threshold levels could be below the 
reported figures.  
When differentiating between types of parallel instruments, the results show that Type 
2 instruments lead to a stronger depreciation of the EU ETS carbon price than Type 1 
instruments. This can be explained by the fact that the former type of instruments lead to 
burden shifting between sectors: investments by end-use sectors effectively reduce the need 
for ETS sectors to invest in carbon abatement. If policymakers prioritize a strong EU ETS 
performance, the results suggest that they should be restrictive in introducing parallel 
instruments in both ETS and non-ETS sectors if the carbon price is already weak.  
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4.1. Introduction 
In 2005, EU member-states chose for the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) as a collective means to reduce CO2 emissions in energy intensive sectors. 
Meanwhile, individual member-states also govern a wide array of domestic instruments in 
parallel to the EU ETS. These parallel instruments are generally intended to further stimulate 
CO2 reduction efforts domestically. However, if parallel instruments are introduced by an EU 
member-state alongside the EU ETS, their net effect on the EU emission level will often be 
zero, compared to a scenario with just the EU ETS (Interact, 2003; Harrison et al., 2005; 
Sorrell et al., 2009). A parallel instrument may stimulate CO2 abatement efforts in the 
member-state where it is introduced. However, in that case it simultaneously provides 
downward pressure on the EU ETS carbon price because the demand for carbon allowances 
falls. In response to the lower carbon price, other EU member-stated are inclined to emit more 
CO2, leaving the overall emission level unchanged (Interact, 2003; Harrison et al., 2005; 
Sorrell et al., 2009). In its extreme, parallel instruments could drive the EU ETS carbon price 
to zero euros permanently, signalling a de facto end to international cooperation regarding 
CO2 abatement in Europe. Given the key role that was assigned by policymakers to the EU 
ETS in 2005, the simultaneous introduction of a range of parallel instruments that leave the 
emission level unchanged but potentially obstruct the functioning of the EU ETS seems 
counter intuitive. Consequently, policymakers need a thorough understanding of the 
magnitude of such interaction effects between parallel instruments and the EU ETS in order to 
be able to design a policy mix that is coherent with their policy objectives. 
Despite a lower than expected EU ETS carbon price since 2005, the role of parallel 
instruments as an explanation for recent low carbon prices remains unclear. Although many 
papers have identified the existence of a negative relationship between the number of parallel 
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instruments and a market-based carbon price (e.g. Hindsberger et al., 2003; Böhringer et al., 
2009; Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010; Linares et al., 2008; Morris et al., 2010), few have 
quantified the impact of parallel instruments on the current performance of the EU ETS. The 
low EU ETS carbon price is typically attributed to the over allocation of emission rights, and 
below average economic growth (Siikamäki et al., 2012), while the role of parallel 
instruments remains unclear.  In Chapter 3 of this study we did find two key thresholds levels 
regarding the sensitivity of the EU ETS to parallel instruments: (1) if parallel instruments 
trigger more abatement than 45 MtCO2 per year, the EU ETS carbon price is certain to fall to 
zero euros. Thereby, international cooperation via the scheme would come to a halt; (2) if the 
impact of parallel instruments falls below 20 MtCO2 per year, the EU ETS is able to co-exist 
with parallel instruments, although a significantly depreciated carbon price is likely if the 
annual impact approaches 20 MtCO2 per year. If the aggregate impact of parallel instruments 
falls in between 20 and 45 MtCO2 per year, the role of the EU ETS is uncertain and depends 
on future economic growth rates around Europe.  
Building on these thresholds, we need a forecast of the impact of the parallel 
instruments on CO2 abatement activity in EU member-states to determine the future role of 
the EU ETS in the policy mix. In this chapter, we aim to estimate that impact so that 
European and domestic policymakers can assess whether the current mix of instruments is 
expected to match their long-term policy goals. If policymakers prioritize the creation of a 
level-playing-field through an EU-wide carbon price, the results of such a study could suggest 
that policymakers should rely less on parallel instruments because their combined impact 
could or will ultimately lead to the redundancy of the EU ETS.  
In this study, we determine the impact on abatement activity of two key parallel 
instruments that have been introduced in the German power sector. Namely, Feed-In Tariffs 
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(FITs) and the Nuclear Phase Out (NPO). FITs are fixed tariffs that are paid to owners of 
newly built renewable sources of electricity. The level of the tariff is technology specific, 
depending on the cost of electricity generation. For example, solar power is awarded a higher 
tariff than wind power. The level of the tariff is fixed in long-term contracts and is awarded 
for each kilowatt hour of electricity that is produced. The NPO refers to the timetable that was 
set up by the German government to decommission all nuclear generation capacity before the 
end of 2022. Note that the NPO is primarily an energy policy measure and not specifically a 
CO2 abatement measure. However, through its impact on the electricity generation mix, the 
NPO is likely to seriously impact the CO2 emission level. Because nuclear electricity 
generation has a relatively low CO2 intensity, the NPO is likely to lead to an increase in the 
CO2 emission level of the German electricity sector as nuclear power will be replaced by 
technologies that, on average, have a higher CO2 intensity. 
We choose to focus on the German power sector for three reasons. First, the German 
power sector is the largest sector within the EU ETS, covering about 15% of all emissions 
under the EU ETS. Policies aimed at this sector are therefore most likely to have a significant 
impact on the performance of the EU ETS. Second, the German government has put in to 
place a relatively ambitious domestic agenda for the power sector, as it aims for increased use 
of renewable electricity supply, CO2 abatement and a nuclear power. This agenda is matched 
by a set of instruments that are likely to have a significant effect on the CO2 emission level in 
the German power sector. Finally, it is impossible to model all parallel instruments that 
interact with the EU ETS across Europe in a detailed manner given the wide array of 
instruments, countries and sectors that should be included in such an analysis. Nevertheless, 
apart from the two German parallel instruments we have modelled explicitly, we do account 
for the influence of other parallel instruments in a stylized manner in Section 4.4.4. In that 
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section, we examine the abatement impact of parallel instruments in the German power sector 
while broadly representing the prevalence of parallel instruments in other sectors and 
countries across the EU. How parallel instruments in other sectors and countries are modelled 
specifically is detailed in Section 4.4.4.  
To perform the required analysis, a model is needed that captures both the impact of 
instruments on the level of CO2 emissions in the German power sector, as well as the 
expected interaction effects between the EU ETS and parallel instruments. The latter element 
is often lacking in existing analyses because the strength of the CO2 price incentive is 
determined exogenously (Weigt et al., 2012). As a result, possible interaction effects between 
the instruments, which have been extensively documented in previous literature (Hindsberger 
et al., 2003; Linares et al., 2008; Böhringer et al., 2009; Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010; 
Morris et al., 2010), are omitted. Therefore, to examine the impact of parallel instruments on 
the expected emission level and carbon price, a more realistic representation of an ETS with 
an endogenously determined carbon price would be required. 
In this study, we apply a stochastic simulation model to capture the interactions 
between domestic instruments, the EU ETS, and the German power sector between 2008 and 
2030 (see Figure 4.1 in Section 4.3.1 for a model overview). The model works on a relatively 
high level of aggregation, but is used to model interactions between social, economic and 
technological systems. For example, we do not model the electricity production level at a 
plant level, but aggregate production levels for each technology type. Thereby, we assume 
that all plants of a particular technology type have the same technological and financial 
characteristics.  
We capture key dynamic – and interacting - factors that are expected to have a 
profound impact on the emission level and carbon price by modelling stochastics in a 
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relatively straight-forward way. Specifically, the economic growth rate, fuel prices, solar 
irradiance levels and wind speeds are modelled stochastically.22 The uncertain stochastic 
nature of each of these variables has a significant effect on operational and investment 
decisions of operators in the power sector and thereby affects the emission level and carbon 
price. The level of economic growth determines the need for, and profitability of, investments 
in generation capacity (Crousillat, 1989; Moreira et al., 2004; Vithayasrichareon and MacGill, 
2012). The economic growth rate thereby affects the expected long-term composition of the 
electricity generation mix. As the composition of the generation mix changes, naturally its 
CO2 emission output will change as well. The stochastic nature of fuel prices drives both the 
profitability of investments in specific generation technologies (Crousillat, 1989; Krey et al., 
2007; Mirkhani and Saboohi, 2012; Vithayasrichareon and MacGill, 2012) as well as fuel 
switching behaviour between existing gas, oil and coal-fired power plants (Söderholm, 2000, 
2001; Krey et al., 2007). Because gas-fired power plants have a significantly lower carbon 
intensity compared to oil and coal-fired plants, fuel price uncertainty can also significantly 
affect the emission level and carbon price (Chevallier, 2009). In turn, uncertain solar 
intensities and wind speed levels drive the availability of renewable, low-carbon, sources of 
supply (Lun and Lam, 2000; Hetzer et al., 2008). For example, in Germany, the difference 
between a year with high solar irradiance levels (95th percentile) and a year with low solar 
irradiance levels (5th percentile) in Germany translates into roughly a 16% difference of the 
annual electricity output of solar-based technologies (Šúri et al., 2007). The intermittent 
nature of solar and wind power also implies that the capacity utilization, emission output and 
                                                 
22 Radical technological innovation could also be modelled as an exogenous stochastic process (Silverberg and Verspagen, 
2003), but is not explicitly covered in this study. In the sensitivity analysis, we do explicitly account for innovation via 
experience curve effects. Experience curve effects can also be approximated as an exogenous stochastic process (Grubb et 
al., 2002; Papineau, 2006). However, we model this type of innovation as an endogenous process that is dependent on the  
rate of deployment of a technology. In that manner, we stick closely to the core principle behind experience curve effects, in 
the sense that cost reductions are directly related to experience that is gained with a technology (Junginger et al., 2010). 
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profitability of thermal power plants is affected as they have to adjust to the unpredictable 
supply of renewable electricity (GE Electric, 2010; Hart and Jacobsen, 2011; Hart et al., 
2012). Obviously, the impact of intermittent technologies on operational and investment 
decisions depends critically on their penetration level. 
As opposed to a deterministic approach, the stochastic approach ensures that we do not 
make implicit technological choices based on the aforementioned variables. Also, the 
confidence intervals around output parameters allow us to assess the likelihood of scenario 
outcomes. Because each of the stochastic parameters influences the emission level, they also 
interact with the strength of the EU ETS carbon price incentive. Higher emission levels 
provide upward pressure for the carbon price, stimulating investments in technologies with a 
low CO2-intensity. Alternatively, low emission levels provide downward pressure on the CO2-
price, and slow down the rate of investments in technologies with a low CO2-intensity. By 
running the model for a range of policy scenarios, the impact of individual policy instruments 
on the emission level can be simulated.  
We find that the combined impact of FITs and the NPO leaves the overall emission 
level in Europe unchanged, yet depreciates the EU ETS carbon price with an average of 15%. 
Given that all 30 countries under the EU ETS govern a much wider range of parallel 
instruments, not limited to the two under study here, the results suggest that parallel 
instruments are a prominent driver behind the relatively low carbon prices that are witnessed 
in the market today. EU member states that are most ambitious with introducing parallel 
instruments carry the most of the burden to abate CO2 in Europe while member states that do 
nothing are, at least partly, left off the hook. We proceed with a concise description of the 
literature on the interaction between instruments and targets in Section 4.2. The methodology 
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follows in Section 4.3. The results and sensitivity analysis are covered in Section 4.4. Finally, 
the discussion and conclusion follow in sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
4.2. Theory on interacting targets and instruments 
4.2.1. Controllability of a policy mix 
The assignment of interacting policy instruments to targets is known as the assignment 
problem and has its roots in the work of Tinbergen (1952; 1956). Tinbergen formulated 
general rules for the controllability of a policy mix. He coined the rule that the number of 
independent instruments must equal the number of independent targets for a solution to exist. 
The term solution refers to the ability to reach all policy targets. Whereas Tinbergen coined 
the rule for existence of a solution, Mundell (1962) formulated a key principle for attainment 
of that solution with regard to monetary and fiscal policy targets. Mundell’s Principle of 
Effective Market Classification states that an instrument should be paired with the target on 
which it has the greatest comparative influence. Specifically, he calculated that fiscal 
instruments should be used to attain internal macro-economic stability (relating to inflation 
and economic growth targets) and that monetary instruments should be used to attain external 
macro-economic stability (relating to balance of payments and exchange rate targets). He 
demonstrated that failure to do so (e.g. by using fiscal instruments to achieve external macro-
economic stability) would bring policymakers further out of course with their policy targets. 
These fundamental principles underline that policymakers should carefully select, design and 
assign instruments to policy targets in order to be able to achieve their target. Without a 
careful configuration of the policy mix achieving policy targets can become impossible or 
simply be the result of good fortune. 
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In this study, we analyse a policy mix with more instruments than targets. The EU 
CO2 emission-reduction target is pursued with multiple instruments that are governed by 
multiple relatively autonomous governments (the EU, as well as 31 individual states23). A 
policy mix with more instruments than targets has many possible solutions24 (Tinbergen, 
1952; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2011; Acocella et al., 2012). However, such a solution can be 
hard, if not impossible, to obtain in practice it requires strong coordination by a central 
planner. That planner should set all excess instruments at arbitrary fixed values, while having 
full information regarding the relations between instruments, targets and the behaviour of the 
private sector. Without a social planner or full information, a solution becomes indeterminate 
and uncontrollable for all governments involved (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2011; Acocella et al., 
2012). We study a policy mix that is neither governed by a central planner, nor can its future 
impact on the economic system be estimated with full certainty. Among other, uncertainty 
regarding fuel prices, economic growth rates and investment behaviour by the private sector 
imply that it is impossible for policymakers to calibrate all instruments such that a set of 
predefined fixed targets is met with certainty. Given this configuration, some loss of control 
over policy outcomes is inescapable. If instruments cannot be assigned to a target in a manner 
that guarantees that the goal is achieved, the objective becomes to maximize the likelihood 
that targets are met, or to minimize the likelihood of unwanted outcomes. The model that is 
developed in this study is a step towards that objective because our stochastic approach allows 
us to assess the likelihood of policy outcomes. 
Despite a possible loss of control, policymakers may opt for a complex mix of 
instruments for a variety of reasons. Pizer (2002) points out that the use of multiple 
                                                 
23 The EU consists out of 28 member states, but Norway and Liechtenstein and Iceland also participate in the EU ETS. 
24 Tinbergen (1952) notes that in an overdetermined system there is always one among the infinity of available solutions that 
maximizes welfare. If policymakers pursue fixed targets, as opposed to maximum welfare, the “problem” of “too many 
instruments” is introduced. 
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instruments may increase the credibility of a certain policy objective. He argues that a 
combination of instruments increases the number of tools that are available to policymakers, 
thereby strengthening their ability to respond to a crisis. Actors in the private sector know that 
the government is able to intervene in the event of a crisis and therefore see the policy 
objective and instrument as more credible. Sorrell and Sijm (2003) argue that combinations of 
instruments can be useful in relation to emission trading if it leads to an improvement of the 
static or dynamic efficiency of a trading scheme or if it delivers other valuable policy 
objectives. Bennear and Stavins (2007) note that multiple instruments can be justified in case 
of multiple market failures or if an exogenous constraint cannot be removed. We note that, 
although the mentioned benefits could exist, they should always be weighed against the cost 
of adverse interaction effects. Obtaining a reliable quantitative estimate of such costs and 
benefits is challenging but also important for anyone that is interested in designing a policy 
mix that is congruent to policy objectives. 
4.2.2. Policy congestion in the environmental domain 
Glachant (2001) studied whether the outcomes of environmental EU Directives25 were 
in line with the targets. He found that this is rarely the case and cited that interaction with 
other legislation (including non-environmental legislation) on the EU or nation state level was 
the primary cause for either non- or over-compliance with EU directives. He called for an 
adaptive design of policy instruments so that its configuration can be altered at a low cost 
when circumstances change. 
Interact (2003) was one of the first large research projects on policy interactions 
regarding climate policy. The project was funded by the European Commission to identify 
                                                 
25 He studied Directive 89/429 regulating atmospheric emission from domestic waste incinerators, Directive 88/609 dealing 
with SO2 and NOX emissions from large combustion plants and the Council Regulation 1836/93 concerning the voluntary 
participation of industrial companies in an EU Eco-management and Audit scheme (EMAS). 
501077-L-bw-Mulder
Chapter 4   115 
 
 
potentially hazardous interactions (between the EU ETS and parallel instruments) and thereby 
inform policymakers across the EU. The project’s final report presents an extensive typology 
regarding interaction types and effects and has resulted in a number of academic publications 
that warn for adverse interaction effects (Smith and Sorrell, 2001; Boemare and Quirion, 
2002; Mavrakis and Konidari, 2002; Boemare et al., 2003; Sorrell and Sijm, 2003). Adverse 
interaction effects that were identified include double counting problems (where avoided 
emissions are rewarded twice, emissions are penalised twice, or even penalized and rewarded 
at the same time via different instruments), a reduced allocative efficiency of the EU ETS (see 
also Sinn (2011)) and a lower carbon price (see also Frankhauser et al. (2010) and 
Hindsberger et al. (2003)). However, the warnings for adverse interactions are accompanied 
by at least as much rationales for co-existence of emission trading schemes with parallel 
instruments. Rationales for the use of parallel instruments that were identified by Interact 
(2003) include the need to overcome market failures that block technological innovation (see 
also Jaffe et al. (2005) and Oikonomou (2010)), mitigating allowance price uncertainty and 
capturing windfall profits26. Market failures can come in the form of imperfect information on 
energy efficiency opportunities. Instruments that correct such market failures may increase 
the dynamic and static efficiency of an emissions trading scheme. In turn, instruments that 
reduce carbon price uncertainty (e.g. by implementing a carbon price ceiling and floor (Pizer, 
1999; Mckibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002)) or capture windfall profits (e.g. by auctioning 
allowances instead of choosing for free allocation (Woerdman et al., 2009)) could improve 
the political acceptability of an emissions trading scheme. 
A number of studies followed in subsequent years, especially concerning interaction 
effects between emission trading schemes and renewable support schemes. Del Rio (2007) 
                                                 
26 Here, windfall profits relate to the ‘free money’ that is received by firms under the EU ETS when emission allowances are 
distributed for free, while these allowances have a positive monetary value via the ETS exchange.  
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performed a literature review on these studies, although he concludes that it remains an under-
researched field. Also he concludes that results are often context-specific and/or based on 
simple numerical examples with arbitrary numbers. Del Rio thus calls for more rigorous 
empirical research in settings that closely approach the conditions in real-world markets.  
Based on the groundwork of the Interact project and subsequent literature on the topic, 
Oikonomou and Jepma (2008) developed a qualitative analytical framework that combines all 
of the identified (beneficial or adverse) interactions. The framework can be used to generate 
an overview of the interactions that are to be anticipated in a policy mix. The analytical 
framework can be applied to any set of climate instruments that is under consideration. An 
important limitation of the framework is that it leaves the important task of determining the 
strength of an interaction as well as the relative weight of that interaction to the user of the 
framework. In absence of accurate data on the interaction effects, any policy mix could be 
justified depending on expert views. 
Despite increasing attention to the topic of policy interaction, Bye and Bruvoll (2008) 
state that policy development in the energy and environmental domain has already resulted 
into an overly congested policy space. They conclude that very little empirical evidence is 
available about the aggregate effect of environmental instruments. Bye and Bruvoll call for 
coordination and simplification of policy tools before new and primarily equivalent 
instruments are added to the policy space.  
Recently, the Appraise research project (Apraise, 2014) presented the 3E method. The 
qualitative 3E method is an iterative series of analytical steps to, first, identify interaction 
effects between environmental instruments and, secondly, use this information to build a 
policy mix that is (more) robust against unwanted interactions. One of the 12 case studies that 
were performed with the 3E method focussed on the attainability of hydropower deployment 
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targets in Austria. The study found that EU legislation on bio-diversity and water quality 
potentially leads to non-compliance regarding EU legislation on renewables targets. In 
absence of guidelines to balance the needs for renewables, bio-diversity and water quality, the 
current policy setting is likely to be set up for failure regarding at least one of the 
environmental targets. 
The authors stress that, although the Apraise 3E method is qualitative, it can also be 
used to improve the internal coherence of scenarios that are used in quantitative forecast 
models. Although we do employ a quantitative forecasting model in this study, we did not 
apply the 3E method in the design process. We suggest that the 3E method is particularly 
useful if it would become a routine procedure for policymakers to create awareness of 
interaction effects while designing a policy instrument. Given that awareness of interaction 
effects was both the starting and focal point of our research, a direct application of the 3E 
method had no added value here. That does not mean that our model covers the all of the 
interaction effect that may be anticipated within the policy space of the EU ETS.27 As 
mentioned in the introduction, for practical purposes we limit ourselves to the interaction 
effects between the EU ETS and key instruments in the German power sector.  
Along the lines of the suggestion made by Del Rio (2007), we aim to provide a 
detailed case study that closely approaches the conditions in the real world. In that manner, 
our results may provide a better insight and be of greater relevance to policymakers, than 
previous theoretical studies that were based on more simplistic models and assumptions. 
Greater relevance and applicability of modelling results may help policymakers to weigh 
more accurately the potential adverse and beneficial interaction effects, for example when 
                                                 
27 For example, the German government also has a Special Energy and Climate Fund (Esch, 2013) with which, among other, 
renewable electricity and energy efficiency projects are financed. This fund may interact in a similar manner with the EU 
ETS as the FITs do. However, the program is significantly smaller in size and is therefore left out of this analysis. 
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applying the analytical framework that was developed by Oikonomou and Jepma (2008) or 
the 3E method (Apraise, 2014). 
4.2.3. Quantitative Modelling of EU ETS with German FITs 
and NPO 
In this section we provide a concise overview of key quantitative modelling attempts 
regarding the interaction effects between the EU ETS, FITs and/or the NPO. 
Rathmann (2007) analysed the electricity price effects of introducing FITs in Germany 
alongside the EU ETS. He showed that electricity prices are expected to fall as long as the 
slope of the abatement cost curve28 lies above a threshold level of 0.16 (€/tCO2)/(MtCO2/yr). 
Rathmann estimates the slope of the abatement cost curve by dividing the CO2-price under the 
EU ETS in 2005 (€20/tCO2) with the expected short position of the EU ETS (70 MtCO2/yr). 
The slope of the marginal abatement cost curve was estimated to be 0.29 
(€/tCO2)/(MtCO2/yr), which lies above the threshold level of 0.16 (€/t)/(Mt/yr) leading to the 
conclusion that electricity prices are likely to fall. Also, with a rough estimation, he argued 
that, in absence of European targets for renewable electricity deployment, the EU ETS carbon 
price should have been approximately €53 instead of around €20 in 2005. In other words, 
these results suggest that introduction of targets for renewable electricity around Europe leads 
to a carbon price depreciation of more than 60%. The author does note that this estimate is 
very rough because of the highly stylized analytical model. In particular, Rathmann (2007) 
lacked detailed information regarding the actual shape of the marginal abatement cost curve 
around Europe and used static information regarding the carbon price and expected short 
                                                 
28 FITs are financed via a mark-up on the retail electricity price and thereby put upward pressure on the electricity price. At 
the same time, FITs are a substitute for an ETS and thus also put downward pressure on the CO2 price (and thereby 
downward pressure on the electricity price). The greater the slope of the abatement cost curve, the greater the latter effect.  
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position of the EU ETS in 2005 to infer its slope.29 As a result, he notes that the carbon price 
dynamics that are to be expected remain unclear and call for further research. Rathmann’s 
rough estimate did show that the sensitivity of the EU ETS carbon price to the introduction of 
parallel instruments may be rather strong. 
In our model, the EU ETS carbon price and short position are simulated dynamically 
over time, reflecting the fact that neither is necessarily linear or constant over time.30 Based 
on a detailed account of the expected abatement costs across the EU, stochastic emission 
growth rates and explicit modelling of allowance banking behaviour by participants under the 
EU ETS, we are able to model the interaction effects between the EU ETS carbon price and 
German FITs with a greater level of precision that Rathmann (2007).  
Abrell and Weight (2008) analysed how the EU ETS and German FITs interact using a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with data from 2004 on the German economy. 
They conclude that in the extreme, FITs can lead to an excess of carbon allowances and a zero 
euro carbon price. However, the limited scope of the analysis (Germany only), the outdated 
data from 2004 and the static and simplistic manner in which emissions trading is represented 
(as a non-tradable emissions quota) imply that these results have little value with regard to the 
performance of the actual EU ETS or the German FITs. The fact that stringent targets for 
renewable deployment can make the EU ETS redundant, with a carbon price of zero euro, has 
also been demonstrated analytically in different settings by De Jonghe et al. (2009) and 
Hindsberger et al. (2003). All of these papers show that a zero euro carbon price is 
theoretically possible yet do not show whether it is a probable outcome.  
                                                 
29 The short position of the EU ETS refers to the scarcity of allowances. The scarcity of allowances under the EU ETS is 
uncertain and unstable over time. As a result, relying on an ex-ante static forecast to estimate the short position of the EU 
ETS can lead to inaccurate modelling results. 
30 For example, fuel price fluctuations affect the marginal cost of CO2 abatement, and thereby the shape of the abatement cost 
curve. Economic growth fluctuations and allowance banking behaviour affect the short position under the EU ETS. 
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Because of the probabilistic approach in this study, we are able to evaluate the 
likelihood of an outcome. For example, we will be able to demonstrate whether it is likely that 
the FITs and NPO lead to redundancy of the EU ETS. Probability distributions of the CO2 
price and emissions level will be provided in the results section for each scenario that we test. 
Traber and Kemfert (2009) performed an ex-post analysis of the impact of FITs on the 
emission level and electricity price in Germany. Based on 2006 data, they find that the 
introduction of FITs changed the emission level by -11%. In their analysis they distinguish 
between a substitution effect (-16%) and a permit price effect (+5%). The substitution effect 
entails that, if FITs are introduced, production switches from conventional production 
capacity to renewable low-carbon production capacity. The permit price effect covers the fact 
that the carbon price falls after the introduction of FITs leading to a stimulus for carbon 
intensive production capacity. They note that the overall emission level in Europe as a whole 
remains unchanged.  
Traber and Kemfert (2009) also estimate that the introduction of FITs lead to a fall of 
the 2006 carbon price from 23 to 20 euro per allowance (-15%). Interestingly, they do not find 
evidence for the theoretically possible decrease in consumer electricity prices, as documented 
by Rathmann (2007). Instead, Traber and Kemfert (2009) identify a pronounced increase in 
the consumer electricity prices. This can be explained by the fact that large conventional 
producers exhibit some level of market power and are able to shift the burden of the FIT (the 
cost incurred due to lower production rates of conventional plants) from producers to 
consumers (via a higher electricity price).  
In a working paper, Traber and Kemfert (2012) also analyse the impact of the NPO on 
the EU ETS carbon price. They find an increase of the carbon price between 1.8 and 2.6 euro 
per allowance by 2020 under the current EU ETS regime. This is in line with the 2 euro jump 
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of the EU ETS carbon price when the NPO was publicly announced in March 2011 (Matthes 
et al., 2011). 
Traber and Kemfert (2009, 2012) employ a model that covers the electricity sector in 
25 EU countries. Albeit static, their representation of the electricity sectors across the EU is 
more detailed than the models used by Rathmann (2007), Abrell and Weigt (2008) and the 
model in this study. However, the static nature of the model implies that the EU ETS is also 
represented in a simple and static manner by Traber and Kemfert (2009); a critique that can 
also applicable to Rathmann (2007) and Abrell and Weigt (2008). The static EU ETS metrics 
from 2005 (Rathmann, 2007) and 2006 (Traber and Kemfert, 2009) that were used in the 
analyses do not accurately represent the form and functioning of the EU ETS since the start of 
Phase II of the EU ETS in 2008. Among others, the ETS allowance supply regime has been 
strongly adjusted at the start of Phase II. Also, banking of allowances became a possibility for 
firms under the scheme in 2008.  
Because firms are allowed to bank allowances (and can thereby offset a short position 
in one year with surpluses from previous years), we stress that models of emission trading 
schemes should account for the cumulative supply and demand of allowances over an 
extended period of time to accurately assess the need for CO2 abatement, and the level of the 
carbon price. For example, the financial crisis in 2008 and subsequent economic crisis showed 
how vulnerable the performance of the EU ETS is to allowance demand uncertainty. The fall 
in economic output resulted in a large surplus of carbon allowances that rendered abatement 
activity unnecessary for years to come while also supressing the carbon price (see Section 
2.3). Parallel instruments could therefore have a stronger or weaker effect on the EU ETS 
carbon price, depending on the availability of banked allowances, the prevailing level of 
economic growth and the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve.  
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Our model does capture the impact of the allowance banking mechanism because we 
simulate the EU ETS over a longer time horizon (2008-2030). Apart from the allowance 
banking mechanism, the chosen time horizon is sufficiently long to capture the impact of all 
the examined instruments on investment behaviour and, thereby, the long term CO2 emission 
output of the German power sector. Key dynamic and interacting parameters (among others 
parameters that are dependent on the rate of economic growth) are modelled stochastically 
over time. As a result, we expect to be able to draw a more complete and accurate picture of 
the impact of the German FITs and NPO on the performance of the EU ETS.  
The insights that are obtained via this study can be particularly valuable to 
policymakers. Specifically, the probabilistic analysis can help policymakers to assign weights 
to potential interaction effects when they consider the introduction of FITs or a NPO 
alongside an ETS. Because this study is specifically tailored to the German case, direct 
extrapolation of the results to other (future) policy settings is not possible. However, the 
results may provide a deeper insight in the dynamics and vulnerabilities of a policy mix with 
this composition.  
4.3. Methodology 
The methodology section is divided into three main sections. In Section 4.3.1 we 
provide a general description of the model design and components. Also, we explain how 
instruments are expected to affect the carbon price and the emission level via each of the 
model components. Subsequently, in Section 4.3.2 we provide the mathematical description 
of the model. Finally, in Section 4.3.3 we layout the 8 scenarios that are tested. 
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4.3.1. General description 
The model, as shown in Figure 4.1, consists out of two key components: an EU ETS 
module (ETSM) and a module for the German power sector (GPSM). Based on the CO2 
emission level in the previous year ( െ ͳ), the ETSM calculates the equilibrium carbon price 
for year  of the simulation.31 Information from a previous year ( െ ͳ) that is used in year  is 
indicated in Figure 4.1 with a forward loop. Based on the equilibrium carbon price, the GPSM 
determines the spot and forward selling of electricity, investments in new generation capacity, 
the retail electricity price and electricity demand. Together, they determine the emission 
output of the German power sector and the emission output of all other sectors that are 
covered by the EU ETS throughout Europe in year .  
                                                 
31 In reality, the accounting process to verify the level of CO2 emissions around Europe takes several months to complete. As 
a result, the emission level over the year ݐ െ ͳ is publicly announced via the European Commission around April of year ݐ. 
We assume that this information is available at the start of year ݐ.  
Figure 4.1: Model overview 
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A detailed description of the ETSM, and the manner in which the annual equilibrium 
carbon price is determined, can be found in Chapter 2. Below, we will describe the GPSM, 
and the manner in which it is linked to the ETSM, in detail. Figure 4.1 is a simplified 
representation of the model. The arrows only indicate key interactions between the different 
model components. Costs and prices are all denoted in 2010 euros. 
The input parameters of the ETSM and GPSM are outlined on the left in Figure 4.1. 
The abbreviation pdf indicates which input parameters are modelled stochastically.32 A more 
detailed overview of all stochastic parameters is provided in Table 4.1. The table outlines nine 
stochastic parameters, divided over four classes. For example, the growth rates of the demand 
for electricity (in Germany) and the emission level (in the rest of Europe) belong to the same 
class because they are both dependent on the rate of economic growth. The probability 
distributions that are associated to the stochastic parameters are described in the sections 
indicated in column four of Table 4.1. 
 Our procedure is as follows. We sample a value from the probability distribution of a 
stochastic parameter for each relevant time step between 2008 and 2030 (see column 3 of 
Table 4.1). For example, emission growth rates that are dependent on economic growth are 
sampled for each year in the interval (implying 23 samples for the German electricity demand 
growth rate). Wind speed and solar irradiance levels are sampled for each hour in the interval 
(implying 201,480 samples for offshore wind speeds). The fuel price growth rate is sampled 
for each season in the interval (implying 92 samples for the rate of change in the oil price).  
                                                 
32 Other model parameters that are uncertain/unknown and could affect the model output will be covered in the sensitivity 
analysis.   
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We perform a Monte Carlo procedure by repeating this process 2,000 times. By 
combining the model output of all 2,000 model runs, we obtain a probability distribution of 
the future emission level in Germany as well as the carbon price. As opposed to a fully 
deterministic approach, the Monte Carlo simulation allows us to determine to what extent 
abatement activity is driven by forces that are outside the control of policymakers and 
operators in the electricity market.  
The ETSM and GPSM modules forecast the emission level and abatement activity 
between 2008 and 2030, but do so using different time steps. The ETSM uses annual time 
steps, while each year is divided up into 16 time slices in the GPSM. A time slice represents a 
portion of a typical day (night, morning, afternoon or evening) in one of the four seasons. An 
overview of all time slices is provided in the first three columns of Table 9.1 in the Appendix. 
We divide up the year in this manner because, as opposed to the carbon price, the 
electricity price pattern is characterized by seasonality and alternations between day and 
night. Consequently, the profitability of investments in a technology depends greatly on the 
exact moments in a year during which a technology is expected to be operational. We 
therefore need time slices that are small enough to capture seasonal and daily variation in the 
production mix and electricity price.  
Table 4.1: Stochastic input parameters 
Class Parameter Sampled for every 
…. time Step 
Section Equation 
Economic growth Electricity demand growth in Germany Yearly (ݐ) 4.3.2.1. 4.1 
Emission growth rate in the Rest of Europe Yearly (ݐ) 4.3.2.4 4.49 
Wind power Onshore wind power Hourly (݄)* 4.3.2.2.1 4.6 
Offshore wind power Hourly (݄)* 4.3.2.2.1 4.6 
Solar irradiance Solar irradiance Hourly (݄)* 4.3.2.2.1 4.8 
Fuel prices Coal price Seasonal (ݏ)** 4.3.2.2.2 4.19 
Gas price Seasonal (ݏ)** 4.3.2.2.2 4.19 
Uranium price Seasonal (ݏ)** 4.3.2.2.2 4.19 
Oil price Season (ݏ)** 4.3.2.2.2 4.19 
*Note that the smallest time step in the GPSM is a time slice (ݐݏ) that consists out of 547.5 hours (see Table 9.1, column 
1-3, for an overview of all time slices). To find the wind speed/solar irradiance level for a single time slice we take the 
average over 547.5 samples. See below in this section for a detailed explanation on time slices. 
**A season consists out of 4 time slices. 
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The hours in a year are grouped in time slices such that seasonal and daily trends can 
be captured while maintaining computational efficiency. Note that the manner of grouping the 
hours implies that the time slices do not have a sequential order from 1 to 16. For example, 
time slice number 10 captures all hours that fall in the summer afternoon; the hours between 
12:00-18:00pm over three months. Given that a typical year exists out of 365*24=8,760 
hours, each of the 16 time slices represents 8,760/16=547.5 hours. Although the time slices 
are relatively large (some power market models use hourly, sequential, time steps) this 
method does not lead to a significant loss of detail. To see why, consider that the composition 
of the production mix may vary over the 547.5 hours that are grouped in a single time slice. If 
the mix of electricity generating technologies changes, the emission level also changes. A 
primary driver of these variations is the uncertain availability of solar and wind power. If the 
model would be deterministic, such variations would not be accounted for and lead to a great 
loss of detail. However, because we perform 2,000 Monte Carlo model runs, and sample solar 
and wind speeds from a probability distribution for each run, relatively large time slices can 
be used without a significant loss of detail. Using smaller time steps would primarily lead to a 
significant increase in the computation time of the model. Individual time slices are denoted 
by ݐݏ. A year is denoted by . Finally, seasons are subsets of 4 time slices and are denoted by 
. See Table A.1 in the Appendix for an overview. 
Having explained the key input parameters, the Monte Carlo procedure, and the 
different time steps/slices in the two modules of the model, we will now describe the manner 
in which the ETSM and GPSM modules interact, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Specifically, we 
explain the ways in which the introduction of a carbon price (ETSM) is expected to affect the 
emission output of the German power sector (GPSM). Subsequently, we explain the concept 
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behind the two parallel instruments that are under study (FITs and the NPO) and the manner 
in which these instruments are expected to affect the carbon price (ETSM).  
The introduction of a carbon price (ETSM) affects abatement activity in the German 
power sector (GPSM) in three ways: via the spot market, via the forward market and via 
investments in new generation capacity. All three will now be discussed in more detail.  
Carbon price impact on the spot market - The spot market functions on the basis of 
economic dispatch. Economic dispatch entails that owners of generation capacity place bids, 
based on their marginal production costs, to obtain production blocks. The technologies with 
the lowest marginal cost are dispatched first, until enough capacity is dispatched to meet the 
spot demand in each time slice. If a carbon price is introduced, operators of CO2 emitting 
technologies will experience higher marginal productions costs. As a direct result, the 
probability that a carbon-intensive technology will become operational via economic dispatch 
falls. If carbon intensive technologies do become operational, the higher marginal production 
costs will generally result in a higher electricity price because the electricity price is 
determined by the producer with the highest marginal production costs. A higher electricity 
price will lower the demand for electricity. Both possible effects, lower reliance on carbon-
intensive technologies or a lower demand for electricity via a higher electricity price, reduce 
the CO2 emissions of the German power sector.  
Carbon price impact on the forward market –The effects of a carbon price on the 
forward market are similar to those on the spot market. We assume that operators can sell 
electricity one or two years ahead of production on the forward market. That is, operators can 
sell forward contract in year  െ ͳ or  െ ʹ to produce a specified amount of electricity in year 
. By selling on the forward market, operators gain certainty about the production level and 
revenue in a future period. What type of generation capacity is sold forward (e.g. hydro, coal-
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fired or gas-fired capacity) depends on the forecasts of the electricity price and the marginal 
production costs of each technology. The lower the marginal production costs, the easier it is 
for operators to sell their electricity forward at a profit. The carbon price will increase the 
marginal production costs of CO2-emitting technologies. Thereby, the introduction of a 
carbon price makes it harder for operators to sell their electricity forward in a profitable 
manner. Consequently, the carbon intensity of the electricity that is sold via the forward 
market is expected to fall. Note that the introduction of a carbon price in year  will not affect 
the forward production in year  itself because those contracts were already negotiated in year 
 െ ͳ and  െ ʹ. However, it can affect new forward contracts with a production date in the 
year  ൅ ͳ or  ൅ ʹ.  
Carbon price impact on investments – Because a carbon price increases the operating 
costs of CO2-emitting technologies, and reduces the probability that those technologies will be 
operational via both the spot and forward market, the net present value of investments in CO2-
emitting technologies is expected to fall. Consequently, the level of investments in CO2-
intensive technologies is expected to decline. At the same time, the introduction of a carbon 
price increases both the price of electricity and the probability that dispatchable renewable 
technologies will become operational. Thereby, the carbon price also, indirectly, stimulates 
investments in renewable technologies. Through discouragement of investments in carbon-
emitting technologies, and indirect support for investment in renewable technologies, the 
introduction of a carbon price is expected to have a downward effect on future emission levels 
via investments. 
 In sum, the carbon price (ETSM) is expected to lead to a lower emission level in the 
German power sector (GPSM). The anticipated effects via the spot market, forward market 
and investments are unidirectional, and point to increased CO2 abatement activity. 
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We will now discuss the anticipated effects of introducing two parallel instruments in 
the German power sector (GPSM) on the carbon price (ETSM). The introduction of a NPO 
and FITs (GPSM) affects the carbon price (ETSM) in a variety of ways, which will be 
discussed below. Note that we discuss the anticipated effects under the assumption that a 
carbon price is already in place, and that one of the parallel instrument is added to that policy 
setting. In general, both parallel instruments affect the carbon price indirectly via the emission 
output of the German power sector. If a parallel instruments leads to an overall increase in the 
emission level, the carbon price is expected to increase. If the overall emission level decreases 
further after the introduction of a parallel instrument, the carbon price is expected to fall. 
First, we discuss the expected effects of introducing a NPO, followed by a discussion of the 
expected effects of introducing FITs. 
NPO impact on the carbon price – The NPO refers to the timetable that was set up by 
the German government to decommission all nuclear generation capacity before the end of 
2022. The timetable specifies when each plant is set to be decommissioned. The first plants 
were decommissioned in 2011, with others following in 2015, 2017, 2019, 2021 and 2022. 
The effect of the NPO on the emission level depends on the technology that replaces the 
nuclear capacity. Nuclear electricity generation has a relatively low CO2 intensity (0.016 
tCO2/MWh versus 0.4 and 0.9 tCO2/MWh for gas and coal fired plants respectively). The 
emission level is therefore likely to increase if nuclear power is replaced by conventional 
thermal generation technologies. However, if nuclear technology is replaced by renewable 
technology with a lower carbon intensity –nuclear generation technology has a CO2 intensity 
of 0.016 tCO2/MWh - a phase out may lead to a slight fall in emissions, although such a fall 
would be hardly noticeable. 
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Conventional thermal generation capacity is readily available in Germany, while the 
capacity of renewable electricity production is currently too low to fully replace the nuclear 
power capacity. Therefore, we expect both higher emissions and a higher carbon price in the 
short term. The long-term effect on the emission level depends on the rate of investments in 
renewable technologies. Other effects of the NPO are (1) a higher electricity price (because a 
relatively cheap abatement option is replaced by technologies with higher marginal 
production costs) and (2) a lower demand level (in response to the higher electricity price).  
Overall, a NPO is likely to provide upward pressure for the emission level and carbon 
price in the long run. However, if the higher electricity price triggers large investments in 
renewables alongside a drop in the demand for electricity, the upward pressure on the 
emission level and carbon price may be partly or fully compensated for. 
FITs impact on the carbon price – FITs offer investors in renewable generation 
technologies the opportunity to sell their electricity at a predetermined fixed price for 20 
years. Also, investors are offered priority dispatch. This means that operators are not 
dependent on the economic dispatch system on the spot market, but have guaranteed access to 
the grid. In other words, any electricity that is produced can be sold directly against the 
predetermined price. Given these clear advantages, FITs are expected to boost the deployment 
of renewable technologies, lower the emission level and provide downward pressure on the 
carbon price. FITs are also expected to significantly increase the retail electricity price, 
because FITs are financed through a mark-up on the retail electricity price. The predetermined 
price that is offered to producers is thereby fully paid for by consumers. A higher electricity 
price will reduce the demand and provide further downward pressure on the emission level. 
All in all, the anticipated effect of FITs on the carbon price is clear: the carbon price is 
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expected to depreciate because of a combination of higher deployment rates of renewables 
and a reduction of the demand for electricity. 
4.3.2. Mathematical description of the GPSM 
 In this section, we formalize the model. The main aim is to develop the GPSM 
module that determines the emission output of the German power sector. Subsequently, we 
link the GPSM to an existing module that determines the EU ETS-based carbon price 
(ETSM). By linking the GPSM and the ETSM, we are able to determine interaction effects 
between instruments in the German power sector, the EU ETS carbon price and the emission 
level. 
To determine the emission output of the German power sector, we first define the 
demand for electricity in Section 4.3.2.1. The supply of electricity is formalized in Section 
4.3.2.2. The equilibrium between the demand and supply for electricity depends on the 
available generation capacity (formalized in Section 4.3.2.2.1), and is ultimately determined 
on both the spot market (Section 4.3.2.2.2.) and the forward market (Section 4.3.2.2.3). The 
production mix in future periods is in part driven by investments in new generation capacity 
(section 4.3.2.2.4). We define how FITs and the NPO are modelled in Section 4.3.2.3. Finally, 
we formalize how the GPSM and ETSM modules are integrated in Section 4.3.2.4 
4.3.2.1.  DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY 
The demand for electricity determines how much electricity needs to be produced. 
Obviously, there is a positive relationship between the demand for electricity and the level of 
CO2 emissions. We do not discriminate between types of consumers (households, industry, 
commerce, etc.), but only determine the total demand for electricity in MWh. The total 
demand for electricity in year ݐ is denoted by: 
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ܶܦ௧ ൌ ܶܦ௧ିଵ כ ሺͳ ൅ ܧܮܩ௧ሻ כ ሺͳ ൅ ோா೟షభିோா೟షమೃಶ೟షభశೃಶ೟షమ
మ
כ െͲǤʹሻ  ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ  (4.1) 
 
Total demand in year ݐ (in MWh) is calculated by multiplying total demand in the 
previous year (ܶܦ௧ିଵ) by two terms: the rate of growth of electricity demand (ܧܮܩ௧), and a 
correction for the arc price elasticity33 of demand. The former term captures changes in the 
demand for electricity that are driven by economic growth whereas the latter term captures 
changes in the demand for electricity that are driven by the level of the retail electricity price 
(ܴܧ). 
ܧܮܩ௧ represents the growth in electricity demand. ܧܮܩ௧ is sampled from a normal 
distribution34 with mean 0.5% and standard deviation 1.09%. The mean is in line with the 
projection of the Institut für Energiewirtshaft und Rationelle Energieanwendung between 
2007 and 2030 (IER, 2010). We calculated the standard deviation on the basis of German 
electricity demand between 1994 and 2008 (BWT, 2013). To represent the impact of the 
recession that started in 2008, the input values for ܧܮܩ௧ over the period 2008-2012 have been 
set deterministically based on historical data. 
The demand correction for the arc price elasticity of demand is calculated based on the 
change in the retail electricity price in the previous year. We assume an elasticity of demand 
of -0.2, in line with other studies on the German power sector (see e.g. Sijm et al., 2006 and 
Hobbs et al., 2005). This implies a demand response of -0.2% for a 1% increase (based on 
arc-elasticity) of the retail electricity price. 
                                                 
33 The arc price elasticity means that the change in the retail price is denoted relative to the midpoint between the retail prices 
in ݐ െ ͳ and ݐ െ ʹ. As a result, the demand response is symmetric, irrespective whether the price changes from, for example 
21ct./KWh to 23 ct./KWh or vice versa. 
34 The number of historical data points is limited and therefore the exact shape of the probability distribution cannot be 
estimated with great certainty. Using a Chi-square goodness-of-fit test we were unable to reject a normal distribution at the 
5% significance level. 
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The retail electricity price in year ݐ is defined as: 
 
ܴܧ௧ ൌ ൫σ ா೟ೞǡ೟ௌ஽೟ೞǡ೟
భల೟ೞసభ ൯
σ ௌ஽೟ೞǡ೟భల೟ೞసభ
൅ ͳ͸Ͳ   ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ     (4.2) 
 
The retail electricity price (in €/MWh) is equal to the sum of two terms: the weighted 
average spot electricity price and other costs. Other costs include network costs as well as 
taxes and levies (excluding those related to the FIT-scheme). In 2008, these other costs 
amounted to approximately €160 per MWh (BDEW, 2013; Gerbert et al., 2013). In order not 
to overly complicate the analysis, we assume that other costs remain constant over time.  
ܧ represents the spot electricity price (in €/MWh) in time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ, ܵܦ 
represent the spot demand for electricity (in MWh) in that same time slice. Both ܧ and ܵܦ 
will be further defined in Section 4.3.2.2.2 on the spot market. 
The demand for electricity, as defined in Equation 4.1, is not constant throughout the 
year. For example, the demand for electricity if higher in the winter compared to the summer. 
Also, the demand is higher in the afternoon and evening compared to the night and morning. 
We account for this in Equation 4.3. The electricity demand in time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ is 
defined as: 
 
ܦ௧௦ǡ௧ ൌ ܶܦ௧ כ ܮܨ௧௦       ݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ   (4.3) 
Total demand (ܶܦ௧) is multiplied by the load factor for time slice ݐݏ (ܮܨ௧௦).35 The 16 
load factors sum to 1 and are provided in column four of Table 9.1 in the Appendix. Data 
sources are specified in Table 9.1 as well.36 
                                                 
35 Note that ݐݏ is a single index (and abbreviation) of a time slice. It is distinct from the index ݐ, which captures an entire 
year. 
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4.3.2.2. SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY 
A mix of electricity generation technologies is used to meet the demand for electricity. 
The exact composition of the production mix determines the level of CO2 emissions. The 
composition of the production mix depends on two factors: the availability and the generation 
costs of each technology. In Section 4.3.2.2.1 we formalize the availability of generation 
capacity of each technology. In Sections 4.3.2.2.2 and 4.3.2.2.3 we formalize the production 
costs of each technology to calculate which technologies supply electricity via the spot and 
forward market respectively. Finally, in Section 4.3.2.2.4, we determine the level of new 
investments in each technology based on their profitability.  
4.3.2.2.1. Generation Capacity 
In this study, we distinguish between 22 generation technologies. See Table 9.2 for an 
overview. The available generation capacity of technology ݅ in MW in year ݐ is defined as:  
 
ܥܣ ௧ܲ௜ ൌ ܥܣ ௧ܲିଵ௜ െ ܴܧ ௧ܶ௜ ൅ ܫܰ ௧ܸି஼்೔௜           ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿ ǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ  (4.4) 
Here, ܥܣ ௧ܲିଵ௜  is the generation capacity of technology ݅ in the previous year, minus 
the capacity that is retired in year ݐ (ܴܧ ௜ܶǡ௧), plus new investments (ܫܰ ௜ܸǡ௧ି஼்೔) in technology 
݅ that come on stream in year ݐ. ܥ ௜ܶ is de construction time of a typical plant of technology ݅ 
(see column 4 of Table 9.2 in the Appendix for input values). New investments are defined 
endogenously and will be specified later in Section 4.3.2.2.4. 
The generation capacity in the first year of the simulation and the retirement schedule 
are exogenous input to the model. The generation capacity in 2008 is shown in column 5 of 
                                                                                                                                                        
36 In Section 4.3.2.2.2. we distinguish between consumers who buy electricity via the spot market (equal to ܵܦ௧௦ǡ௧) and those 
that buy electricity via the forward market (equal toσ ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ  ). The total demand for electricity in a specific time slice 
(ܦ௧௦ǡ௧) is equal to the sum of spot demand (ܵܦ௧௦ǡ௧) and forward demand (σ ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ). 
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Table 9.2 in the Appendix. The retiring schedule between 2008 and 2030 is displayed in 
Figure 9.1 in the Appendix. Some technologies are not included in Figure 9.1. This is due to 
one of two reasons: either no capacity was deployed in 2008, or no capacity is projected to be 
retired before 2030. We estimated the retiring schedule of the existing portfolio on a plant-
level (UB, 2014), based on the year of construction, the generation capacity and the assumed 
technical life time (column 6 in Table 9.2) of each plant. The most detailed plant-level data 
that we are aware of (UB, 2014) also specified if plants underwent a technical upgrade at 
some point since their first commissioning. We assume that, if such an upgrade was 
performed, it extends the technical lifetime of a plant by 70%. We calibrated this percentage 
such that the calculated operational capacity for 2008 matches the actual 2008 levels, as 
specified in column 5 of Table 9.2. Upgrading an existing plant is not an investment option in 
the model. We only accounted for upgrading to generate the retirement schedule. Regarding 
nuclear generation capacity, we have brought the retirement schedule in line with existing 
retirement planning before the introduction of the NPO (Bundestag, 2010). 
Column 7 in Table 9.2 specifies the year in which a technology is introduced to the 
power market model. For example, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is assumed to be 
technically ready to be introduced in 2025. Before that year, CCS technology will not be 
deployed. Similarly, a new type of Biomass technology (CHP and dedicated) is assumed to 
become available in 2015 alongside the conventional biomass technologies.  
Equation 4.4 defines the available technical generation capacity in MW for each 
technology. However, none of the technologies is able to utilize 100% of the technical 
generation capacity at any time during the year. Intermittent sources of electricity supply are 
dependent on the availability of wind power and solar irradiation levels. Also, thermal plants 
generally never operate above 95% of the installed capacity. Other dispatchable sources of 
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electricity supply are dependent on the supply of resources (e.g. water, biomass or biogas) 
which may not always be available. To account for this limit, a capacity factor is specified for 
each technology. The capacity factor indicates the maximum operational capacity as a fraction 
of the rated capacity. For example, a technology with an installed capacity of 2 GW and a 
capacity factor of 0.95 has a maximum operational capacity of 1.9 GW. For dispatchable 
technologies, the capacity factor is constant over time and is provided in column 8 of Table 
9.2. Using the capacity factor, we can determine the production factor (ܲܨ). The production 
factor is used to convert MW of installed generation capacity into the maximum production 
level in MWh per technology ݅: 
 
ܲܨ௜ ൌ ܥܣܲܨ௜ כ ͷͶ͹Ǥͷ    ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሼͷǡǥ ǡʹʹሽ      (4.5) 
 
The above formula holds for all dispatchable technologies (݅ ൌ ሼͷǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡʹʹሽ). Note that 
we multiply by 547.5 because there are 547.5 hours in a time slice. In the remainder of this 
section we specify the production factor for intermittent technologies (݅ ൌ ሼͳǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡͶሽ), which 
are modelled stochastically. In the following section (Section 4.3.2.2.2) we use the production 
factor ܲܨ to determine the production mix on the spot market. 
Wind power - The production and capacity factor for wind turbines depends on a 
stochastically sampled wind speed, and the technical parameters of the wind turbine. We 
assume a typical 80 meter high wind turbine, with cut in, rated and cut off wind speed of 3, 12 
and 25 meter/second. These parameters indicate that the turbine starts producing electricity if 
the wind speed is greater than 3 m/s, and is shut down if the wind speed surpasses 25 m/s. The 
turbine is able to produce at full capacity between 12 and 25 m/s.  
501077-L-bw-Mulder
Chapter 4   137 
 
 
The capacity factor of wind powered technology during an hour ݄  in time slice ݐݏ in 
year ݐ is defined as: 
  
Ͳ݂݅߱௛ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൫ߣ௧௦௜ ǡ ߢ௧௦௜ ൯ ൏ ͵݋ݎ߱௛ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൫ߣ௧௦௜ ǡ ߢ௧௦௜ ൯ ൐ ʹͷ 
ܥܣܲܨ௛ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൌ  ఠ೓ǡ೟ೞǡ೟
೔ ൫ఒ೟ೞ೔ ǡ఑೟ೞ೔ ൯ି௖௨௧௜௡
௥௔௧௘ௗି௖௨௧௜௡ ݂݅͵ ൑ ߱௛ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൫ߣ௧௦௜ ǡ ߢ௧௦௜ ൯ ൑ ͳʹ    
                                      1݂݅ͳʹ ൑ ߱௛ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൫ߣ௧௦௜ ǡ ߢ௧௦௜ ൯ ൑ ʹͷ 
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሼͳǡʹሽǡ ݄ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͷͶͺሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                     (4.6) 
A graphical representation of Equation 4.6 is shown in Figure 9.2 in the Appendix. 
The capacity factor is zero if the stochastically sampled wind speed (߱௛ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ) is either lower 
than the cut-in wind speed, or higher than the cut-off wind speed. If the wind speed is in 
between the cut-in and rated wind speeds, we assume that the capacity factor rises linearly 
from zero to one. Finally, the capacity factor is equal to one if the stochastically sampled wind 
speed is both greater than the rated wind speed, and lower than the cut-off wind speed.  
The wind speed is stochastically sampled from a Weibull distribution with scale 
parameter ߣ௧௦௜  and shape parameter ߢ௧௦௜ .37 The distributions differ strongly for onshore (݅ ൌ ͳ) 
and offshore (݅ ൌ ʹ) wind speeds. Offshore wind speeds are generally higher. This is reflected 
in the input data provided in columns 5-8 of Table 9.1. In each time slice, the values of the 
scale and shape parameters are the greatest for offshore wind, when compared to those of 
onshore wind. Data sources are provided below Table 9.1. 
Equation 4.6 defines the capacity factor for a single hour within a time slice. There are 
547.5 hours in a time slice. Therefore, we take a sample for each hour, and sum the obtained 
capacity factors to determine the production factor of technology  in time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ: 
                                                 
37 Aksoy et al., 2004 show that Weibull distributions accurately capture the variability in wind speeds.  We estimated the 
Weibull distribution parameters using the maximum likelihood method because this method is considered most appropriate 
(Seguro and Lambert, 2000). Data sources are provided in Table 9.1.  
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ܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜ୀሼଵǡଶሽ ൌ σ ܥܣܲܨ௛ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ହସ଻௛ୀଵ ൅ ܥܣܲܨ௛ୀହସ଼ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ כ ͲǤͷ  
 ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሼͳǡʹሽǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ       (4.7) 
Note that the 548th sample is multiplied by 0.5 to account for the final half hour in the 
time slice. 
 
Solar Irradiation - For technologies based on solar radiation, the capacity factor 
depends on the amount of solar irradiation that reaches the earth’s surface (in Watt/m2). A 
simple, yet accurate, way to infer the capacity factor of solar-based technologies is by using 
the clearness index (Kumar and Umanand, 2005). The clearness index is the ratio between the 
solar irradiation that reaches the earth’s surface (in W/m2) and the solar irradiation level just 
outside the earth’s atmosphere (in W/m2). The latter is assumed constant at 1,360 W/m2. The 
former, the amount of irradiation that reaches the earth’s surface, depends strongly the 
humidity of the air, dust particles, the season and the time of day. Average surface level 
irradiance data in Germany for each time slice was taken from Photovoltaic Geographical 
Information System (PVGIS) of the European Commission Joint Research Centre. The data is 
provided in column 9 of Table A.1.  
Based on the average clearness index in each time slice ሺ݃௧௦ሻ we use a modified 
gamma distribution to accurately capture the hourly variability of the clearness index 
(Hollands and Huget, 1983). The general form of the modified gamma distribution if derived 
by Hollands and Huget (1983): 
 
ܲ൫ܥܣܲܨ௛ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ǡ ݃௧௦൯ ൌ ߲௧௦ ௖೘ೌೣି஼஺௉ி೓ǡ೟ೞǡ೟
೔
௖೘ೌೣ
ሺߥ௧௦ܥܣܲܨ௛ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ሻ      
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሼ͵ǡͶሽǡ ݄ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͷͶͺሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ  (4.8) 
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ܥܣܲܨ௛ǡ௧௦ǡ௧௜ୀሼଷǡସሽ is the sampled capacity factor for a single hour. ݃௧௦ is the mean clearness 
index and ܿ௠௔௫ is the upper bound to the clearness index, which is set at 0.864 (Hollands and 
Huget, 1983). An upper bound indicates that some solar irradiance is always absorbed by, or 
scattered in, the earth’s atmosphere, even on day with clear blue skies. 
߲௧௦ and ɋ௧௦ are the scale and shape parameters of the gamma distribution. The values of 
߲௧௦ and ɋ௧௦ are dependent upon the mean clearness index ݃௧௦. For a derivation of this 
relationship we refer to the original paper. We calculated the values of 
߲௧௦ and ɋ௧௦ for all time slices, and provide them in columns 10 and 11 of Table 9.1.  
Based on these parameters, we constructed the cumulative probability distributions of 
the clearness index for each time slice and depicted them in Figure 9.3.  The distributions for 
evenings and nights are not depicted. Average solar irradiance levels during evenings and 
nights are mostly zero (0.01 in the summer). Therefore, we assume a fixed capacity factor of 0 
during all of these time slices. 
 Finally, similar to the methodology for wind power, we take samples from the 
modified gamma distribution for all 547.4 hours in a time slice. We sum the obtained capacity 
factors to obtain the production factor for solar based technologies in time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ: 
 




݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሼ͵ǡͶሽǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ        (4.9) 
4.3.2.2.2. Spot Market 
In this section, we describe the manner in which the spot market is modelled. The 
economic dispatch procedure on the spot market ensures that the supply of electricity equals 
the total demand for electricity at any point in time. In the process, the equilibrium spot 
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electricity price is determined. The equilibrium spot electricity price depends on the marginal 
production costs of the available production technologies and on the level of demand on the 
spot market.  
The description of the spot market is divided into multiple steps. First, we lay out the 
interactions of the spot market with the forward market. The spot and forward market are 
collectively exhaustive: their sum covers the entire supply of, and demand for, electricity. The 
greater the forward market, the smaller the spot market. Secondly, we describe the economic 
dispatch procedure, which determines the production volume of each production technology. 
Third, we define how the CO2 emission level is calculated. Fourth, we derive the spot 
electricity price based on the production volumes that were determined via the economic 
dispatch procedure. In the final steps we specify the drivers behind the marginal production 
costs of each technology. The drivers behind the marginal production costs are divided into 
three cost components: the emission costs, the fuel costs and other operating costs. Each of 
these cost components is separately discussed. 
 
Interactions with the forward market – Producers can sell electricity via either the spot 
or the forward market. If producers sold electricity forward in earlier years that is due for 
production and delivery in time slice ݐݏ, generation capacity is needed to do so. As a result, 
the generation capacity that is available for production on the spot market is lower than the 
maximum operational capacity, as defined in Equation 4.4. Similarly, the demand for 
electricity on the spot market is lower than the total demand in time slice ݐݏ if some 
consumers have bought electricity on the forward market one or two years ago. First, we 
formalize these interactions between the spot and forward market. The demand for electricity 
on the spot market in time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ is defined as: 
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ܵܦ௧௦ǡ௧ ൌ ܦ௧௦ǡ௧ െ σ ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ      ݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                        (4.10) 
The spot demand for electricity (ܵܦ௧௦ǡ௧) is equal to the total demand for electricity 
(ܦ௧௦ǡ௧) minus the electricity that was sold via the forward market and set for delivery in time 
slice ݐݏ in year ݐ (σ ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ). At the beginning of year ݐ, σ ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ  is a known 
quantity (because it is based on production contracts that were signed in previous periods). 
We will further define σ ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ  in Section 4.3.2.2.3 on the forward market. All terms in 
Equation 4.10 are denoted in MWh of electricity. 
The production capacity of technology ݅ that is available on the spot market (in MWh) 
in time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ is defined as: 
 
ܵ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൌ ܥܣ ௧ܲ௜ כ ܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜ െ ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜       ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ        (4.11) 
 
Here, ܥܣ ௧ܲ௜ is the installed generation capacity (in MW, see Equation 4.4) andܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜  is 
the production factor of technology ݅ (to convert MW into MWh of generation capacity per 
time slice). Finally, we subtract any electricity that is produced for the forward market by 
technology ݅ (ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ).  
 
݂݅ܵܦ௧௦ǡ௧ ൒ σ ܵ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ܵܦ௧௦ǡ௧ െ σ ܵ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ൌ ݅݉݌݋ݎݐ௧௦ǡ௧  
݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                           (4.13) 
 
If the spot demand is greater or equal than the available production capacity, all 
technologies produce at full capacity. In that case, the difference is assumed to be imported 
from abroad (݅݉݌݋ݎݐ௧௦ǡ௧). Imports may be required if new investments in generation capacity 
cannot keep up with the retirement of old capacity. 
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Economic Dispatch – If the spot demand is lower than the available production 
capacity (ܵܦ௧௦ǡ௧ ൏ σ ܵ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ), the production level of each technology is determined via 
economic dispatch.38 Economic dispatch entails that the production technologies with the 
lowest marginal production costs are dispatched first, until enough capacity is dispatched to 
meet the spot demand for electricity. The spot market can therefore be specified as a linear 
optimization problem with two constraints that is solved for ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ , the production level in 
MWh of technology ݅ in during time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ: 
 
݉݅݊݅݉݅ݖ݁ 
     σ ሺܯܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ כ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ሻ        ݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                                (4.12.1) 
ݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐݐ݋ 
     Ͳ ൑ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൑ ܵ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜           ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ             (4.12.2) 
σ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൌଶଶ௜ୀଵ ܵܦ௧௦ǡ௧          ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ             (4.12.3) 
 
Here, ܯܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜  is the marginal production cost of technology ݅ (in €/MWh). The 
marginal production cost of each technology is known at the beginning of every time slice and 
will be explained in full detail below. ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜  is the spot production of technology ݅ in MWh. 
Two constraints are in place. First, the production level of technology ݅ ( ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ሻ is constrained 
by a lower bound of zero and an upper bound equal to ܵ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜  (as defined in Equation 4.11). 
The second constraint specifies that the total production of all ܼ technologies should equal the 
spot demand in each time slice.  
 
                                                 
38 In our model, exports are disregarded. Exporting electricity is only theoretically possible (namely, if the cumulative supply 
of electricity by intermittent resources – wind and solar - during a time slice ݐݏ is larger than the demand in that same time 
slice). However, the probability of such an event is negligible because, first, a time slice covers a total of 547.5 hours (supply 
peaks from wind and solar are thereby smoothened) and, secondly, penetration levels of intermittent technologies by 2030 are 
generally not sufficiently high.  
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Emission level – Based on the production level in the spot and forward market, the 
emission level of the German power sector in year ݐ is: 
 
ܧܯ௧ ൌ σ ൣσ ൫ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൅ ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൯ଵ଺௧௦ୀଵ ܥܫ௜൧ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ͳǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲΤ  ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ            (4.14) 
 
The emission level is the sum of spot and forward production, multiplied by the 
carbon intensity of each technology (ܥܫ௜ in tCO2/MWh). ܥܫ௜ is exogenous input and provided 
in column 9 of Table 9.2.39 We divide by 1,000,000 so thatܧܯ௧ is denoted in million tonnes 
of CO2 (MtCO2). 
 
Spot electricity price - Given ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ , we can determine the spot electricity price (in €/MWh) 
during time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ: 
 
ܧ௧௦ǡ௧ ൌ ௜൫ܯܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ห ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൐ Ͳ൯  ݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                            (4.15) 
 
The spot price for electricity (ܧ௧௦ǡ௧ሻ is equal to the marginal production costs of the 
most expensive technology that is operational ( ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൐ Ͳ) during time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ. 
Equations 4.10 to 4.15 capture the key mechanism behind the spot market. Also, we defined 
one of the key output parameters of the model: the emission level of the German power sector 
(ܧܯ௧). The remainder of this section is devoted to a further explanation on the marginal 
production costs (ܯܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ). So far these costs were assumed to be known, but we will now 
explain how they are determined.40 
                                                 
39 A limitation of our study is that we do not account for the possibility that the carbon intensity of technologies may fall 
through innovation. 
40 Note that the production levels do not depend on the capital expense that is incurred by operators. Fixed costs are paid for 
via operating profits (electricity price – marginal production costs).If operators invest in a technology, they anticipate enough 
operating profits over the lifetime of the technology to cover the capital expense.  
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Marginal production costs – The economic dispatch procedure and the calculation of the spot 
electricity price depend on the marginal production costs of technology ݅ during time slice ݐݏ 
in year ݐ (ܯܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ): 
 
ܯܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൌ ܧܥ௧௜ ൅ ܨܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൅ ܱܥ௜ ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ            (4.16) 
The marginal production cost of technology ݅ (ܯܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ) is the sum of the cost of 
emitting CO2 emissions (ܧܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ), the costs of fuel use (ܨܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ) and other operating costs (ܱܥ௜). 
Each of these components will now be explained in detail. 
 
The costs of emitting CO2 (ܧܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ) - The cost of emitting CO2 (in €/MWh) of technology ݅ 
during year ݐ is defined as: 
 
ܧܥ௧௜ ൌ ܥܫ௜ כ ܨܥܲܫ௧   ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                    (4.17) 
Here, ܥܫ௜ is the carbon intensity of technology ݅ and ܨܥܲܫ௧ is the carbon price in year 
ݐ (in €/tCO2).41 The carbon price is an endogenous model parameter, calculated in the ETSM 
module. A full description of the ETSM module is provided in Chapter 2. 
 
The costs of fuel use (ܨܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ) - The costs of fuel use (in €/MWh) of technology ݅ during time 
slice ݐݏ in year ݐ is defined as: 
 
ܨܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൌ ܨ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ כ ߚ௜   ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ           (4.18) 
 
                                                 
41 The carbon price is termed the Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator (FCPI). For a full explanation on the definition of the 
FCPI, we refer to Chapter 2. 
501077-L-bw-Mulder
Chapter 4   145 
 
 
Here, ܨ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜  is the price of the fuel used by technology ݅. The prices are denoted in 
euros per gigajoule energy content (€/GJ). ߚ௜ is the burn rate of the fuel used by technology ݅. 
The burn rate is used to convert the fuel cost from €/GJ into €/MWh. The burn rates thereby 
specify how much energy a technology uses (in GJ) to produce one MWh of electricity. Two 
technologies that use the same fuel may have very different burn rates, indicating that one 
technology is more fuel efficient than the other. The burn rates are exogenous input and are 
provided in column 5 of Table 9.2. 
The fuel prices are generated in the following manner. In general, we allow each fuel 
price to change after each season ݏ. The fuel prices for the first season of 2008 are exogenous 
input, and are provided in column 2 of Table 9.4. During a season (covering 4 non-sequential 
time slices, see Table 9.1) the price indices remain constant. We generate price indices that 
reflect the historical price pattern of coal, gas, oil and uranium, as well as the correlations 
between the returns of these four fuels. The fuel price index (ܨ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௦ǡ௧௜ ) related to technology ݅ 
in season ݏ in year ݐ is defined as: 
 
ܨ ௦ܲǡ௧௜ ൌ ܨ ௦ܲିଵǡ௧௜ כ ൣͳ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߪ௜ ௦ܹ൧  
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݏ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡͶሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                         (4.19) 
 
 Here ܨ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௦ିଵǡ௧௜  is the price of the fuel used by technology ݅ in the previous season, ߤ௜ 
is the average historical seasonal growth rate of that fuel price and ߪ௜ is the associated 
historical standard deviation. Finally, ௦ܹ is a standard Wiener process. The standard Wiener 
process entails that, for each of the four fuels, a value is sampled from a normal distribution 
with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The four values are correlated to each other to reflect 
historically observed correlations between fuel prices. The input values for ߤ௜, ߪ௜ and the 
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correlations between fuels are provided in columns 3-9 of Table 9.4. An example of the 
simulated price path is provided in Figure 9.4. The figure shows the simulated price indices 
for a single model trail. Figure 9.5 shows the probability distributions of the price indices for 
2,000 model trails.  
Two fuels, biomass and biogas (see Table 9.4), are not traded on world exchanges. 
Therefore, historical price data is scarce forcing us to make a simplifying assumption for the 
price level of these fuels. We assume that biomass and biogas become increasingly popular 
leading to a fuel price increase of 0.5 percent per season.  
 
Other operating costs (ܱܥ௜) - Other operating costs (in €/MWh) are exogenous input to the 
model. The input values are provided in column 3 of Table 9.3. Other operating costs cover, 
among others, consumption of water, lubricants, fuel additives, spare parts and repairs. 
Labour costs are not part of the marginal operating costs but are considered fixed operating 
costs, since they do not depend on the prevailing production level. Fixed operating costs are 
accounted for in Section 4.3.2.2.4 on investments. 
4.3.2.2.3. Forward Market 
The forward market plays an important role for both consumers and producers of 
electricity. For example, large industrial firms may wish to shield themselves from electricity 
price uncertainty and buy electricity forward at a pre-determined price. By buying electricity 
via the forward market, the buyer obtains certainty about the cost of electricity use, while the 
seller obtains certainty about its minimum production volume. Obtaining certainty about 
production volumes is beneficial for producers because the conditions on the spot market can 
501077-L-bw-Mulder
Chapter 4   147 
 
 
change rapidly. For example, in absence of forward contracts, a hike in the gas price may 
force gas powered generation capacity out of business overnight. 
In this study, we want to determine the size and production mix on the forward market 
for two reasons. First, the production mix on the forward market drives the emission output of 
the electricity sector. Secondly, the spot market and the forward market are collectively 
exhaustive. The larger the amount of electricity that is sold via the forward market, the 
smaller the amount of electricity that is sold via the spot market. This relationship between the 
spot and forward market was already defined in Equations 4.10 and 4.11, although we did not 
formalize the parameter ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜  yet. We will be able to do so at the end of this section, after 
explaining all elements of the forward market. 
Operators are only able to sell their electricity forward if they can offer electricity at a 
competitive price. We thus have to determine which technologies are expected to be 
competitive, one and two years ahead. Operators that are forecasted to be competitive are 
assumed to be willing and able to sell forward contracts. We determine which technologies 
are competitive by forecasting the one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead economic dispatch 
procedure on the spot market. The economic dispatch procedure ranks the technologies based 
on their marginal production cost and can thereby generate forecasts for future production 
levels.  
To determine the spot market for a future period, we have to make some simplifying 
assumptions because the value of some model parameters is not yet known. Specifically, we 
have to make assumptions for all of the stochastic parameters in Table 4.1. Regarding fuel 
prices, we assume that operators are aware of the mean seasonal growth rate of fuel prices 
(see column 3 of Table 9.4). Second, we also assume that operators know the mean levels for 
wind power and solar irradiance during each time slice. Third, we assume that operators 
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anticipate that the carbon price remains constant in future periods. Finally, we assume that 
operators also know the average growth of electricity demand (ܧܮܩ௧), which we assumed to 
be 0.5% per year in Section 4.3.2.1. Based on these mean values and mean growth rates, we 
extrapolate the levels of these input parameters two years ahead. 
To determine which technologies are most competitive two years ahead, we run the 
economic dispatch procedure under the assumed market conditions for that year and solve for 
ܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ :  
 
݉݅݊݅݉݅ݖ݁ 
    σ ሺܯܥʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ כ ܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ሻ              ݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                (4.20.1) 
ݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐݐ݋ 
 Ͳ ൑ ܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൑ ܥܣ ௧ܲାଶ௜ כ ܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜          ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ       (4.20.2) 
    σ ܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൌଶଶ௜ୀଵ ܦ௧௦ǡ௧ כ ሺͳ ൅ ܧܮܩ௧ሻଶ  ݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                  (4.20.3) 
 
Here, ܯܥʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜  is the two-year-ahead marginal production cost of technology ݅ (in 
€/MWh). ܯܥʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜  is determined through an extrapolation of the cost parameters in Equation 
4.16 over future periods. ܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜  is the forecasted two-year-ahead production level of 
technology ݅ in MWh. Again, two constraints are in place. First, the production level of 
technology ݅ (ܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ሻ is constrained by a lower bound of zero and an upper bound equal to the 
two-year-ahead production capacity (in MWh per timeslice). We assume that the retirement 
scheme and new investments in previous years are known to operators. Investments in year ݐ, 
ݐ ൅ ͳ and ݐ ൅ ʹ are not yet known and therefore cannot be accounted for by operators on the 
forward market. The second constraint (4.20.3) defines that the total production of all 
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technologies should equal the two-year-ahead demand for electricity in each time slice. Recall 
that we extrapolate the electricity demand with an annual growth rate of 0.5%. 
If the forecasted production level (ܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ) is positive, that technology is assumed to be 
competitive on the forward market. Not all of the forecasted production is sold forward, as 
only a limited number of consumers is willing to buy electricity two years ahead of delivery. 
To determine the amount of electricity that is sold two years ahead, we make the following 
assumption: 
 
ܨܱܴʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൌ ͲǤͳ כ ܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜              ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                  (4.21) 
 
We assume that 10% of the forecasted two-year-ahead production level is sold 
forward.42 Note that ܨܱܴʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜  denotes the electricity that is sold during time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ, 
but delivered during time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ ൅ ʹ.  
We forecast the one-year-ahead electricity market in a similar manner by solving for 
ܲͳ௧௦ǡ௧௜ :  
 
݉݅݊݅݉݅ݖ݁ 
         σ ሺܯܥͳ௧௦ǡ௧௜ כ ܲͳ௧௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ሻ      ݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                     (4.22.1) 
ݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐݐ݋ 
         Ͳ ൑ ܲͳ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൑ ܥܣ ௧ܲାଵ௜ כ ܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧ାଵ௜ െ ܨܱܴʹ௧௦ǡ௧ିଵ௜      
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ            (4.22.2) 
         σ ܲͳ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൌଶଶ௜ୀଵ ܦ௧௦ǡ௧ כ ሺͳ ൅ ܧܮܩ௧ሻଵ െ σ ܨܱܴʹ௧௦ǡ௧ିଵ௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ       
             ݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                    (4.22.3) 
                                                 
42 Exactly how much electricity is sold forward on the one-year and two-year-ahead basis is lacking. However, we test the 
sensitivity of this parameter in Section 4.4.5.3, and show the results are very robust to a 50% increase in the size of the 
forward market. 
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The amount of electricity that is sold one years ahead is defined as: 
 
ܨܱܴͳ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൌ ͲǤͶ כ ܲͳ௧௦ǡ௧௜         ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ            (4.23) 
Note that there are two key differences compared to the forecast of the two-year-ahead 
electricity market. First, the total production on the one-year-ahead spot market (σ ܲͳ௧௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ  
in Equation 4.22.3) is equal to the demand minus the electricity that was already sold via the 
two-year-ahead forward market. Secondly, in Equation 4.23, we assume that 40% of the 
forecasted one-year-ahead production level is sold forward, as opposed to 10% on the two-
year-ahead market. 
Earlier, in Equation 4.10 and 4.11, we defined ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜  as the electricity that is sold 
via the forward market by technology ݅, and delivered in time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ. We are now 
ready to formalize this parameter: 
 
ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൌ ܨܱܴͳ௧௦ǡ௧ିଵ௜ ൅ ܨܱܴʹ௧௦ǡ௧ିଶ௜  
 ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                        (4.24) 
ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜  is denoted in MWh of electricity and is the sum of the electricity that was 
sold in the previous year (ݐ െ ͳ) on the one-year-ahead market, and the electricity that was 
sold two years ago (ݐ െ ʹ) on the two-year-ahead market. 
4.3.2.2.4. Investments 
The future composition of the production mix, and its emission output, depends to a 
large extent on new investments in generation capacity. The decision to invest in a specific 
generation technology is made on the basis of its expected profitability. The more profitable a 
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technology is, the more generation capacity is invested in. The investment decision can be 
summarized in the following equation: 
 
୲୧ ൌ ୧ ቀͳ െ ˈି୒୔୚౪౟ େ୅୔୉ଡ଼౪౟ൗ ቁ  ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ            (4.25) 
 
Equation 4.25 is illustrated in Figure 9.6. The level of investments in technology ݅ 
(୲୧) depends on the profitability index of that technology. The profitability index is defined 
as ୲୧ ୲୧Τ , where ୲୧  is the net present value and ୲୧  is the upfront capital 
expense of investing in a MW of generation capacity.43 ୲୧ will be defined later on in this 
section and input values for ୲୧  are provided in column 5 of Table 9.3. Investments in 
year  are bounded by a saturation limit (୧).44 The assumed input values for ୧ are provided in 
column 8 of Table 9.3. To determine the input values for ୧ we took the highest year-to-year 
increase in generation capacity between 1991 and 2011. To the extent that that rendered 
improbable results, we manually adjusted the input values.45 By differentiating the saturation 
limit between technologies, similar to Olsina et al. (2006), we take into account that some 
technologies are more scalable than others. For technologies without representative historical 
data, we have assumed values for ୧. Specifically, regarding ocean-based electricity 
production (୧ ൌ ͹), we take into account that the potential to tap tidal, wave and current 
energy is very low. The technical potential is low because of competing uses of water ways 
                                                 
43 Note that the minus sign is not part of the profitability index. The net present value is calculated based on a required rate of 
return of 6%. If the net present value is positive, it indicates that the expected return surpasses 6%, which leads to 
investments. 
44 For high levels of profitability is seems logical to assume a saturation level for new investments. First, operators may 
anticipate the mass entry of new generation capacity. New entrants thereby saturate the market and reduce the profitability of 
existing production capacity and additional new investments. Secondly, banks may only be willing to simultaneously fund a 
limited number of new investment projects (Olsina et al., 2006). 
45 For some technologies, insufficient historical data is available. For others, the historical data provided odd results. For 
example, based on the historical data method, the saturation limit for nuclear power should be 267 MW. For comparison, a 
single typical plant within the current portfolio already produces approximately 1,400 MW. Therefore, we have set the 
saturation limit somewhat higher to 1,000 MW. 
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and concerns over nature conservation (Bӧmer et al., 2010). For geothermal technology 
(୧ ൌ ͹ͷͲ), we assume a relatively low saturation limit because its technical potential is 
almost exclusively located in the north of Germany (Schulz et al., 2007). Also, the long 
exploration process that is required to find locations with optimal geological conditions 
(Stafánsson, 2002) limits the scalability of the technology. Finally, the saturation limits for 
technologies with CCS (e.g. Black Coal with CCS) are assumed to be 50% of the saturation 
limit of the same technology without CCS (Black Coal). Thereby, we account for the fact that 
CCS technology has high infrastructural requirements including a CO2 storage location. The 
remainder of Section 4.3.2.2.4 is devoted to an explanation of the manner in which the net 
present value is calculated. 
 
Net Present Value calculation - To calculate the net present value of a technology, we 
discount the expected cash flows. Again, we use the subscriptݕܽ to denote cash flows that lie 
ݕܽ years into the future. The subscript ݕܽ ranges from ୧ ൅ ͳ (the first operational year after 
the construction time) to ୧ ൅ ୧ (the investment horizon). The net present value (୲୧) of 
technology  in year  is denoted in €/MW and is defined as: 
 
୲୧ ൌ െ୲୧ ൅ σ
σ ሺୖ୊౪౩ǡ౪ǡ౯౗౟ ିେ୊౪౩ǡ౪ǡ౯౗౟ ሻభల౪౩సభ
ሺଵା୰ሻ౯౗
େ୘౟ା୐୘౟
୷ୟୀ஼்೔ାଵ ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡ ǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ  (4.26) 
݂݅	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧ െ 	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧ ൏ Ͳ	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧ െ 	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧ ൌ െ	୲୧ כ ͳǤͲͳ௬௔            (4.27) 
 
Here, 	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧  is the forecasted revenue and 	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧  is the forecasted cost in time slice 
ݐݏ, ݕܽ years ahead of ݐ. The expected cash flow is discounted with a discount rate (ݎ) of 6%. 
Note from Equation 4.27 that, if the forecasted cash flow ݕܽ years ahead is negative, we 
assume that the forecasted cash flow is equal to the fixed operating costs of technology ݅ 
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(ܨܱܥ௜, denoted in €/MW). We make this assumption, because we assume that an operator will 
not produce electricity if the expected payoff is negative. The only costs that are incurred if 
the operator does not produce electricity are the fixed operating costs, which include 
employee wages and planned maintenance. Input values for the fixed operating costs are 
provided in column 4 of Table 9.3. The fixed operating costs are assumed to grow annually 
with 1%. In the remainder of this section, we will define the parameters 	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧  and 	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧ .  
 
Forecasted revenue (	୲ୱǡ୷ୟ୧ ) - The forecasted revenue (	୲ୱǡ୷ୟ୧ ) per MW is defined as: 
 
	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧ ൌ ܧܨ௧௦ǡ௧ǡ௬௔ כ ܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜    
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿǡ ݕܽ ൌ ሼܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳǡǥ ǡ ୧ ൅ ୧ሽ                  (4.28) 
 
Here, ܧܨ௧௦ǡ௧ǡ௬௔ is the forecast of the electricity price (in €/MWh) and ܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧ǡ௬௔௜  is the 
expected production factor (in MWh/MW) in time slice ݐݏ, ݕܽ years ahead of ݐ. The forecast 
of the electricity price that is made during time slice  in year ,  years into the future, is 
defined as: 
 
ܧܨ௧௦ǡ௧ǡ௬௔ ൌ ܧ௧௦ǡ௧ ൅
ݕܽ
ʹ ቀ௜ ൫ܯܥʹ௧௦ǡ௧
௜ หܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൐ Ͳ൯ െ ܧ௧௦ǡ௧ቁ 
݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿǡ ݕܽ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͷͶሿ                                           (4.29) 
 
We calculate the ݕܽ-year ahead forecast of the electricity price through linear 
extrapolation of the spot electricity price (ܧ௧௦ǡ௧) and the two-year ahead electricity price 
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(௜൫ܯܥʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ หܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൐ Ͳ൯).46  
The expected production factor ܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜  (in MWh/MW) of technology ݅ in future 
periods is defined as:  
 
ܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൌ ൬σ ௉೟ೞǡഓ
೔ ାிைோ௉೟ೞǡഓ೔
஼஺௉೟೔
௧ఛୀ௧ିଶ ൰ ͵ൗ       ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ      (4.30) 
 
The forecasted production factor is equal to the average production level over the 
previous three years (in MWh), divided by the installed generation capacity (in MW). The 
expected production factor is assumed to be the same for all time slices and years in the 
investment horizon.47  
 
Forecasted cost (	୲ୱǡ୷ୟ୧ ) - The forecasted production costs (in €/MW) for technology ,  
years ahead, are defined as: 
 
	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧ ൌ ܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൣܧܥ௧௜ ൅ ܨܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ሺͳ ൅ ߤ௜ሻ௬௔כସ ൅ ܱܥ௜ כ ͳǤͲͳ௬௔൧ ൅ ܨܱܥ௜ כ ͳǤͲͳ௬௔  
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿǡ ݕܽ ൌ ሼܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳǡǥ ǡ ୧ ൅ ୧ሽ                    (4.31) 
 
The costs depend on the expected production factor (ܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ), the forecasted marginal 
operating costs (the terms in between square brackets) and the fixed operating expenses 
(ܨܱܥ௜). Note that the marginal operating expenses are similarly defined as in Equation 4.16, 
although we now take an annual growth factor into account. The carbon price is assumed to 
remain constant. Fuel prices increase with the assumed mean seasonal growth rate. Other 
                                                 
46 We forecast a maximum of 54 years ahead (ݕܽ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡͷͶሿ) because hydropower is the technology with the longest 
investment horizon (4 years of construction and 50 years of operational lifetime, see Table 9.2). 
47 Note that the expected production factor is a forecast based on realized production levels, while we calculated the 
maximum production factor in Equation 4.5.  
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operating expenses (ܱܥ௜) and fixed operating expenses (ܨܱܥ௜) are assumed to increase by 
1% annually.  
4.3.2.3. NPO & FITS 
In the previous sections we have laid out all of the components of the GPSM assuming 
that no other instruments are in place except for the EU ETS. Therefore, we will now describe 
how the above algorithm is impacted once we allow for the NPO and FITs. 
 
NPO - The impact of the NPO is relatively straight-forward. The existing nuclear generation 
capacity (ܥܣ ௧ܲ௜ୀଵ଻) is phased out along the timetable set out in Table 9.5 in the Appendix. 
After 2022, nuclear power is completely phased out. Obviously, apart from phasing out 
existing generation capacity, the NPO also implies that no new investments are allowed 
(ܫܰ ௧ܸ௜ୀଵ଻ ൌ Ͳ).  
 
FITs - FITs change the modelling algorithm via three characteristics that distinguish FIT-
capacity from regular generation capacity: (1) the FITs change the NPV of each technology, 
and thereby changes investment behaviour, (2) FIT-capacity has guaranteed access to the grid, 
thereby operators no longer rely the spot and forward market, and (3) the FIT scheme is paid 
for via a mark-up on the retail electricity price (known as the EEG apportionment). How each 
of the three characteristics impacts the GPSM will be explained below. 
 
Characteristic 1: The effect of FITs on investments – Because operators of FIT-
capacity receive a FIT that is generally higher than the electricity price on the spot or forward 
market, their expected revenue increases. This stimulates investments in FIT-capacity, and 
provides downward pressure on the CO2 emission output of the sector. The FIT that operators 
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receive depends on the year in which FIT-capacity becomes operational. However, once the 
FIT-capacity has become operational (and the FIT has been set), the FIT remains fixed over 
the first 20-years of its operational lifetime. 
The forecasted revenue of FIT-capacity of technology ݅ (in €/MW),  years ahead, is 
defined as: 
 
		୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧ ൌ ൫Ԗ୷ୟ୧ 	୲ା஼்ାଵ೔୧ ൅ ሺͳ െ Ԗ୷ୟ୧ ሻܧܨ௧௦ǡ௧ǡ௬௔൯ܨܫܶܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜  
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿǡ ݕܽ ൌ ሼܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳǡǥ ǡ ୧ ൅ ୧ሽ                           (4.32) 
 
Equation 4.32 is an extension of Equation 4.28. 	୲ା஼்೔ାଵ୧  is the FIT (in €/MWh) that 
is applicable to capacity of technology ݅ that becomes operational in year  ൅ ܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳ. FIT-
tariffs are taken from the German Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (Bundestag, 2004, 2009, 
2012).ܨܫܶܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௬௔௜  is the realized production factor of FIT-capacity over the past 3 years 
(analogous to 4.30). Ԗ୷ୟ୧   is a dummy: 
 
Ԗ୷ୟ୧ ൌ ͳ݂݅ݕܽ ൌ ሼܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳǡǥ ǡ ܥܶ௜ ൅ ʹͲሽ  ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿ                  (4.33.1) 
Ԗ୷ୟ୧ ൌ Ͳ݂݅ݕܽ ൌ ሼܥܶ௜ ൅ ʹͳǡǥ ǡ ܥܶ௜ ൅ ܮܶ௜ሽ ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿ                        (4.33.2) 
 
The dummy parameters account for the fact that, after 20 operational years, operators 
of technology ݅ no longer receive the FIT-tariff, but receive the spot electricity price instead.  
By replacing 	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧  with 		୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧  and ܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧ǡ௬௔௜  with ܨܫܶܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧ǡ௬௔௜  we calculate 
the net present value of FIT-capacity (	୲୧), instead of regular capacity (୲୧ in 
Equation 4.26). 
 
݂݅	୲୧ ൒ ୲୧Ԉ௧௜ ൌ ͳ  ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ         (4.34.1) 
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݂݅	୲୧ ൏ ୲୧Ԉ௧௜ ൌ Ͳ  ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ         (4.34.2) 
 
We assume that investors in technology ݅ opt to receive the FIT-tariff if the net present 
value of FIT-capacity (	୲୧) is greater than the net present value of regular capacity 
(୲୧). Conversely, if the net present value of regular capacity is greater than the net present 
value of FIT-capacity, we assume that operators opt to invest in regular capacity (and forgo 
the option to participate in the FIT-scheme). The dummy variable Ԉ௧௜  indicates whether 
investments in technology ݅ in year ݐ represent FIT-capacity (Ԉ௧௜ ൌ ͳ) or regular capacity 
(Ԉ௧௜ ൌ Ͳ). This dummy will be used below. 

Characteristic 2: Priority Dispatch – Priority dispatch implies that operators of FIT-
capacity have guaranteed access to the grid and therefore are no longer dependent on the spot 
or forward market to sell electricity. Any electricity that is produced can be sold against the 
pre-determined FIT-tariff. Therefore, if the FIT-tariff is greater than the marginal production 
costs, we assume that operators of FIT-capacity produce at maximum capacity. The 
production level (in MWh) of all FIT-capacity of technology݅ in slice ݐݏ in year ݐ is: 
 
ܨܫܶ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൌ σ ൫ܫܰ ௧ܸିௗ௜ Ԉ௧ିௗ௜ ߸௧ିௗ௜ ܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൯஼்
೔ାଵା௧
ௗୀ஼்೔ାଵ 
 ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                          (4.35) 
We distinguish between (and sum over) all previous years in the simulation because 
the profitability of generation capacity depends on the FIT that applied in the year in which 
the generation capacity first becomes operational. ܫܰ ௧ܸିሺ஼்೔ାଵሻ௜  represents the newest 
generation capacity of technology ݅, as it becomes operational in year ݐ. ܫܰ ௧ܸିሺ஼்೔ାଵା௧ሻ௜  
represents the generation capacity that became operational in 2008, the first year of the 
simulation. For 2008, we use exogenous input that is provided in columns 9 and 10 of Table 
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9.3. The input data captures all FIT-based capacity that was deployed by 2008, since the 
introduction of FITs in Germany. Finally, ߸ is a dummy that indicates whether producing 
electricity is profitable during time slice ݐݏ in year ݐ for FIT-capacity that was invested in in 
year ݐ െ ݀: 
 
݂݅ܯܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൏ 	୲ିୢା஼்೔ାଵ୧ ߸௧ିௗ௜ ൌ ͳ  
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿǡ ݀ ൌ ሾܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳǡǥ ǡ ܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳ ൅ ݐሿ         (4.36.1) 
݂݅ܯܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൒ 	୲ିୢା஼்೔ାଵ୧ ߸௧ିௗ௜ ൌ Ͳ  
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿǡ ݀ ൌ ሾܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳǡǥ ǡ ܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳ ൅ ݐሿ         (4.36.2) 
 
If the marginal production costs of technology ݅ are lower than the applicable FIT-
tariff48 the operators can make a profit by producing, and hence ߸௧ିௗ௜  is equal to one. If the 
marginal production costs are equal or higher than the applicable FIT-tariff the operator is not 
able to make a profit, and hence ߸௧ିௗ௜  is equal to zero.  
The production of electricity by FIT-capacity affects the spot market: the greater the 
production level of FIT-capacity (Equation 4.35), the smaller the production via the spot 
market. We rewrite Equations 4.10 to account for this: 
 
ܵܦ௧௦ǡ௧ ൌ ܦ௧௦ǡ௧ െ σ ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ െ σ ܨܫܶ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ  ݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ      (4.37) 
 
The demand on the spot market is lower, because part of the demand for electricity is 
fulfilled by FIT-capacity (σ ܨܫܶ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ). Similarly, we rewrite Equation 4.11: 
 
                                                 
48 Investments from year ݐ െ ݀ become operational in year  െ  ൅ ܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳ. Hence, the applicable FIT-tariff of ܫܰ ௧ܸିௗ௜  is 
	୲ିୢା஼்೔ାଵ୧ .  
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ܵ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൌ ቌܥܣ ௧ܲ௜ െ ෍ ൫ܫܰ ௧ܸିௗ௜ Ԉ௧ିௗ௜ ߸௧ିௗ௜ ൯
஼்೔ାଵା௧
ௗୀ஼்೔ାଵ
ቍ כ ܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜ െܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜  
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                    (4.38) 
The maximum production limit of technology ݅ (in MWh) that is available on the spot 
market decreases because part of the production capacity is FIT-capacity. 
Similarly, the one-year and two-year ahead spot market are affected. Therefore, we 
rewrite Equations 4.20.2, 4.20.3, 4.22.2 and 4.22.3 to account for lower demand levels and 
production limits on forward markets: 
 
Ͳ ൑ ܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൑ ܥܣ ௧ܲାଶ௜ כ ܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜ െ ܨܫܶܲ௧௦ǡ௧ାଶ௜   
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ               (4.39) 
σ ܲʹ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൌଶଶ௜ୀଵ ܦ௧௦ǡ௧ כ ሺͳ ൅ ܧܮܩ௧ሻଶ െ σ ܨܫܶ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧ାଶ௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ   
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                          (4.40) 
Ͳ ൑ ܲͳ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൑ ܥܣ ௧ܲାଵ௜ כ ܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜ െ ܨܫܶ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧ାଵ௜   
 ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ               (4.41) 
σ ܲͳ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ൌଶଶ௜ୀଵ ܦ௧௦ǡ௧ כ ሺͳ ൅ ܧܮܩ௧ሻ െ σ ܨܱܴʹ௧௦ǡ௧ିଵ௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ െ σ ܨܫܶ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧ାଵ௜ଶଶ௜ୀଵ   
݂݋ݎݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                                      (4.42) 
 
Finally, we have to account for the emissions from FIT-based production capacity. 
Equation 4.14 therefore becomes: 
 
ܧܯ௧ ൌ σ ൣσ ൫ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൅ ܨܱܴ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൅ ܨܫܶ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ ൯ଵ଺௧௦ୀଵ ܥܫ௜൧ଶଶ௜ୀଵ ͳǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲΤ   
݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                      (4.43) 
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Characteristic 3: the EEG apportionment – The EEG apportionment is a mark-up on 
the retail electricity price to finance the FIT-scheme. Network operators are responsible for 
the financing of the FIT-scheme. Network operators buy electricity from operators of FIT-
capacity against the going FIT-tariff and sell the electricity to consumers against the going 
spot price. The network operators settle the difference by charging consumers via the EEG 
apportionment. The EEG apportionment (in €/MWh) is thus added to Equation 4.2 that 
defines the retail electricity price: 
 
 ܴܧ௧ ൌ ൫σ ா೟ೞǡ೟ௌ஽೟ೞǡ೟
మమ೟ೞసభ ൯
σ ௌ஽೟ೞǡ೟మమ೟ೞసభ
൅ ܧܧܩ௧ ൅ ͳͶͲ  ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ             (4.44) 
 
The level of the EEG apportionment is calculated as follows: 
 
ܧܧܩ௧ ൌ ிூ்ா௑௉೟ିிூ்ோா௏೟்஽ாா ೟ீ     ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ             (4.45) 
 
Here, ܧܧܩ௧ is the EEG apportionment in €/MWh in year ݐ. ܨܫܶܧܺ ௧ܲ represents the 
expenses of network operators (in €) to finance the FIT-scheme. ܨܫܴܶܧ ௧ܸ represents the 
revenues (in €) that are obtained by network operators by selling the FIT-based electricity. 
Finally, ܶܦܧܧܩ௧ represents the total demand by consumers that are obliged to pay the EEG 
apportionment. ܶܦܧܧܩ௧ is lower than ܶܦ௧ (total demand, Equation 4.1) because some 
consumers are exempt from paying the EEG apportionment: 
 
ܶܦܧܧܩ௧ ൌ ܶܦ௧ െ ܦ݋ݓ݊௧ െ ܦ݌ݎ݅ݒ௧ െ ܦ݁ݔ݌௧ െ ܦ݈݋ݏݏ௧ ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ            (4.46) 
 
Here, ܶܦ௧ represents the total demand for electricity. We differentiate between four 
types of electricity consumption that are exempt from paying the EEG apportionment. ܦ݋ݓ݊௧ 
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represents the electricity use by the electricity sector itself.  ܦ݌ݎ݅ݒ௧ represents so-called 
privileged demand which includes sectors that face strong international competition, ܦ݁ݔ݌௧ 
represents the exports of electricity and ܦ݈݋ݏݏ௧ represents the network losses and unregistered 
usage of electricity. The assumed input values and sources for these parameters can be found 
in Table 9.6. 
 
ܨܫܶܧܺ ௧ܲ ൌ σ ൣσ ൫ܫܰ ௧ܸିௗ௜ Ԉ௧ିௗ௜ ߸௧ିௗ௜ ܲܨ௧௦ǡ௧௜ כ 	୲ିୢା஼்೔ାଵ୧ ൯௧ௗୀ஼்೔ାଵ ൧ଶଶ௜ୀଵ   
݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                              (4.47) 
 
The FIT expenses are calculated by multiplying the production level (as obtained via 
Equation 4.35) with the applicable FIT-tariff and summing over all technologies. 
 
ܨܫܴܶܧ ௧ܸ ൌ σ ൫ܨܫܶ ௧ܲ௦ǡ௧௜ כ ܧ௧௦ǡ௧൯ଵ଺௧௦ୀଵ    ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ             (4.48) 
 
The revenues are obtained by multiplying the FIT-based production level with the spot 
electricity price in each time slice and summing over all time slices.  
4.3.2.4. INTEGRATION WITH THE ETSM 
For a detailed description of the ETSM, we refer to Chapter 2. Here, we highlight the 
adjustments that have been made to integrate the GPSM with the ETSM.  
First, the demand for EU ETS emission allowances is specified as: 
 
ܣܦ௧ ൌ ሺܣܦ௧ିଵ െ ܧܯ௧ିଵሻሺͳ ൅ ܧܩ௧ሻ ൅ ܧܯ௧ െ ܶͳ௧ െ ܶʹ௧       ݂݋ݎݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿ            (4.49) 
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Equation 4.49 is the adjusted form of Equation 3.4 in Chapter 3. The emissions from 
the German power sector (ܧܯ௧) are now included as a separate term and are no longer 
directly driven by the stochastically sampled emissions growth rate in the rest of Europe 
(ܧܩ௧). ܣܦ௧ିଵ represents total demand for emission allowances in the previous year.49 ܧܩ௧ is 
the stochastically sampled emissions growth rate. ܧܩ௧ is sampled from a distribution with a 
mean of 0.33% and a standard deviation of 2.08%.50 The parameters ܶͳ௧ and ܶʹ௧ capture the 
impact of parallel instruments in other sectors of the EU ETS (other than the German power 
sector). ܶͳ௧ and  ܶʹ௧ will be further explained below. 
Note that both ܧܩ௧ (Equation 4.49 in the ETSM) and ܧܮܩ௧ (Equation 4.1 in the 
GPSM) are intrinsically linked to the level of economic growth in the EU. If the economy in 
the EU stagnates, the CO2 emissions in the rest of the EU (ܧܩ௧), as well as the demand for 
electricity in Germany (ܧܮܩ௧) are expected to fall. Conversely, if the economy in Europe 
grows, both the emission level in the rest of the EU and the demand for electricity in Germany 
are expected to rise. To account for this,  ܧܩ௧ and ܧܮܩ௧ are sampled with a correlation of 
0.54. The correlation was calculated over the interval 1994-2008, based on emission data 
from the EEA (2012) and German electricity demand figures from AGEB (2013a). 
Apart from FITs and the NPO, there are many more operational parallel instruments in 
Europe today that influence the CO2 emission level. To account for these other parallel 
instruments, ܶͳ௧ and  ܶʹ௧ are included in Equation 4.49. These other parallel instruments are 
not modelled in detail, but instead we account for them by assuming an aggregate effect on 
the emission level in EU ETS sectors (e.g. we assume in Section 4.4.4 that other parallel 
instruments trigger abatement activity of 10 MtCO2 per annum). We distinguish between two  
                                                 
49 In Chapter 2, ܣܦ௧ିଵ is the sum of several sources of demand. For clarity, we have left these other parameters out of the 
description here. For a full description, see section 2.2.3.   
50 To represent the impact of the recession that started in 2008, the input values for ܧܩ௧ over the period 2008-2012 have been 
set deterministically based on historical data, similar to ܧܮܩ௧ in Equation 4.1. 
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types of parallel instruments (ܶͳ௧ and ܶʹ௧) because they have a different impact on the 
performance of the EU ETS. Type 1 instruments (ܶͳ௧) are defined as instruments that lower 
the carbon intensity of production in ETS-sectors (e.g. by triggering investments in more 
efficient production technologies in the electricity sector). Type 2 instruments (ܶʹ௧) are 
defined as instruments that reduce the production levels in ETS-sectors (e.g. by triggering the 
deployment of decentralized solar power). For a full explanation of the difference between 
Type 1 and Type 2 instruments and more examples of both types of instruments that are 
currently in place in the EU, we refer to Chapter 3. 
Note that the key model parameters to which we will refer in the results section are the 
following three: the emission level in the German power sector (Equation 4.14, or 4.43), the 
emission level under the EU ETS as a whole (Equation 4.49) and the FCPI (Equations 2.7.1 
and 2.7.2). 
4.3.3. Scenarios 
The eight scenarios that will be tested are outlined in Table 4.2. Scenario 1 is a 
scenario without any instruments in place from 2008 to 2030. We test three scenarios with a 
single instrument (Scenarios 2, 3 and 4), three scenarios with a combination of two 
instruments (Scenarios 5, 6 and 7) and one scenario with all three instruments (Scenario 8).  
Table 4.2: 8 Scenarios 
Instruments 
/ Scenarios 















EU ETS  9   9  9 9 
FIT   9  9 9  9 
NPO    9  9 9 9 
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In the first set of simulations, we do not consider the potential effect of parallel 
instruments in sectors other than the German power sector. We do account for additional 
parallel instruments in Section 4.4.4. We re-run all scenarios assuming the aggregate impact 
of both Type 1 (ܶͳ௧) and Type 2 (ܶʹ௧) instruments on the emission level under the EU ETS is 
-5 MtCO2/yr, leading to a total aggregate effect of parallel instruments of -10 MtCO2/yr. 
Because, to our knowledge, empirical data on the relative influence of Type 1 and 
Type 2 instruments is not available, we assume that Type 1 and Type 2 instruments have an 
equally strong influence on the emission level (-5 MtCO2/yr). The rationale for the total 
impact of Type 1 and Type 2 instruments (-10 MtCO2/yr) will be explained at the start of 
Section 4.4.4, because it is based on the results in Table 4.3 in the next section. For purposes 
of clarity we refer to all parallel instruments that are operational outside the German power 
sector as External Instruments (EIs) in the remainder of this study and make no further 
analytical distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 instruments. For a detailed analysis of the 
different impact of Type 1 versus Type 2 instruments on the EU ETS, see Chapter 3. 
4.4. Results 
The mean value, the 10th percentile and the 90th percentile of each output parameter 
are shown in Table 4.3. Mean values for the carbon price and emission level are also  
displayed in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. For easy referencing, each column and row is numbered. 
The numbering is provided in the first column and the first row of Table 4.3. For example, the 
2030 mean carbon price under Scenario 2 is provided in column 7, row 6. Quick references  
 are provided in the text in the following format: (column 7, row 6). Due to rounding, values 
may not add up exactly. 
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4.4.1. No instruments (Scenario 1) 
Without any instruments in place, the emission level increases with an average of 5 
MtCO2 per year (column 4, row 15), to 423 MtCO2 in 2030 (column 4, row 11). Note that the 
growth in emissions varies over time. Over the interval 2008-2015, the emissions change by 
an average of -2 MtCO2 per year (column 4, row 16), while the emissions increase by an  
Table 4.3: Carbon price, emission level and abatement per year (10th perc/mean/90th perc) 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No 
Instruments EU ETS FITs NPO EU ETS + FIT FIT + NPO EU ETS + NPO All Instruments 












2015    0 0 0       0 0 0    0 2 0 0 0 0 
4 2020    10 32 46       0 19 40    23 37 55 0 24 40 
5 2025    27 49 66       9 36 65    35 55 66 20 44 66 
6 2030    19 40 50       17 35 50    17 40 50 17 35 50 



























2015 284 311 329 280 309 327 217 242 261 329 354 369 213 239 258 264 291 309 323 352 369 262 289 307 
9 2020 310 352 382 283 331 366 220 254 279 340 392 423 203 243 269 259 294 319 302 364 406 236 280 307 
10 2025 349 398 438 288 350 399 253 293 324 382 440 484 218 267 302 287 329 363 307 377 435 239 294 335 
11 2030 357 423 479 255 329 388 262 314 356 387 459 513 187 253 303 290 337 378 279 354 415 209 273 323 





























2030 1,886 Mt 1,548 Mt 1,777 Mt 1,922 Mt 1,541 Mt 1,800 Mt 1,545 Mt 1,538 Mt 





































’08-‘30 +2 +5 +7 -3 +1 +4 -3 0 +2 +3 +6 +9 -6 -3 0 -1 +1 +2 -1 +2 +5 -5 -2 +1 
16 ‘08-‘15 -6 -2 +1 -4 0 +2 -15 -11 -9 +1 +4 +7 -14 -10 -8 -8 -5 -2 +2 +6 +8 -7 -3 -1 
17 ‘16-‘20 0 +8 +14 -5 +4 +11 -4 +2 +7 -3 +8 +14 -7 +1 +6 -6 +1 +6 -10 +2 +11 -11 -2 +4 
18 ‘21-‘25 -1 +9 +17 -9 +4 +14 0 +8 +14 -2 +10 +19 -5 +5 +12 -1 +7 +14 -11 +3 +14 -8 +3 +11 
19 ‘26-‘30 -8 +5 +16 -19 -4 +8 -6 +4 +13 -11 +4 +15 -16 -3 +7 -8 +2 +10 -20 -5 +8 -17 -4 +6 
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Figure 4.2: Sources of uncertainty around 2030 emission level 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Mean Carbon price 
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Figure 4.4: Mean emission level 
 
 
Figure 4.5:  Impact of instrument(s) over time compared to Scenario 1 (without instruments) 
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average of 9 MtCO2 per year over the interval 2021-2025 (column 4, row 18). Without any 
instruments in place, the emission level in all sectors that would normally fall under the EU 
ETS increases to 1,886 MtCO2 (column 4, row 13). 
Note that the confidence intervals around the means are generated because several 
model parameters are modelled stochastically. To show which stochastic parameters are most 
responsible for uncertainty around the means, we refer to Figure 4.2. The figure shows all 
sources of uncertainty around the mean emission level in 2030 for Scenario 1 (column 4, row 
11). The mean levels are normalized to zero, the median is indicated by the horizontal line 
close to the middle of each box, the edges of the boxes indicate the 25th to the 75th percentile 
and finally the whiskers indicate approximately 99.3% of all observations. Boxplot 1 
combines all stochastic parameters, and relates directly to the results of Scenarios 1 in Table 
4.3. Boxplots 2, 3, 4 and 5 capture one (or two in boxplot 4 and 5) classes of stochastic 
uncertainty (the other classes are controlled for by assuming mean values). Fuel price 
uncertainty is the biggest driver of uncertainty in the future emission level, followed by 
uncertainty in the business-as-usual emission growth rate. The latter driver is, at least partly,  
dependent on the economic growth rate. Finally, uncertain irradiation levels and wind speeds 
are a relatively small source of uncertainty regarding the 2030 emission level. Boxplot 5 
shows that the uncertainty stemming from the supply of wind and solar power does become  
significantly larger if intermittent technologies play a more important role in the portfolio of 
electricity supply. Boxplot 5 was obtained from Scenario 5 (EU ETS + FITs). 
 
4.4.2. Scenarios with one instrument (Scenarios 2 to 4) 
The introduction of the EU ETS (Scenario 2) leads to a 94 MtCO2 fall in the 2030 
emission level compared to Scenario 1 (column 4, row 12). Before 2025, a surplus of 
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emission allowances results in a low carbon price and limited abatement activity. Between 
2026 and 2030, emissions fall by an average of -4 MtCO2 per year (column 7, row 19). The 
average FCPI peaks at €49 in 2025 (column 7, row 5). Note that we refer to Scenario 2 as the 
reference scenario in Table 4.3 (see e.g. column 7, row 12) because we are mainly interested 
in the effect of introducing instruments alongside the EU ETS. 
Figure 4 shows that the FITs (Scenario 3) lead to a sharper fall in emissions than the 
EU ETS (Scenario 2) until 2030.  FITs lead to an emission level of 314 MtCO2 (column 10, 
row 11) and most of the abatement that is triggered by FITs is achieved before 2015 (column 
10, row 16). FITs are more effective in early years of the simulation because the German 
government has set FIT-tariffs that fall each year. Thereby, the incentive from FITs becomes 
weaker as time progresses. The slowdown may be less pronounced if a higher rate of 
technological learning is assumed (so far 0%). In the sensitivity analysis (see Section 4.4.5), 
we analyse the effect of technological learning in more detail.   
Finally, Scenario 4, with an NPO as the sole instrument, leads to the highest expected 
emission level: the 2030 emission level is expected to be 130 MtCO2 higher than the emission 
level found in Scenario 2 (column 13, row 12). Despite this overall increase, the year-to-year 
growth in the emission level is slightly lower over the interval 2025-2030 if an NPO is in 
place compared to Scenario 1 (comparing column 4, row 19 and column 13, row 19). This  
result can be explained by the fact that much of the nuclear generation capacity would be 
retired anyway in these last five years of the simulation window. The NPO leads to a gradual 
retirement of nuclear capacity before 2022, often only a few years before that capacity would 
have been retired anyway. As a result, without a NPO in place, the energy sector has to absorb 
the retirement of nuclear generation capacity generation a few years later, providing upward 
pressure to the emission level in those years.  
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4.4.3. Scenarios with multiple instruments (Scenarios 5 to 8) 
Because FITs trigger the most CO2 abatement activity in early years, while the EU 
ETS is the most effective in later years, Scenario 5 results in a relatively constant abatement 
tempo over time (see Figure 4.5) and the lowest projected emission level in Germany in 2030. 
However, the results also show that the emission level in Europe as a whole remains 
unchanged in Scenario 5 (-0%, column 16, row 14). Scenarios 7 and 8 also include an EU 
ETS and show that FITs and the NPO do not affect the overall emission level in the EU. The 
upward effect of the NPO on the German emission level is cancelled out by more abatement 
activity in the rest of Europe. Similarly, the downward effect of FITs on the German emission 
level if offset by less abatement activity in the rest of Europe. Adding FITs alongside the EU 
ETS thus does not offer any benefits from an atmospheric climate change perspective.  
FITs do have a strong impact on the performance of the EU ETS. The EU ETS carbon 
price falls with 13% in 2030 (from €40 to €35, column 16, row 7). In 2020 and 2025 the 
impact of FITs on the EU ETS carbon price is -41% and -27% respectively (column 16, row 
4-5). This result is in line with the earlier observation that FITs have the strongest impact on 
abatement activity in early years. 
In the short and medium term (2015-2025) an NPO provides upward pressure to the 
carbon price, while the impact on the 2030 carbon price is near zero (-1%, column 22, row 7). 
This result is also in line with earlier results: in absence of an NPO the German power sector 
absorbs the retirement on nuclear generation capacity after 2025. 
The combination of the NPO and FITs alongside the EU ETS leads to a 14% 
depreciation of the average carbon price in 2030, or €5 in absolute terms (column 25, row 7). 
The 10th percentile of the carbon price falls from €10 to €0 in 2020 and from €27 to €20 in 
2025, compared to Scenario 2 (comparing column 6, row 4-5 and column 24, row 4-5). These  
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Figure 4.6: Mean Carbon price incl. EIs 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Mean Emission level incl. EIs 
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values indicate that, if economic growth rates remain low while fuel prices favour low-carbon 
alternatives, adding FITs and the NPO to the policy mix could seriously extend the period 
over which the EU ETS plays a marginal role in the policy mix.  
4.4.4. Introducing External Instruments  
We run all scenarios again, this time assuming that EIs trigger 10 MtCO2 of abatement 
Table 4.4: Assuming 10 MtCO2/yr abatement by EIs (10th perc/mean/90th perc) 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No 
Instruments EU ETS FITs NPO EU ETS + FIT FIT + NPO EU ETS + NPO All Instruments 












2015    0 0 0       0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 2020    0 16 40       0 6 23    0 21 40 0 9 24 
5 2025    0 29 58       0 16 36    0 37 65 0 23 44 
6 2030    1 25 50       0 19 34    0 25 50 0 20 35 
7 2030 Diff.  €-15 -38% 





























   280 310 327       213 239 258    326 353 369 262 289 307 
9 2020 
   297 343 374       214 249 274    322 380 415 249 288 313 
10 2025 
   324 376 416       241 283 312    345 407 456 266 314 347 
11 2030 
   305 371 427  
 
    229 285 326    329 401 457 254 307 347 
12 2030 Diff.  +58 Mt +18% 
  -44 Mt 
-13% 




















2030  1,519 Mt   1,514 Mt  1,517 Mt 1,511 Mt 
14 Diff.  -29 Mt -2 %   
-34 Mt 





























’08-‘30    0 +3 +5       -4 -1 +1    +1 +4 +7 -3 0 +2 
16 ‘08-‘15 
   -4 0 +2       -14 -10 -8    +2 +6 +8 -7 -3 -1 
17 ‘16-‘20 
   -3 +7 +13       -5 +2 +7    -6 +5 +12 -8 0 +5 
18 ‘21-‘25 
   -4 +7 +15       -2 +7 +13    -7 +5 +15 -4 +5 +12 
19 ‘26-‘30 
   -14 -1 10       -11 0 +9    -16 -1 +10 -12 -1 +7 
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per year. The rationale for this number is based on the results in Table 4.3. Note that the 
introduction of FITs and the NPO alongside the EU ETS lowers the emission level in the 
German power sector by 56 MtCO2 (column 25, row 12 in Table 4.3) In other words, 
abatement efforts are speeded up by 2.4 MtCO2 per annum over the interval 2008-2030.51 If 
we assume that the rest of Europe would be as effective to reduce the domestic emission level 
via the introduction of parallel instruments alongside the EU ETS, the impact of EIs would be  
approximately 13,6 MtCO2 per annum.52 In reality, parallel instruments seem to be primarily 
focused on the electricity sector, while roughly half of the coverage of the EU ETS is 
accounted for by other sectors. We represent this by assuming that the overall impact of EIs 
on all other sectors is not proportional in size to the impact of FITs and the NPO on the 
German electricity sector. Specifically, we assume that EIs have an annual impact of -10 
MtCO2 on the domestic emission level of EU member states. 
Table 4.4 summarizes the results of our simulations. The new means for the carbon 
price and emission level are also depicted in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Scenarios 1, 3, 4 and 6 are 
not affected by the introduction of EIs because the EU ETS is not part of the policy mix in 
these scenarios. Without an EU ETS in place, there is no direct link between abatement in 
other EU ETS sectors and the German power sector. Therefore, Scenarios 1, 3, 4 and 6 will 
not be discussed in this section, although we have reproduced the emission level of Scenario 1 
in Figure 4.7 for ease of comparison to Figure 4.4. Scenario 2 in Table 4.3 remains our 
reference scenario for the results in this section. In that manner we can assess the combined 
impact of parallel instruments in the German power sector and elsewhere under the EU ETS 
on the performance of the EU ETS. 
                                                 
51 The interval 2008-2030 covers 23 years. 56/23=2.4 MtCO2. 
52 The German power sector covers approximately 15%  of all emissions under the EU ETS. Based on this number, the 
impact of external instruments would be: ଶǤସ଴Ǥଵହ െ ʹǤͶ ൎ ͳ͵Ǥ͸ଶ. 
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EIs strongly affect the performance of the EU ETS as well as the German power 
sector. The 2030 carbon price in Scenario 2 falls with 38% from €40 to €25 (column 7, row 7 
in Table 4.4), while the 2030 emission level in the German power sector increases with 18% 
to 371 MtCO2  (column 7, row 12 in Table 4.4). Despite these effects, the overall emission 
level across Europe remains unchanged, irrespective of the policy mix that is under study.53   
 Turning to Scenario 8, we observe that EIs, FITs and the NPO collectively lead to an 
average depreciation of the EU ETS carbon price of 50% in 2030 (column 25, row 7). Note 
that the 10th percentile of the projected carbon price falls to €0 in 2020, 2025 and 2030 
(column 24, row 4-6), indicating that redundancy of the EU ETS is possible if the economic 
growth rates remain low while fuel prices favour low-carbon alternatives. 
In general, the observed effects of EIs on the EU ETS and the German power sector 
can be divided into 4 separate effects, each of which will be explained in detail below. 
 First, the EU ETS carbon price is generally lower across all scenarios. Secondly, the 
emission level in the German power sector is generally higher. Third, FITs lead to more 
abatement in Germany and have a stronger depreciating effect on the EU ETS carbon price 
after accounting for EIs. Fourth, a NPO leads to a stronger increase in the emission level in 
Germany and has a stronger appreciating effect on the EU ETS carbon price after accounting 
for EIs. 
The upshot of a stronger depreciating effect of FITs and a stronger appreciating effect 
of the NPO is that their combined effect on the EU ETS remains largely unchanged. 
Specifically, the 2030 carbon price falls with €5 (comparing column 7, row 6 and column 25, 
                                                 
53 The negligible fall in the emission level of  2% that is observed across all scenarios in Table 4.4 can be attributed to the 
fact that that fuel switching in the rest of the EU is not accounted for. This modelling limitation is further discussed in 
Section 4.5. 
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row 6 in Table 4.4), equal to the results in the previous section (€-5, comparing column 7, row 
6 and column 25, row 6 in Table 4.3). The four effects will now be discussed in more detail. 
Lower carbon price – The carbon price depreciates following the introduction of EIs 
because abatement by EIs implies that less abatement needs to be triggered via the EU ETS to 
remain below the emission cap. 
Higher emission level in the German power sector– Part of the abatement by EIs is 
offset via higher emissions in the German power sector. The emissions increase in the 
German power sector because the depreciated carbon price incentivizes operators of carbon 
intensive production capacity to produce more, at the expense of low-carbon production 
capacity. We illustrate this with the results of Scenario 2 in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. 
We observe a change in the 2030 emission level of +58 MtCO2 (see column 7, row 12 in 
Table 4.4), equivalent to an average of +2.5 MtCO2 per year over the interval 2008-2030. This 
implies that 25% of the abatement that is initiated by EIs (-10 MtCO2/yr) is offset by higher 
emissions in the German power sector (+2.5 MtCO2/yr).  
The percentage of abatement by EIs that is offset in the German power sector is not 
constant across all scenarios because it depends on the composition of the electricity 
generation mix. Obviously, the policy mix influences the composition of the electricity 
generation mix. For example, in Scenario 5, only 14% of the abatement by EIs is offset in the 
German power sector (+32 MtCO2 in 2030, comparing column 16, row 11 in Table 4.3 and 
4.4). The percentage is significantly lower in Scenario 5 compared to Scenario 2 because FITs 
are included in the policy mix of Scenario 5. The larger the share of FIT-based operators in 
the electricity sector, the lower the responsiveness of the sector’s emission level to changes in 
the carbon price. The emission level becomes less responsive because operators of FIT-based 
501077-L-bw-Mulder
176  The EU ETS in the policy mix 
 
renewables enjoy the advantage of a fixed FIT and priority dispatch. Thereby, operators are 
protected against fluctuating market prices and are triggered to produce at full capacity. 
 
 Stronger depreciating effect of FITs on the carbon price – In the previous section, we 
determined that introducing FITs next to the EU ETS (going from Scenario 2 to 5) would lead 
to a carbon price depreciation of 13% in 2030. After accounting for the influence of foreign 
EIs, FITs lead to a carbon price depreciation of 24% in 2030 (difference between column 7, 
row 6 and column 16, row 6 in Table 4.4). Two key factors explain the increased depreciating 
effect of FITs on the carbon price. 
 First, FITs make the composition of the German electricity production mix, and thus 
the emission output, less responsive to market price fluctuations. Consequently, the German 
demand for EU ETS emission allowances also becomes less elastic. If the demand for 
emission allowances is less elastic, a stronger depreciation of the carbon price is required to 
offset the same amount of abatement via EIs.  
Secondly, the weaker the EU ETS, the more abatement is triggered by FITs and the 
greater its carbon price depreciating effect. If the EU ETS is weaker because of EIs, more of 
the ‘low hanging fruit’ can be captured by FITs. The results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 confirm 
this: adding FITs to the policy mix triggers an additional 86 MtCO2 of abatement by 2030 if 
we take EIs into account (difference between column 7, row 11 and column 16, row 11 Table 
4.4), while FITs only trigger 76 MtCO2 of additional abatement if EIs are not taken into 
account (difference between column 7, row 11 and column 16, row 11 Table 4.3). In other 
words, the impact of FITs on investment behaviour increases by roughly 13% if the EU ETS 
is weakened by EIs. The fact that FITs trigger more abatement is reflected by a stronger 
depreciation of the carbon price.  
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Stronger appreciating effect of a NPO on the carbon price – In the previous section 
we determined that introducing a NPO next to the EU ETS (going from Scenario 2 to 7) 
would lead to a carbon price appreciation of 16% in 2020.  After accounting for the influence 
of EIs, a NPO leads to a carbon price appreciation of 31% in 2020 (difference between 
column 7, row 4 and column 22, row 4 in Table 4.4). The reason for the stronger appreciating 
effect of a NPO on the carbon price is straightforward: because the equilibrium carbon price is 
lower after accounting for EIs, any nuclear generation capacity that is phased-out is now 
replaced by generation capacity with a higher carbon intensity than before. The higher 
emission intensity of electricity production provides greater support for the carbon price. 
All of the four partial effects become more pronounced if we increase impact of EIs, 
while they become less pronounced if we decrease the impact of EIs.  
4.4.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
We will test the sensitivity of the results to changes in some of the parameter values. 
The parameters that are tested have in common that they may have a significant impact on the 
result, while empirical data is either unavailable or highly uncertain. The six parameters that 
are covered in the sensitivity analysis are provided in Table 4.5. The reference value and the 
assumed value for the sensitivity analysis are provided in columns 3 and 4 respectively. The 
symbol and equation of each parameter can be found in columns 5 and 6. Note that not all of 
the parameters have a symbol. This is either because the value of the parameter was direct 
input in the equation (this is true for sensitivity parameters 1 and 2), or because neither the 
parameter nor its value was explicitly accounted for in the equations because the reference 
value is 0% (this is true for sensitivity parameters 5 and 6).  
For sensitivity parameters 1 to 4, the assumed value for the sensitivity analysis is 50% 
above the reference values that we have assumed so far. That large difference reflects the 
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large uncertainty regarding the reference value. Because the difference is the same for each of 
these parameters, their relative impact on the results can be compared more easily. The 
reference value of parameters 5 and 6 is 0%. Therefore, the difference between the reference 
value and the value that is used in the sensitivity cannot be expressed as a percentage of the 
reference value.  
Parameters five and six were not explicitly covered in the methodology section, 
therefore they require a more elaborate explanation, presented below. The results of the 
sensitivity analysis follow in Section 4.4.5.3. 
4.4.5.1. ANTICIPATED PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF THE CARBON PRICE 
So far, we have assumed that operators assume that the carbon price remains constant 
over the investment horizon when planning their investments (see Equation 4.31). Of course, 
if operators anticipate a different future price path of the carbon price, that may alter their 
investment decisions considerably. Therefore, we will re-run the previously tested scenario 
assuming that operators anticipate a 2.5% increase in the carbon price over the investment 
horizon. Equation 4.31 now becomes: 
 
	୲ୱǡ୲ǡ୷ୟ୧ ൌ ܧܲܨ௧௦ǡ௬௔௜ ൣܧܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ כ ͳǤͲʹͷ௬௔ ൅ ܨܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ሺͳ ൅ ߤ௜ሻ௬௔כସ ൅ ܱܥ௜ כ ͳǤͲͳ௬௔൧ ൅ ܨܱܥ௜ כ ͳǤͲͳ௬௔  
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐݏ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡͳ͸ሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ǡʹͲ͵Ͳሿǡ ݕܽ ൌ ሼܥܶ௜ ൅ ͳǡǥ ǡ ୧ ൅ ୧ሽ        (4.50) 
 
Table 4.5: Parameters that are covered in the sensitivity analysis 
# Parameter Reference value Assumed value for sensitivity analysis 
Symbol Equation 
1 Size of the two-year-ahead market 10% 15% - 4.21 
2 Size of the one-year-ahead market 40% 60% - 4.23 
3 Saturation limit See col. 7 of Table 9.3 Reference value +50% ܮ௜ 4.25 
4 Discount rate 6% 9% ݎ 4.26 
5 Anticipated %Δ of the carbon price 0% per annum 2.5% per annum - 4.31 
6 Technological experience curve effects 0% See col.7 of Table 9.2 - - 
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The cost of emitting CO2 per MW produced (ܧܥ௧௦ǡ௧௜ ) is now multiplied by a factor 
ͳǤͲʹͷ௬௔. 
4.4.5.2. TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE CURVE EFFECTS 
Technological experience curve effects refer to cost savings that are achieved when 
more experience is gained with a certain technology. Technological learning generally 
follows a law: each time the cumulative deployed capacity of a technology doubles, the costs 
fall by a constant percentage (Junginger et al., 2010).54 We cannot directly apply this law in 
the model because we would also have to account for the deployment of technologies in all 
other countries around the world. Instead, we opt for a simplified approach that relates 
deployment of a technology to cost savings. Specifically, we assume the following: 
 
ܫ݂୲ିଵ୧ ൐ Ͳ ቐ
୲୧ ൌ ୲ିଵ୧ ሺͳ െ ୧ሻ
ܱܥ௧௜ ൌ ܱܥ௧ିଵ௜ ሺͳ െ ܶܧܥ௜ሻ





   
݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ሾͳǡ ǥ ǡʹʹሿǡ ݐ ൌ ሾʹͲͲͺǡǥ ʹͲ͵Ͳሿ                  (4.51) 
 
If investments in technology  are positive, the capital costs (୲୧), other operating 
costs (ܱܥ௧௜), and fixed operating costs (ܨܱܥ୲୧) fall with a fixed percentage ୧. The 
percentages that we have assumed are provided in column 7 of Table 9.3. Note that the 
percentages in Table 9.3 are technology specific: cost savings are 1% for technologies that we 
consider mature, 3% for technologies without any deployment so far and 2% for all other  
                                                 
54 Learning effects can also be driven by R&D activity, without any deployment of the technology (Klaassen et al., 2005; 
Jamasb, 2006; Kobos et al., 2006). In order not to complicate the analysis unnecessarily, we will not consider this type of 
learning here.  
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Figure 4.8: Mean Carbon Price 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Mean Emission level 
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technologies. The differentiation reflects that a capacity doubling can be achieved much more 
easily for new technologies than for mature technologies.55 
4.4.5.3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS 
We use Scenario 8 (with EIs) as the reference scenario and re-run that scenario with 
different assumptions. The results for the mean carbon price and emission level are shown in 
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 respectively. Note that parameters 1 and 2 in Table 4.5 are tested together 
in one scenario because they cover the same phenomenon (the size of the forward market).  
Three factors have a relatively large effect on the results: the assumed discount rate, 
technological experience curve effects and the saturation limit. A fourth factor, the 
anticipation of operators regarding the future path of the carbon price, also has a moderate 
effect on the emission level and carbon price, although this effect is negligible compared to  
the former three effects.56 The size of the forward market has a negligible effect on the 
simulation results. We will now discuss the role of the discount rate, technological experience 
curve effects and the saturation limit in more detail.  
The key role of the discount rate is unsurprising as it has been widely discussed in 
academic literature (Hausman, 1979; Train, 1985; Jaffe et al., 2003; Neuhoff, 2005). If the 
discount rate increases, the investor has a shorter time span to recoup the capital expense 
because the net present value of future cash flows become smaller. As a result, an investment 
                                                 
55 Over the total simulation window of 23 years, the assumed percentages imply that the costs of mature technologies may 
have fallen with a maximum of approximately 21% (ሺͳ െ ͲǤͲͳሻଶଷ ൎ Ͳǡ͹ͻ) in 2030. Similarly, the costs of new technologies 
may have fallen with a maximum of 50%, while the costs of other technologies (with a learning percentage of 2%) may have 
fallen with a maximum of 37%. These maxima are only achieved if a technology is deployed in each of the 23 simulated 
years. If that criteria is not met, the cost saving will be less than the reported maximum. Note that we do not account for 
radical technological innovation that may be driven by a technological breakthrough. 
 
56 Note that the different outlook on the carbon price only affects investment behavior, but has not affected allowance 
banking strategies of German firms. Although a different outlook of German operators on the future carbon price may also 
change their allowance banking strategies, it is unclear how such strategy changes would precisely alter the shape of the 
supply curve of banked allowances in the ETSM (see Chapter 2, Equation 2.6). Therefore, we have not taken into account 
any changes to the allowance banking strategy in this simulation. A deeper understanding of the relationship between firm-
level carbon price expectations, allowance stock sizes and banking strategies may therefore provide an interesting avenue for 
further research. 
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typically becomes less attractive, the higher the discount rate.57 The corollary of the above is 
that FITs will also have a smaller impact on investment behaviour. This is reflected by a 
higher carbon price and a higher emission level (because the generation mix changes less  
rapidly if new investments become less attractive). Obviously, if the discount rate is lower 
than 6%, investments become more attractive. 
Technological experience curve effects also have been widely discussed in academic 
literature (Wright, 1936; Rapping, 1965; Duke and Kammen, 1999; Grübler et al., 1999; 
Junginger et al., 2010) and have the opposite effect: they reinforce the impact of FITs on 
investment behaviour, the carbon price and the emission level. If FITs trigger the deployment 
of a certain technology, this leads to technological experience, which further improves the 
attractiveness of that technology. Consequently, we observe an even lower carbon price and 
emission level for Scenario 8 if we account for technological experience. Note that our 
method to account for technological experience curve effects and the assumed percentages 
(୧) were simplistic and quite arbitrary respectively. However, considering that 
technological learning curve effects are a real phenomenon with a reinforcing effect on our 
results, the results in the previous sections could be considered conservative, provided that the 
reference discount rate and saturation limits are accurate. That is, FITs may well have an even 
stronger depreciating effect on the EU ETS carbon price if technological learning curve 
effects are triggered. 
Finally, the saturation limit also has a considerable impact on the results, although its 
impact seems comparatively smaller than the role of the discount rate and technological 
learning. If the saturation limit increases, more will be invested in a particular technology at a 
given level of profitability. Obviously, instruments that improve the profitability of a 
                                                 
57 An exception to this general rule could be an investment with large positive cash flows in the short term, and negative cash 
flows in the longer term. 
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particular technology will therefore also have a greater impact on investment behaviour if the 
saturation limit increases.  
4.5. Discussion 
The above results reveal that the FITs and NPO that have been introduced by the 
German government in the German power sector have a considerable impact on the 
functioning of the EU ETS, while leaving the overall emission level in Europe unchanged. 
Despite the fact that the German power sector currently only encompasses around 15% of all 
emission under the EU ETS, the investment decisions that are made within the sector have 
strong implications for the performance of the EU ETS, and thereby for investment behaviour 
around Europe. The combined impact of FITs and the NPO in the German power sector alone 
are forecasted to lead to an average depreciation of the long-term EU ETS carbon price of 
around 14%, without reducing the overall emission level in Europe. FITs do trigger a 
substantial amount of abatement activity in the German power sector, while the NPO 
temporarily increases the emission level in the German power sector. However, if Germany 
speeds up abatement efforts in its domestic power sector via FITs, they also take the other 
sectors and countries under the EU ETS off the hook. The more (less) abatement is achieved 
in the German power sector, the less (more) abatement needs to be achieved elsewhere to 
remain below the EU ETS emissions cap.  
If all parallel instruments that interact with the EU ETS are considered, the 2030 EU 
ETS carbon price is forecasted to fall by roughly 50%.  
Given the large depreciating effect of parallel instruments on the EU ETS carbon 
price, the scheme is unlikely to deliver on its promise as the European flagship instrument. 
Complete redundancy of the EU ETS (with a permanent 0 euro carbon price) seems unlikely, 
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although such a scenario cannot be ruled out if the economic growth rates remain low while 
fuel prices favour low-carbon alternatives. The EU ETS does not have to be the flagship 
instrument to ensure that the emission reduction targets are met. However, it is important to 
realize that, to a large extent, policymakers themselves seem to be responsible for the fact that 
the EU ETS is not playing its intended role in the policy mix. 
The performance of the EU ETS is diminished quite strongly, despite the fact that 
Germany’s policy mix conforms rather well to Mundell’s Principle of Effective Market 
Classification. Mundell’s principle states that instruments should be paired with the targets on 
which they have the most influence. Logically, the EU ETS has been paired with the target to 
reduce CO2 emissions. FITs have been paired with the target to increase the deployment of 
renewable forms of electricity generation, and the NPO has been paired with the target to 
phase out nuclear generation capacity. The assignment of instruments to targets therefore does 
not seem to be the critical problem, at least regarding these two parallel instruments in 
Germany. Instead, the problem seems to be that the performance of the EU ETS is strongly 
linked to the pursuit of other political objectives. In that light, a reduction in the number of 
policy targets would seem necessary to ensure that the EU ETS is playing its intended role in 
the policy mix. Alternatively, the policy targets that interfere the strongest with the 
performance of the EU ETS could be set to a less ambitious level. 
The stochastic approach that we have taken in this study reveals that uncertainty 
regarding the economic growth rate and the level of fuel prices is an important driver of the 
future emission level. Introducing instruments such as FITs, a NPO or an EU ETS to the 
policy mix may significantly lower the long-term emission level, yet economic growth and 
fuel price dynamics have the potential to partly (and in some cases fully) offset these 
instrument-induced effects on the emission level. 
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The decision to phase out nuclear generation capacity in the German power sector has 
a significant but temporary appreciating effect on the carbon price. Without a NPO in place, 
much of the nuclear generation capacity would have been retired towards 2030 anyway. 
Two limitations of our methodology that may bias the estimation of the carbon price 
require mentioning. First, fuel switching is not accounted for outside the German power 
sector. In practice, parallel instruments depreciate the carbon price, which triggers other 
operators around Europe to emit more CO2 by switching to a more CO2 intensive fuel. In that 
manner, the abatement via parallel instruments is immediately offset. The immediate offset 
also provides immediate upward pressure on the carbon price. In our model, operators in other 
sectors can only offset abatement by parallel instruments in the long-term via investments. 
Short-term responsiveness, via fuel switching, is not accounted for. As a result, the sensitivity 
of the carbon price to parallel instruments may be slightly overstated. Although our results are 
unlikely to be strongly affected by this limitation, further research with a more detailed 
account of the power sectors in all 31 countries that participate in the EU ETS could take 
away this limitation. Secondly, speculation on the market for CO2 allowances is not taken into 
account. Speculation can either amplify the volatility of the carbon price, or stabilize it. Its 
aggregate effect on the results is hard to predict, although long-term averages are once more 
unlikely to be strongly affected by this limitation. 
4.6. Conclusion 
In 2005, EU member-states chose for the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) as a collective means to abate CO2 emissions in energy intensive sectors. Any 
additional instrument that operates in parallel to the EU ETS, and also triggers abatement 
activity, directly (and often adversely) affects the performance of the EU ETS. Germany 
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governs two key parallel instruments in the electricity sector: Feed-In Tariffs (FITs) and a 
Nuclear Phase Out (NPO). So far, however, is has been unclear to what extent the 
performance of the EU ETS is affected by these instruments. In this study, we perform a 
scenario analysis to quantitatively asses to what extent the performance of the EU ETS is 
affected by these parallel instruments. 
The results indicate that the combined impact of FITs and the NPO in the German 
power sector is responsible for a 14% depreciation of the EU ETS carbon price. If all parallel 
instruments across Europe that interact with the EU ETS are considered, the 2030 EU ETS 
carbon price is forecasted to fall by roughly 50%. These results suggest that parallel 
instruments are a prominent driver behind the relatively low carbon prices that are witnessed 
in the market today. If policymakers want the EU ETS to play a leading role in the pursuit of 
long-term CO2 reduction goals, they are advised to reconsider and simplify the existing policy 
mix before complicating it even further. 
Although FITs and the NPO have serious implications for the performance of the EU 
ETS and investment behaviour around Europe, the overall CO2 emission level in Europe 
remains unchanged. FITs do trigger a substantial amount of abatement activity in the German 
power sector, while the NPO temporarily increases the emission level in the German power 
sector. However, if Germany speeds up abatement efforts in its domestic power sector via 
FITs, they also take the other sectors and countries under the EU ETS off the hook. The more 
(less) abatement is achieved in the German power sector, the less (more) abatement is needed 
in other EU ETS sectors to remain below the EU ETS emissions cap.  
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5.1. Revitalizing the EU ETS: in search of solutions 
We started out this research project with the observation that, although the European 
Union has succeeded in placing a cap on CO2 emissions from energy intensive sectors via the 
EU ETS, a second rather important objective has not yet been met. Specifically, the European 
Commission also pursues dynamic efficiency of the scheme (EC, 2013, 2014a). Dynamic 
efficiency implies that the EU ETS provides a credible incentive for investing in CO2 
abatement technologies in Europe. If the EU ETS is able to do that, it would likely prompt: 
more certainty to potential investors and with it willingness to act; and more technological 
learning effects and infrastructural development, each of which can bring down abatement 
costs significantly (Wright, 1936; Rapping, 1965; Duke and Kammen, 1999; Grübler et al., 
1999; Junginger et al., 2010). This would allow the EU to attain its long-term emission 
reduction goals at a lower cost than would otherwise be the case.  
This research project provides a deeper insight into the performance drivers of the EU 
ETS. The ultimate goal of the research is to assist policymakers to enhance the EU ETS 
effectiveness, and to achieve its dynamic efficiency goal. 
In Section 5.2 of this epilogue we reflect on the results that have been obtained in the 
previous chapters. After that, we evaluate the results in Section 5.3 by establishing a link 
between the results in Chapter 2 and those in Chapter 4. Subsequently, in Section 5.4 we 
discuss the merit of proposals that have been put forward recently by European policymakers. 
Finally, in Section 5.5 we provide some interesting avenues for future research. 
5.2. Key results and policy implications  
First of all, in Chapter 2, we analysed to what extent the current design of the EU ETS 
translated itself into investment uncertainty for potential investors in CCS. Some literature 
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suggests that CCS offers enough technical potential to account for 1/7th of the required global 
abatement efforts necessary to prevent the most devastating consequences of anthropogenic 
climate change (Pacala and Socolow, 2004). However, its development crucially hinges on 
the availability of a credible economic incentive for deployment. If such an incentive is 
created in a timely and structural manner, its deployment cost can decrease significantly. 
Thereby, CCS can not only contribute substantially to achieving long-term emission targets, 
but also do so at a substantially lower societal cost compared to scenarios without CCS as a 
technological option (e.g. Finnon, 2012; Riahi et al., 2004). In that light, an EU ETS-based 
incentive that can structurally drive the deployment of CCS could be seen as a litmus test for 
the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS. This is especially true given the high capital 
requirements and long lead times that are typically associated with CCS projects. Therefore, 
we explored in Chapter 2 to what extent potential investors are exposed to investment 
uncertainty under the current design of the EU ETS, and how amendments to the EU ETS 
design would alter their investment outlook. 
In order to analyse the EU ETS impact more thoroughly, in the same chapter a 
dynamic stochastic simulation model of the EU ETS is developed to perform the required 
analysis. The EU ETS allowance price is an endogenous model variable that is dependent on 
the allowance supply regime, the demand for emission allowances, allowance banking 
strategies of firms and the abatement costs. Stochasticity is incorporated into the model to 
account for various types of uncertainty. The inclusion of the baseline emissions growth rate 
as a stochastic parameter (which is, in part, driven by the uncertain macro-economic growth 
rate) is particularly important in combination with the banking provision because it can lead 
to diverging pathways with regard to the CO2 price and investment behaviour. In case of 
continued economic stagnation, allowance surpluses may build up, which can depreciate the 
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allowance price for years or even decades into the future. In such a case, much less 
investment would be required to remain below the allowance cap, compared to a scenario 
with high economic growth rates. This may have serious ramifications for potential investors 
in CCS. In our view, the current literature on the topic generally does not sufficiently take 
these dynamics into account. We have performed a Monte Carlo simulation to generate 
probability distributions of output parameters. 
The results of our study indicate that potential investors in CCS face considerable 
investment uncertainty under the EU ETS. Based on the abatement costs of various CCS types 
in the merit order of abatement technologies, the average scope for CCS across all types is 
forecasted to be 85 MtCO2/yr by 2030 under the current design of the EU ETS. However, the 
standard deviation of this estimate is 70 MtCO2/yr because the baseline emission level until 
2030 is uncertain. The baseline emission level is driven by several factors with a key driver 
being the macro-economic growth rate. In the end, if economic growth rates are relatively 
high, substantial investments will be required over the next 15 year to remain below the ETS 
allowance cap. Alternatively, if the economy stagnates until 2030 the scope for CCS may be 
negligible or even non-existent. Given the long lead times towards completion of CCS 
abatement projects, the implied investment uncertainty is likely to be a significant obstacle 
towards deployment of CCS in reality, or, for that matter, any other technology with similar 
characteristics. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that a more restrictive allowance supply does not 
reduce the standard deviation of the expected scope for CCS, although the average scope does 
increase. Because the investment uncertainty remains, adjustments to the allowance supply do 
not seem to be an effective manner to structurally improve the strength of the EU ETS 
incentive mechanism for investments in CCS. In fact, even if a far-reaching restrictive policy 
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would be adopted, a single downward economic shock could largely undo the positive impact 
of such a measure (see Section 2.3.3). Nevertheless, most EU ETS amendments that have 
recently been proposed involve restrictions on the supply of allowances (see also Section 5.4). 
Therefore, if policymakers want to ensure that the EU ETS can structurally provide an 
incentive for technologies with high capital requirements and lead times such as CCS, they 
are advised to shift their efforts from supply restrictions to measures that can reduce the 
allowance price uncertainty that investors face. Such measures could, for example, take the 
form of price floors and ceilings. In any case, they should be geared towards a more stable 
investment incentives’ outlook. Under the current design of the EU ETS, only waiting for the 
allowance price to (possibly only temporarily) reach the required level to trigger deployment 
does not seem to be a viable long-term strategy. 
 
In Chapter 3 and 4, we turn to another issue that is known to influence the 
performance of the EU ETS: the interaction effects between the EU ETS and other 
instruments that operate in parallel to it. Parallel instruments often interact adversely with the 
performance of the EU ETS if such instruments, directly or indirectly, affect the CO2 
emission level in ETS sectors. Notable parallel instruments include incentives for the 
deployment of renewables and energy efficiency measures. If parallel instruments lead to a 
lower emission level in ETS sectors, they effectively operate as a substitute of the EU ETS. 
This is because abatement via parallel instruments implies that less abatement activity needs 
to be triggered via the EU ETS to remain below the allowance cap. As a result, such parallel 
instruments generally depreciate the EU ETS allowance price. Although this general 
mechanism has been identified before (see e.g. Hindsberger et al., 2003; Morthorst, 2003), the 
exact scope and impact of these interactions on the EU ETS has so far remained unclear. 
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Therefore, both Chapter 3 and 4 of this research project have been dedicated to an in depth 
analysis of this issue. 
 
In Chapter 3, we assessed under which conditions the EU ETS would become 
redundant as a result of the impact of parallel instruments. Here, we strictly define 
redundancy of the EU ETS as a scenario in which the allowance price permanently is €0. 
Also, we differentiated between two types of parallel instruments and investigated to what 
extent their effect on the performance of the EU ETS is different. The analysis can help 
policymakers to assess more precisely the extent to which parallel instruments undermine the 
performance of the EU ETS. In that manner, policymakers can weigh costs and benefits of 
introducing a parallel instrument more easily. 
In this study, we built on the dynamic stochastic simulation model that was developed 
in Chapter 2 and introduced parallel instruments to it. Note that it is impossible to accurately 
model the drivers of all parallel instruments that are currently in place in Europe. Instead, we 
introduce them to the model in a rather stylized manner, namely by assuming their annual 
abatement impact (in MtCO2/yr) on the emission levels in ETS sectors. By running a range of 
scenarios, each time with a higher impact on the emission level (with increments of 1 
MtCO2/yr), we assess at which impact level the EU ETS becomes redundant. 
We differentiated between two classes of parallel instruments, termed Type 1 and 
Type 2 instruments. Type 1 instruments have been defined as instruments that aim at ETS 
sectors, and thereby reduce the carbon intensity of production of energy intensive sectors. A 
biomass co-firing mandate for the power sector is an example of a Type 1 instrument. In turn, 
Type 2 instruments have been defined as instruments that aim at non-ETS sectors and lower 
the demand for products that are produced by ETS sectors. Incentives for the deployment of 
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decentralized renewables are a prominent example of a Type 2 instrument. Such instruments 
lower the demand for centrally produced electricity and thereby they lower the production 
volume and emission output of firms under the EU ETS. 
Our analysis shows that Type 2 instruments have the greatest allowance price 
depreciating effect. This result can be explained by the fact that Type 2 instruments 
effectively take away the burden to abate CO2 from ETS firms, while leaving all of the 
abatement options of ETS firms intact. Instead, if a Type 1 instruments leads to abatement of 
a tonne of CO2, some of the technological abatement potential that is available in ETS sectors 
is used to do so. This implies that, in the case of Type 2 instruments, ETS firms retain more 
degrees of freedom to pursue future abatement efforts. This lowered burden on ETS firms is 
reflected by a more strongly depreciated CO2 price. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that, if the collective impact of Type 1 and Type 2 
instruments surpasses 40 MtCO2/yr, the EU ETS is certain to become redundant. If the 
abatement impact surpasses 20 MtCO2/yr, the future of the EU ETS is uncertain, and hinges 
on the macro-economic growth rate. The lower the economic growth rate, the greater the 
likelihood that the EU ETS becomes redundant. If the impact is below 20 MtCO2/yr the EU 
ETS is unlikely to become redundant. However, these thresholds only hold under the 
assumption that policymakers and firms remain fully committed to the EU ETS. Otherwise 
the threshold levels are likely to be significantly below the reported values, indicating a 
considerably more vulnerable scheme. Firms may show a lack of commitment by dumping 
their emission allowances, while policymakers may trigger that response by expressing doubt 
regarding the future perspective of the EU ETS, by taking measures to that effect, or by 
implementing no measures at all when there is a deliberate call for intervention. In any case, 
even if firms and governments are fully committed to the EU ETS, the allowance price may 
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be strongly depreciated if the impact is below the 20 MtCO2/yr threshold but approaches that 
value. 
If policymakers are interested in implementing a safeguard that would prevent the 
redundancy of the EU ETS via the impact of parallel instruments, they could consider the 
introduction of a cap on the use of parallel instruments. By setting the cap well below the 20 
MtCO2/yr threshold, redundancy or even marginally low allowance prices can be avoided. At 
the same time, the dynamic efficiency of the scheme would be stimulated. Although such a 
cap may be politically hard to establish in practice, it would provide a strong safeguard while 
also forcing national, local and regional governments in Europe to carefully select only those 
parallel instruments that offer the greatest local benefits and the least adverse impact on the 
EU ETS. In line with earlier results, a cap on parallel instruments should not only consider 
instruments that aim at ETS sectors, but explicitly also those that aim at non-ETS sectors and 
indirectly interfere with the performance of the EU ETS.  In that manner, a more coherent and 
goal oriented policy mix can be organized. 
 
In Chapter 4 we delve deeper into the topic of policy interaction. After having 
established in Chapter 3 that parallel instruments have the potential to strongly affect the 
performance of the EU ETS, we performed a case study to better understand to what extent 
the current performance of the EU ETS can be explained by this phenomenon. The fact that 
the EU ETS is currently performing worse than initially anticipated by many European 
policymakers is undisputable (EC, 2013, 2014a). The same holds for the adverse interaction 
effects between the EU ETS and parallel instruments. However, it remains unclear to what 
extent the former fact can be explained by the latter phenomenon.  
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The results of the case study indicate that the combination of Feed-In Tariffs (FITs) 
and the Nuclear Phase Out (NPO) in the German power sector depreciate the average EU ETS 
allowance price in 2030 by approximately €5 (or about 14% in relative terms). If all other 
parallel instruments that are in place across Europe are also taken into account in a stylized 
manner, we obtain a rough estimate of a €20 depreciation of the EU ETS allowance price (or 
about 50% in relative terms), compared to a scenario without any parallel instruments in place 
(see Section 4.4.2). We find that redundancy of the EU ETS is possible in the existing policy 
setting (including parallel instruments), albeit only in case of both continued sluggish 
economic growth rates and fuel prices that favour lower carbon alternatives. 
In light of these results, policymakers that are interested in revitalizing the impact of 
the EU ETS on abatement activity are seriously advised to reconsider the composition of the 
policy mix in the energy and climate domain, to the extent that these policies directly or 
indirectly impact the EU ETS incentive strength. Simplification and recalibration of the policy 
mix may have a significant positive effect on the dynamic efficiency and overall strength of 
the EU ETS incentive. If policymakers want an EU ETS that structurally provides a strong 
incentive to energy-intensive sectors to reduce their CO2 emissions, recalibration of the 
existing policy mix seems like a logical starting point. 
We note that the two parallel instruments that were examined in the German power 
sector seem fairly well matched with the policy goals that they were intended to achieve. The 
NPO is a very effective means to accomplish a full phase out of nuclear energy, whereas FITs 
are also a rather direct means to stimulate the deployment of renewables. Given that the 
policy goals have been set, the choice for the respective instrument can be justified rather 
easily. To the extent that this is representative for all parallel instruments across Europe, 
policymakers are advised to first focus on reducing the number of parallel policy goals that 
501077-L-bw-Mulder
198  Conclusion and Epilogue
 
have been set in the energy and climate domain. This advice applies to policymakers on all 
governmental levels, irrespective whether it is on the European, national, regional or local 
level. Alternatively, the parallel policy goals could be set to a different ambition level so as to 
avoid some of the adverse interactions. Subsequently, policymakers could focus on 
redesigning individual instruments in such a manner that adverse interactions are, at a 
minimum, reduced. 
 
In short, the following lessons can be learned from the research that was presented in this 
thesis: 
- The EU ETS provides investors with a high level of investment uncertainty making it 
unlikely that the scheme will trigger investments in CO2 abatement technologies, which have 
a long lead-time and high capital requirements, like CCS (Chapter 2); 
- Reducing the supply of emission allowances does not lower, and may even increase, the 
investment uncertainty that investors face (Chapter 2); 
- If policymakers aim to improve the impact of the EU ETS on investment behaviour, they are 
advised to introduce measures that reduce CO2 price uncertainty (Chapter 2). 
- The EU ETS may become redundant if parallel instruments trigger more than 20 MtCO2/yr 
abatement in EU ETS sectors. If some firms and/or policymakers have less than full 
commitment to the EU ETS that threshold is likely to be lower (Chapter 3); 
- Capping the use of parallel instruments could both help to revitalize the EU ETS and would 
force policymakers to carefully select only those parallel instruments that offer the most 
favourable cost-benefit trade-off (Chapter 3) 
- Parallel instruments that target non-ETS sectors have a stronger depreciating effect on the 
EU ETS CO2 price than parallel instruments that are aimed at ETS sectors (Chapter 3); 
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- The FITs and NPO in the German power sector alone are responsible for a 14% depreciation 
of the EU ETS CO2 price in 2030 (Chapter 4); 
- All parallel instruments that are in operation today across Europe are estimated to depreciate 
the EU ETS allowance price by roughly 50% (Chapter 4); 
- If policymakers aim to improve the impact of the EU ETS on investment behaviour, they are 
advised to reduce the number of policy targets (and the associated instruments) that interfere 
with the EU ETS (Chapter 4). 
5.3. Epilogue: A final assessment of the scope for CCS 
under the EU ETS 
In Chapter 2, we forecasted a scope for CCS in 2030 with a mean of 85 MtCO2/yr and 
a standard deviation of 70 MtCO2/yr. However, in that Base Case Scenario, we did not take 
parallel instruments into account. In Chapter 4, we concluded that parallel instruments have a 
significant depreciating effect on the EU ETS CO2 price. A significantly lower CO2 price is 
likely to lead to a significantly smaller deployment potential for CCS. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the deployment levels of CCS in the German power sector 
under all of the tested scenarios in 2030. Note that, from a policy mix perspective, Scenario 2 
from Chapter 4 (see Section 4.4.2) is the same as the Base Case simulation in Chapter 2. Both 
scenarios assume that the EU ETS is the only operational instrument.  
 If FITs, the NPO and External Instruments (EIs) are all added alongside the EU ETS, 
Table 5.1: Cumulative CCS Deployment in 2030 in the German power sector 
Scenario number Scenario Mean deployment in GW 
  No EIs EIs = 10 MtCO2 
1 No instruments 5.3 -17% 5.3 -17% 
2 EU ETS (equiv. to Base Case in Chapter 2) 6.3 Ref. 5.7 -11% 
5 EU ETS + FITs 5.4 -15% 5.1 -20% 
7 EU ETS + NPO 5.6 -11% 4.3 -32% 
8 EU ETS + FITs + NPO 3.8 -40% 3.1 -51% 
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the forecasted deployed capacity of CCS in the German power sector drops from 6.3 GW to 
3.1 GW in 2030, equivalent to a fall of 51%. FITs and a NPO alone would result in a fall of 
the average investment potential of 40%. Note that introducing the NPO (going from Scenario 
5 to 8) reduces the scope for CCS. This is because the removal of nuclear capacity from the 
production mix, starting in 2012, stimulates the deployment of other technologies to such an 
extent that the potential for CCS is reduced (compared to Scenario 5) by the time the 
technology is introduced to the market in 2025. 
Although the average deployment levels are positive, we do note that investment 
uncertainty via the EU ETS remains a likely obstacle to deployment of CCS and other 
technologies. Also, various barriers to deployment have not been explicitly modelled (such as 
possible societal resistance, permitting procedures and local geological or infrastructural 
obstacles) which may further reduce the scope for CCS. In spite of that, we conclude that the 
potential for investments in CCS on the basis of the EU ETS allowance price incentive alone 
is further diminished significantly through the impact of parallel instruments across Europe. 
5.4. Epilogue: current state of EU ETS policy development 
Proposed amendment 
In light of the fact that the EU ETS has, so far, not been able to meet prior 
expectations by many policymakers, various very recent proposals have been put forth in an 
effort to revitalize the EU ETS.  In January 2014, the European Commission (EC, 2014a) 
proposed to add a Market Stability Reserve (MSR) to the EU ETS. The MSR was proposed 
because the European Commission noted that the current oversupply of emissions allowances, 
and the low CO2 price, does not change existing investment patterns. 
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The MSR is a mechanism to adjust the number of emission allowances that are 
auctioned if the total number of banked allowances is outside a predefined range. Specifically, 
the number of allowances that is auctioned is temporarily reduced if the number of banked 
allowances is higher than 833 MtCO2.58 The allowances that are reduced from the auctionable 
allowances in a specific year are kept in the MSR. If the stock of banked allowances falls 
below 400 MtCO2, 100 MtCO2 of allowances are taken from the MSR and added to the 
auctionable volume in that year. The proposal states that the MSR should operate from the 1st 
of January 2021.  
The MSR can be defended on the basis of two positive impacts. First, part of the 
currently observed low market price may be explained by the fact that some market 
participants have little confidence in the ability of the authorities to pass far-reaching 
proposals to revive the EU ETS, and take their positions in the market accordingly. Passing 
the MSR amendment would show that legislative action remains a viable option. Therefore, to 
the extent that the market price is suppressed by scepticism of market participants towards the 
legislative process itself, the MSR could make a difference. Secondly, the MSR would allow 
the authorities to withdraw allowances from being auctioned when the market price is 
relatively low, and allow them to reintroduce these allowances on the auction when the CO2 
price is higher. As a result, the authorities incur a higher auction revenue. Although this does 
not bring the EU any closer to its dynamic efficiency objective, policymakers are likely to see 
merit in higher auction revenues. 
Interestingly, the potential to reap higher auction revenues may be a blessing in 
disguise. Member-state governments can determine how to use the auction revenues 
                                                 
58 The exact number of allowances that are reduced from the auctionable volume in year ݐ is equal to 12% of the stock of 
banked allowances in year ݐ െ ͳ, unless this number is less than 100 million allowances. Note that 100/0.12=833, which is 
equal to the upper bound of the predefined range. 
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themselves. However, the EU ETS directive (EC, 2009a) suggests in Article 10 that at least 
50% of the revenues generated from the auctioning process should be used for one of the 
following options: 
 
- To reduce greenhouse gas emissions (T1/T2); 
- To develop renewable energy (T1/T2); 
- To avoid deforestation and increase afforestation and reforestation; 
- To apply CCS (T1); 
- To encourage low-emission and public forms of transport (T2); 
- To finance R&D in energy efficiency and clean technologies (T1/T2); 
- To stimulate energy efficiency and insulation investments (T1/T2); 
- To cover administrative expenses of the management of the EU ETS. 
 
Many of the above investment options have great merit by themselves. However, in 
light of the discussion in the previous chapters, legislators should be careful when choosing 
their investment goal because many of the above options also adversely interact with the EU 
ETS. Between brackets, we have indicated in what manner the suggested options may 
interfere with the performance of the EU ETS. Here, T1 and T2 refer to Type 1 and Type 2 
parallel instruments respectively, as defined in Chapter 3. Note that there are only two options 
that do not directly or indirectly interfere with the EU ETS performance. Higher auction 
revenues via the introduction of the MSR may therefore hurt the performance of the EU ETS 
if these revenues are spent on parallel instruments that adversely interact with the scheme. 
In line with the suggestion in the EU ETS Directive, Germany has earmarked all of its 
auction revenues for a Special Energy and Climate Fund (in German: Sondervermögen 
Energie und Klimafonds, abbreviated EKF) (Esch, 2013). For 2014, the German government 
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expects revenues into the fund totalling around 900 million euros. Around half of all of the 
revenues is spent on measures to stimulate renewable energy, energy efficiency, national 
climate action programmes, CO2 building restoration and urban renewal with energy 
efficiency and climate neutrality as guiding principles. Poland, France, Romania, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary have made similar pledges to stimulate domestic climate-related 
projects, although none of them have earmarked 100% of the auction revenues (Esch, 2013). 
All in all it is questionable whether the MSR, as foreseen, may really alter investment 
patterns in a meaningful way. In the end, the overall amount of emission allowances remains 
unchanged. Whether the allowances are immediately auctioned or whether they are temporary 
held in the MSR makes no fundamental difference as long as firms themselves hold more than 
enough allowances on stock to satisfy their immediate demand. The lower bound of the 
predefined range, 400 MtCO2, ensures that this is the case. 
 
Passed amendments 
An amendment of EU ETS legislation that did pass (EC, 2014b) concerned a timetable 
to delay the auction of a total of 900 MtCO2 of allowances. These allowances were reduced 
from the allowances that were set to be auctioned in 2014, 2015 and 2016, and are set to be 
redistributed in 2019 and 2020. Some market participants have suggested not to redistribute 
the allowances in 2019 and 2020, but to add these allowances to the MSR in the event that the 
amendment that introduces the MSR passes (EPRS, 2014). Similar to the MSR, the back 
loading proposal did not and will not have a large effect on the CO2 price level, because the 
overall number of allowances does not change. 
Another proposal that passed involves an adjustment of the annual reduction factor of 
the EU ETS allowance cap. In October of 2014, the European Council agreed to reduce GHG 
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emissions by 40% in 2030 (compared to 1990). In order to achieve that target, the EU ETS 
allowance cap needs to be adjusted. Specifically, the emission allowance cap used to fall by 
1.74% and will now fall by 2.2%, starting in 2021. This measure reduces the overall supply of 
emission allowances and, therefore, is an effective means to provide upward pressure for the 
CO2 price.  
All in all, the amendments that have passed may increase the average CO2 price to 
some extent, while most proposals that are under serious consideration are unlikely to provide 
significant upward pressure to the CO2 price. A more stringent adjustment, compared to the 
passed amendment, of the annual reduction factor was tested in Chapter 2. However, in that 
chapter, we concluded that an amendment with that magnitude is unlikely to transform the EU 
ETS into a credible incentive for investors that face large capital expenditures and long lead-
times. 
5.5. Avenues for future research 
Interesting avenues for future research on emission trading schemes, and the EU ETS 
in particular are: 
 
- Analyses of the relative cost-efficiency of various CO2 abatement instruments (such as a CO2 
tax, emissions trading schemes, hybrid schemes, emission standards and others) that 
explicitly and realistically accounts for interactions between instruments in complex policy 
settings; 
- Further development of analytical frameworks for policymakers to help prioritize and 
organize policy targets and instruments;  
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- Empirical analyses regarding emission allowance banking strategies. We have explicitly 
accounted for allowance banking strategies although our assumptions were not based on 
empirics. With greater knowledge on actual banking strategies and carbon price expectations 
of firms under the EU ETS, banking strategies can be modelled in a more detailed and 
ideally even dynamic manner; 
- A more explicit account of the most important parallel instruments and EU ETS sectors 
across Europe. Our analysis in Chapter 4 captured the single largest sector under the EU 
ETS, and two of its most important parallel instruments. Yet, because the EU ETS spans 31 
countries and a range of energy-intensive sectors a more explicit account of these other 
sectors (and associated instruments) would allow for an even more complete analysis. 
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3E  Efficacy, Effectiveness and Efficiency (relates to the 3E method (Appraise, 2014)) 
All.  Allowances 
CCS  Carbon Capture and Storage 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
CHP  Combined Heat and Power 
CRC  Carbon Reduction Commitment (UK law to stimulate energy efficiency measures) 
Diff.  Difference 
EEG  Erneuerbare Energien Gezets (legislation on the feed-in tariff scheme in Germany) 
EIs  External Instruments (parallel instruments EU ETS sectors other than the German power sector) 
EOR  Enhanced Oil Recovery (CCS application in which injected CO2 is used to recover oil from a reservoir) 
ETSM  Emissions Trading Scheme Module 
EU  European Union 
EU ETS   European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
FCPI  Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator 
FITs  Feed-in tariffs 
GBM  Geometric Brownian Motion 
GHG  Greenhouse gasses 
GJ  Gigajoule 
GPSM  German Power Sector Module 
GW  Gigawatt (equal to a 1,000 megawatt) 
GWh  Gigawatt hour (equal to a 1,000 megawatt hour) 
kW  Kilowatt (equal to 1,000 watt) 
kWh  Kilowatt hour (equal to a 1,000 watt hour) 
m  Meter 
M  Mean output value (see tables in the results section) 
MEE  Meerjarenafspraak Energie-efficientie (Dutch agreement between government and industry on energy 
efficiency measures) 
MtCO2  Megatonne of CO2 (equal to a 1,000,000 metric tonnes of CO2) 
MW  Megawatt 
MWh  Megawatt hour (equal to the generation of one MW for the duration of one hour) 
NAP  National Allocation Plan 
NCP  Non Compliance Penalty 
NER  New Entrants Reserve 
NPO  Nuclear Phase Out 
NPV  Net Present Value 
P10  10th percentile (10% of all observations are lower than the reported value) 
P90  90th percentile (90% of all observations are lower than the reported value) 
PIMA Sol Plan de Impulso al Medio Ambiente en el Sector hotelero (Spanish law to stimulate GHG reduction) 
pdf  Probability Distribution Function 
RGGI  Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
ROC  Renewable Obligation Certificates 
SDE+  Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie (Dutch measure to stimulate renewable energy)  
Stdev  Standard Deviation 
T1  Type 1 instruments 
T2  Type 2 instruments 
tCO2  Tonne of CO2 
UNFCCC United National Framework Convention on Climate Change 
USA  United Stated of America 
W  Watt 
Yr  Year
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8. VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS 
 Parameter Type Dimension Equation 
A     
ܣܦ Demand for EU ETS emission allowances Exogenous / 
Endogenous 
MtCO2 4.49 
ܣܴ Annual reduction of the EU ETS emission allowance cap Exogenous MtCO2 2.1 
ܣܵ Supply of EU ETS emission allowances  Exogenous MtCO2 2.1 
C     
ܿ௠௔௫ Upper bound to the Clearness Index Exogenous # 4.8 
ܥ Cap of EU ETS emission allowances Exogenous / 
Endogenous 
MtCO2 2.1 
ܥܣܲ Generation capacity Exogenous / 
Endogenous 
MW 4.4 
ܥܣܲܨ Capacity factor Exogenous %/100 4.5 
ܥܫ Carbon Intensity Exogenous tCO2/MWh 4.14 
	 Forecasted costs Endogenous €/MW 4.26 
ܥܶ Construction time Exogenous # in years 4.4 
D     
 Help variable to sum the electricity production of FIT-based production 
capacity over all years in which FIT-based production has been 
commissioned 
Endogenous # 4.35 
ܦ Demand for electricity in a time slice (ts) Endogenous MWh 4.3 
ܦܥ Deployed capacity of abatement potential Endogenous tCO2 2.10 
ܦ݁ݔ݌ Assumed exports of electricity (for calculation of the EEG apportionment) Exogenous MWh 4.46 
ܦ݈݋ݏݏ Network losses and unregistered use of electricity Exogenous MWh 4.46 
ܦ݋ݓ݊ Electricity use by the electricity sector itself Exogenous MWh 4.46 
ܦ݌ݎ݅ݒ Electricity demanded by privileged sectors (= sectors that face strong 
international competition) 
Exogenous MWh 4.46 
E     
ˈ Mathematical constant ≈ 2.71828 Exogenous - 4.25 
ܧ Spot electricity price (Wholesale) Endogenous €/MWh 4.15 
ܧܧܩ EEG Apportionment Endogenous €/MWh 4.45 
ܧܥ Cost of emitting CO2 Endogenous €/MWh 4.16 
ܧܨ Forecast of the electricity price Endogenous €/MWh 4.28 
ܧܩ Growth in the emission level in the rest of Europe Exogenous %/100 4.49 
ܧܮܩ Growth in electricity demand in Germany Exogenous %/100 4.1 
ܧܯ Emission level in the German power sector Endogenous MtCO2 4.14 
ܧܲܨ Expected production factor Endogenous MWh/MW 4.28 
F     
ܨܥ Cost of fuel use Endogenous €/MWh 4.16 
ܨܥܲܫ Fundamental Carbon Price Indicator Endogenous €/tCO2 4.17 
	 FIT-tariff Exogenous €/MWh 4.32 
ܨܫܶܧܲܨ Expected production factor of FIT-based capacity Endogenous MWh/MW 4.32 
ܨܫܶܧܺܲ Total FIT expenses: the total amount of money that is transferred to FIT-
based operators in a given year 
Endogenous € 4.47 
	 Total production level of all FIT-based production capacity Endogenous MWh 4.35 
ܨܫܴܶܧܸ Total FIT revenues: the total amount of money that network operators 
earn by selling the electricity that was produced by FIT-based production 
capacity in the market place. 
Endogenous € 4.48 
	 Fixed operating expenses (are incurred even if no electricity is produced) Exogenous €/MW 4.27 
ܨܱܴͳ Electricity that is sold for delivery one year ahead Endogenous MWh 4.24 
ܨܱܴʹ Electricity that is sold for delivery two years ahead Endogenous MWh 4.24 
ܨܱܴܲ Electricity that is produced based on previously negotiated forward 
contracts 
Endogenous MWh 4.10 
ܨܲ Fuel price Exogenous / 
Endogenous 
€/GJ 4.18 
G     
݃ Mean clearness index Exogenous # 4.8 
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ܩܣܵ Gross allowance surplus Endogenous MtCO2 2.4 
H     
݄ hour Exogenous # 4.5 
I     
݅ Index for electricity generation technologies in the German power sector Exogenous # 4.4 
݅݉݌݋ݎݐ Imports of electricity Endogenous MWh 4.13 
ܫܰܧܴ Issued allowances from the New Entrants Reserve Exogenous MtCO2 2.3 
ܫܸܰ Investments Exogenous / 
Endogenous 
MW 4.4 
K     
݇ Index for CO2 abatement technologies in ETS sectors Exogenous # 2.11 
L     
 Saturation limit Exogenous MWh 4.25 
ܮܨ Load factor Exogenous %/100 4.3 
 Life time of a technology Exogenous # in years 4.26 
M     
ܯܣܥ Marginal abatement costs Exogenous €/tCO2 2.11 
ܯܥ Marginal production costs Endogenous €/MWh 4.12.1 
ܯܥʹ Forecast of the marginal production costs two years ahead Endogenous €/MWh 4.20.1 
N     
݊ Number of CO2 abatement technologies in the EU ETS model Exogenous # 2.13 
ܰܣܵ Net Allowance Surplus Endogenous MtCO2 2.6.1 
ܰܥܲ Non Compliance Penalty Exogenous / 
Endogenous 
€ 2.7 
ܰܧ Emissions by new entrants into the EU ETS Exogenous MtCO2 2.3 
O     
ܱܥ Other operating costs Endogenous €/MWh 4.16 
P     
ܲ Spot production Endogenous MWh 4.12.1 
ܲͳ Forecast of the spot production level one years ahead Endogenous MWh 4.23 
ܲʹ Forecast of the spot production level two years ahead Endogenous MWh 4.20.1 
ܲܨ Production factor: maximum production in MWh per time slice for 1 MW 




R     
 Discount rate Exogenous %/100 4.26 
ܴܦ Residual demand Endogenous MtCO2 4.49 
ܴܧ Retail electricity price Endogenous €/MWh 4.2 
ܴܧܶ Retired capacity Exogenous MW 4.4 
	 Forecasted revenue Endogenous €/MW 4.26 
		 Forecasted revenue of FIT-based production capacity Endogenous €/MW 4.32 
S     
ݏ Season Exogenous # 4.18 
ܵܦ Spot demand for electricity Endogenous MWh 4.10 
ܵܲ Available production capacity for spot production Endogenous MWh 4.11 
T     
 Year Exogenous # 4.1 
ܶͳ Abatement via Type 1 parallel instruments Exogenous MtCO2 4.49 
ܶʹ Abatement via Type 2 parallel instruments Exogenous MtCO2 4.49 
ܶܣ Total abatement of CO2 via all EU ETS sectors (in Chapter 4 covering all EU 
ETS sectors except for the German power sector) 
Endogenous MtCO2 2.13 
ܶܦ Total demand for electricity Exogenous / 
Endogenous 
MWh 4.1 
ܶܦܥ Cumulative deployed capacity of abatement technology in year ݐ since 
2008 
Endogenous MtCO2 2.12 
 Cost savings that are achieved via technological experience curve effects  Exogenous %/100 4.51 
ܶܦܧܧܩ Total demand for electricity by consumers that are obliged to pay the EEG 
apportionment  
Endogenous MWh 4.46 
 Time Slice Exogenous # - 
U     
ܷܤܣ Used Banked Allowances from the stock of Banked Allowances (BA) Endogenous MtCO2 2.5.2. 
W     
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ܹ Wiener process sample from a normal distribution with mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1 
Exogenous # 4.19 
Y     
ݕܽ Years ahead of ݐ, index used for forecasting cash flows Endogenous # 4.20.3 
Other     
͵ͲͲ Captures emission allowances from the NER300 reserve Exogenous # 2.1 
ߝ Scalar that accounts for the fact that part of the EU ETS allowance cap is 
reserved in the New Entrants Reserve between 2008 and 2020. 
Exogenous # 2.1 
Ԗ Dummy variable that accounts for the fact the operators only receive a 
FIT-tariff over the first 20 operational years 
Endogenous # 4.32 
߱ Weibull distribution Exogenous - 4.6 
ߚ Burn rate Exogenous GJ/MWh 4.18 
ߣ Scale parameter of a Weibull distribution Exogenous # 4.6 
ߢ Shape parameter of a Weibull distribution Exogenous # 4.6 
߲ Scale parameter of the gamma distribution Exogenous # 4.8 
ߥ Shape parameter of a gamma distribution Exogenous # 4.8 
ߤ Average historical growth rate of a fuel price Exogenous %/100 4.19 
ߪ Historical standard deviation of the fuel price growth rate Exogenous %/100 4.19 
Ԉ Dummy variable that indicates whether certain investments are FIT-based 
production capacity or regular production capacity  
Endogenous # 4.34.2 
߸ Dummy variable that indicated whether producing electricity is profitable 
for FIT-based production capacity that was commissioned in a particular 
year 








Figure 9.1: Retirement of 2008 generation capacity 
 







Figure 9.3: Cumulative distribution functions of the clearness index  
 
 
Figure 9.4: Example of generated price indexes 
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Figure 9.5: Confidence intervals of generated price indexes (2,000 model trails) 
 
 





Table 9.1: Input variables per time slice for the GPSM 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 

















Morning 0.070 6.85 1.77 10.66 2.26 0.11 -5.6606 7.1018 
2 Afternoon 0.072 7.33 1.99 10.71 2.24 0.13 -4.8533 6.3432 
3 Evening 0.067 5.85 1.38 10.73 2.32 0.00 - - 




Morning 0.067 7.11 2.22 9.57 2.33 0.29 0.0483 2.2827 
6 Afternoon 0.068 7.44 2.37 10.04 2.45 0.29 0.0483 2.2827 
7 Evening 0.060 4.56 1.45 9.51 2.39 0.01 - - 




Morning 0.066 6.46 2.11 9.50 2.18 0.26 -0.6993 2.8035 
10 Afternoon 0.068 6.49 2.03 9.63 2.24 0.26 -0.6993 2.8035 
11 Evening 0.060 3.50 0.93 9.01 2.12 0.01 - - 




Morning 0.070 7.05 1.63 11.80 2.52 0.10 -6.0838 7.5039 
14 Afternoon 0.072 6.93 1.72 11.63 2.36 0.10 -6.0838 7.5039 
15 Evening 0.066 6.07 1.35 11.85 2.65 0.00 - - 
16 Night 0.051 6.07 1.44 11.71 2.67 0.00 - - 
Source of load factor: ENTSOE (2014) based on hourly load values for Germany over the year 2013. Source for wind speed 
distributions: KNMI (2014) from Huibertsgat (offshore) and Volkel (onshore) stations from 2011 to 2013. Source for capacity 
factor of solar power: PVGIS (2012) Latitude 50㺎37'30" North, Longitude 10㺎1'10" East. Global average irradiance data with 
15 minute interval, assuming a 35⁰ inclined plane, oriented to the south. 
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Table 9.2: Technology characteristics (non-financial) 




















݅   ܥܶ௜  ܥܣܲ௜  ܮܶ௜  NL = No 
Limit 
ܥܣܲܨ௜  ܥܫ௜  ߚ௜  
1 Wind onshore Wind 1 23,815 25 NL - 0 0.00 
2 Wind offshore Wind 3 0 25 NL - 0 0.00 
3 Solar PV - Commercial Solar 0 918 25 NL - 0 0.00 
4 CSP Solar 1 0 20 NL - 0 0.00 
5 Hydro Water 4 10,059 50 NL 0.25 0 0.00 
6 Ocean Wave 1 0 20 2020 0.5 0 0.00 
7 Geothermal Heat 2 3 30 NL 0.3 0 0.00 
8 Biomass - CHP Biomass 4 991 30 NL 0.3 0 10.00 
9 Biomass - CHP Biomass 4 0 30 2015 0.3 0 12.93 
10 Biomass - dedicated Biomass 4 991 40 NL 0.3 0 10.90 
11 Biomass - dedicated Biomass 4 0 40 2015 0.3 0 9.64 
12 Biogas Biogas 4 1,455 40 NL 0.25 0.4 11.61 
13 Coal  Black Coal 4 29,648 40 NL 0.95 0.86 8.70 
14 Coal Brown Coal 4 22,360 40 NL 0.95 0.99 14.40 
15 Gas - Combined Cycle Gas 3 17,976 30 NL 0.95 0.4 6.42 
16 Gas - Single Cycle Gas 2 4,778 25 NL 0.95 0.4 9.47 
17 Nuclear Nuclear 4 21,587 40 NL 0.95 0.016 61.66 
18 Oil Oil 3 5,350 30 NL 0.95 0.67 11.25 
19 CCS Coal - IGCC Black Coal 4 0 40 2025 0.95 0.09 10.74 
20 CCS Coal - Oxyfuel Black Coal 4 0 40 2025 0.95 0.09 9.47 
21 CCS Coal - PC Black Coal 4 0 40 2025 0.95 0.09 10.00 
22 CCS Gas - Combined 
Cycle Gas 3 0 30 2025 0.95 0.04 7.82 
Sources for capacity in 2008: AGEB (2013a), BUNR (2013). Sources provide totals for Solar PV, Biomass and Gas. Multiple 
technologies fall within each of these classes. The shares of individual techs within a class is based on own assumptions: 
Solar PV Commercial (0.15) vs Decentralized (0.85); Biomass CHP (0.5) vs dedicated (0.5); Gas Combined Cycle (0.79) vs 






Table 9.3: Technology characteristics (financial) 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 
Te
ch 

























݅  ܱܥ௜ ܨܱܥ௜ ܥܣܲܧܺ௜ BAU Sen ܮ௜   
1 Wind onshore 1.81 8,171 1,562,083 0% 2% 10,000 22,794 88 
2 Wind offshore 4.40 34,218 3,704,558 0% 3% 1,000 0 150 
3 Solar PV - Commercial 0.00 14,604 1,737,858 0% 2% 20,000 6,120 502 
4 CSP 0.00 0 4,519,831 0% 2% 7 0 0 
5 Hydro 0.00 11,874 1,647,057 0% 1% 250 1,270 76 
6 Ocean 7.38 0 6,299,509 0% 3% 7 0 0 
7 Geothermal 4.08 0 2,738,711 0% 2% 750 3 150 
8 Biomass - CHP -13.94 187,923 4,402,246 0% 2% 1,000 959 142 
9 Biomass - CHP -20.99 124,026 4,166,863 0% 3% 1,000 0 0 
10 Biomass - dedicated 1.00 155,439 2,637,706 0% 2% 1,000 959 142 
11 Biomass - dedicated 4.92 48,034 2,979,143 0% 3% 1,000 0 0 
12 Biogas 0.00 231 2,551 0% 2% 1,800 638 71 
13 Coal 0.53 13,582 1,349,815 0% 1% 2,000 0 0 
14 Coal 3.78 22,698 1,556,798 0% 1% 2,000 0 0 
15 Gas - Combined Cycle 0.40 14,401 694,351 0% 1% 2,000 0 0 
16 Gas - Single Cycle 0.89 0 415,510 0% 1% 2,000 0 0 
17 Nuclear 0.40 74,220 4,119,107 0% 1% 1,000 0 0 
18 Oil 3.78 22,698 1,287,529 0% 1% 700 0 0 
19 CCS Coal - IGCC 12.69 71,854 2,498,149 0% 3% 1,000 0 0 
20 CCS Coal - Oxyfuel 11.16 72,838 3,150,247 0% 3% 1,000 0 0 
21 CCS Coal - PC 13.51 60,042 2,633,490 0% 3% 1,000 0 0 
22 CCS Gas - Combined 
Cycle 5,34 40,848 1,330,279 0% 3% 1,000 0 0 
Sources for cost parameters: averaged over estimates from the following sources: IPCC 2005; IEA/NEA, 2010; US EIA, 2010, 
2013; Black & Veatch, 2012; DEA, 2012; EDF, 2012; IRENA, 2012, 2013; JRC, 2012, 2013; NREL, 2012; Schmidt et al., 2012; 
IEA, 2013; IEA-RETD,  2013; UNDP, 2013. Learning rates are assumed to be 0% in the Base Case Scenario. Sources for 
calculation of saturation level: BUNR, 2013; BWT, 2013. Assumed saturation levels for CSP, Ocean, Geothermal and CCS-
based technologies. CCS-based technologies are assigned the saturation limit of the same technology without CCS. Low 
levels are assigned to CSP and Ocean because of limited technical scope for these technologies. Geothermal technology is 
assigned the saturation limit of Biomass. Source for FIT-capacity in 2008: Bundesnetzagentur, 2010. 
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Table 9.4: Fuel prices 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 
 Assumptions Empirical standard dev. 
of quarterly returns 
(based on historical data 
from 2009-Q3 to 2014-
Q1) 
Empirical correlations of quarterly returns (based on 
historical data from 2009-Q3 to 2014-Q1) 
Fuel €/GJ in 
ݐ ൌ ʹͲͲͺ 



























Biomass 8.00 0.50% - - - - - - 
Biogas 5.38 0.50% - - - - - - 
Black Coal 3.39 0.14% 0.1121 1 - - - - 
Brown Coal 1.09 0.14% 0.1121 1 1 - - - 
Gas 7.17 0.50% 0.0601 0.2503 0.2503 1 - - 
Uranium 0.00135 0.00% 0.0953 0.3724 0.3724 0.2660 1 - 
Oil 13.24 1.00% 0.1169 0.6331 0.6331 0.0511 0.3314 1 
Sources for calculating standard deviations and correlations: Australian thermal coal and Russian Natural Gas border price in 
Germany (IMF, 2014), Uranium u3o8 Nuexco spot (IndexMundi, 2014), Europe Brent oil spot price (US DOE, 2014). 
Calculations based on historical data from 2009-Q3 to 2014-Q1. 
 
Table 9.5: Available nuclear generation capacity (in MW) under NPO regulation 
 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
NPO 21,587 21,587 21,587 21,587 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 10,800 10,800 9,500 9,500 8,100 4,000 4,000 
 
Table 9.6: Demand between 2008-2030 that is exempt from the EEG apportionment (in TWh) 
 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
ܦ݋ݓ݊௧ 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
ܦ݌ݎ݅ݒ௧  72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 102 105 108 111 114 117 120 123 126 129 132 135 138 
ܦ݁ݔ݌௧ 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
ܦ݈݋ݏݏ௧ 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
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10. SAMENVATTING 
In 2005 trad het Europese emissiehandelssysteem (afgekort EU ETS) in werking. De 
EU beoogt met dit systeem enerzijds de collectieve emissies van de installaties die onder het 
stelsel vallen te beheersen en anderzijds om investeringen te stimuleren Dit proefschrift gaat 
vooral in op de vraag waarom de EU tot dusverre niet overtuigend in dit tweede doel lijkt te 
slagen. We onderzoeken daartoe in hoeverre het ontwerp van het EU ETS zelf - in combinatie 
met de diverse beleidsmaatregelen buiten het stelsel - kan verklaren waarom. 
Het EU ETS stelt een jaarlijkse limiet aan de individuele en dus gezamenlijke CO2-
uitstoot van ca. 12.000 energie-intensieve installaties, welke gezamenlijk verantwoordelijk 
zijn voor iets minder dan de helft van alle CO2-emissies binnen de EU, en vermindert deze 
limiet jaarlijks met een vast percentage. De EU dwingt bedrijven om te voldoen aan deze 
limiet door ieder jaar, in lijn met de gestelde limiet, een beperkt aantal emissiecertificaten in 
omloop te brengen. Bedrijven zijn vervolgens verplicht om één certificaat (officieel afgekort 
EUA, ofwel European Union Allowance) te hebben voor elke ton CO2 die zij uitstoten. Heeft 
een bedrijf dat valt onder het EU ETS geen certificaat, maar stoot het toch CO2 uit, dan 
ontvangt het een hoge boete. Sinds 2005 heeft de overheid het grootste gedeelte van deze 
certificaten gratis aan bedrijven verstrekt, maar in toenemende mate zullen bedrijven 
certificaten moeten inkopen op veilingen. Daarnaast kunnen bedrijven onderling de 
certificaten aan elkaar kopen en verkopen. Omdat deze handel voornamelijk via beurzen 
verloopt, is er een marktprijs voor EUAs. Door het totale aantal EUAs elk jaar naar beneden 
bij te stellen, beoogt men om certificaten schaarser te maken, de marktprijs omhoog te stuwen 
en daarmee bedrijven aan te zetten om te investeren in technologie met een lage (of geen) 
CO2-uitstoot. 
501077-L-bw-Mulder
Chapter 10   231 
 
 
De EU streeft ernaar dat het EU ETS op structurele basis investeringen weet te 
prikkelen bij Europese industrie omdat op die manier de Europese emissiereductiedoelstelling 
(-40% in 2030 in vergelijking met 1990) op een goedkopere manier kan worden behaald. 
Immers, als er op structurele basis vraag is naar ‘schone’ technologieën (zoals windmolens, 
zonnepanelen en isolatiemateriaal), kunnen netwerken van toeleveranciers (zogeheten 
waardeketens) zich verder ontwikkelen en kunnen er ook leereffecten optreden omdat 
producenten steeds slimmer leren te werken.  
Tot nu toe is het EU ETS nog niet in staat geweest om structureel een prikkel te bieden 
voor investeringen. De economische crisis die in 2008 begon heeft hierin een grote rol 
gespeeld: het productieniveau van de Europese industrie daalde sterk waardoor de CO2-
emissies in 2009 meer dan 11% lager waren dan het emissieniveau in 2008. Hierdoor daalde 
zowel de vraag naar emissierechten als de marktprijs voor EUAs. Waar de prijs voor EUAs 
midden 2008 nog boven de 30 euro stond, daalde de prijs begin 2013 tot onder de 3 euro. 
Doordat emissierechten goedkoper zijn geworden, zijn investeringen in technologie met een 
lage CO2-uitstoot logischerwijs ook minder interessant geworden.  
De grote vraag is daarom of het EU ETS in de toekomst wel in staat zal zijn om op 
structurele basis een investeringsprikkel te bieden aan de Europese industrie, en welke 
maatregelen hiervoor eventueel noodzakelijk zijn. In dit proefschrift geven we een antwoord 
op deze vragen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert de onderzoeksvragen die in dit proefschrift worden 
behandeld. In Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 worden de onderzoeken beschreven, en in Hoofdstuk 5 
volgt een conclusie en epiloog. De onderzoeksvragen die in Hoofdstukken 2, 3, en 4 worden 
behandeld bouwen op twee deelterreinen in de literatuur: 
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1) In Hoofdstuk 2 kijken we naar de mate waarin potentiele investeerders bloot staat 
aan investeringsonzekerheid vanwege de marktgedreven, en dus onzekere, prijs van 
EU ETS emissierechten. Specifiek kijken we naar potentiele investeerders in 
ondergrondse CO2-opslag (afgekort CCS). We doen dit omdat het grote technische 
potentieel van CCS om CO2 te reduceren vaak van doorslaggevende betekenis wordt 
geacht om de verregaande emissiereductiedoelen te kunnen halen welke de EU voor 
de periode tot aan 2050 en voor dat jaar hanteert. De EU emissiereductie voor 2050 
behelst immers dat de EU dan een zo goed als CO2-neutrale economie wil hebben 
gerealiseerd (Pacala and Socolow, 2004; IPCC, 2005; Haszeldine, 2009; EC, 2009b; 
IEA, 2010; IEA, 2011). Als potentiele investeerders in CCS bloot staan aan te veel 
CO2-prijs onzekerheid zullen kritiek geachte investeringen nooit van de grond komen.  
2) In Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 richten we ons op de vraag in hoeverre de impact van het EU 
ETS op investeringsgedrag beïnvloed wordt door andere beleidsinstrumenten. In de 
afgelopen jaren hebben EU lidstaten vele beleidsinstrumenten geïntroduceerd parallel 
naast het EU ETS die ook, direct of indirect, het CO2-emissieniveau beïnvloeden. 
(EEA, 2011; Lundberg et al., 2012; IPCC, 2013). Voorbeelden zijn subsidies voor de 
installatie van hernieuwbare elektriciteitsproductiecapaciteit of maatregelen om de 
energie-efficiëntie van gebouwen te verhogen. Veel van deze instrumenten 
interacteren op een nadelige manier met het EU ETS (Interact, 2002; Harrison et al., 
2005; Sorrell et al., 2009; Alberola, 2014) en kunnen zodoende een verklaring vormen 
voor een zwakke CO2-prijs. Tot dusverre is het echter onduidelijk hoe groot de invloed 
van deze nadelige interacties is geweest. 
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Hoofdstuk 2 kijkt naar de mate waarin het EU ETS een prikkel kan bieden voor 
investeringen in een set technologieën die bekend staat als CCS (Carbon Capture and 
Storage). Wat alle typen CCS gemeen hebben is dat ze CO2 kunnen afvangen, transporteren 
en opslaan. CCS kan bijvoorbeeld in de elektriciteits- staal- of cementsector worden toegepast 
om de CO2-uitstoot van bestaande en nieuwe installaties met ongeveer 90% te reduceren. De 
afgevangen CO2–uitstoot kan vervolgens worden vervoerd (bijvoorbeeld per boot of 
pijpleiding), om daarna te worden opgeslagen in de diepe ondergrond. Potentiele 
opslaglocaties zijn, onder andere, lege olie- en gasvelden. 
CCS wordt op dit moment nog niet op grote schaal toegepast, maar biedt wel veel 
potentie. Pacala en Socolow (2004) beargumenteren dat CCS tot 1/7e van de totaal wereldwijd 
benodigde CO2-reductie voor haar rekening zou kunnen nemen die nodig is om de ergste 
consequenties van klimaatverandering te voorkomen. CCS bevindt zich op dit moment nog in 
een ontwikkelingsstadium, waarbij hoge kosten en onzekerheden de introductie van CCS 
bemoeilijken. Eén volwaardig CCS-project van industriële omvang vergt al gauw een 
investering van vele honderden miljoenen euro’s of meer, terwijl de doorlooptijd van 
dergelijke projecten langer kan zijn dan een decennium. Om CCS op een succesvolle manier 
te introduceren, en leereffecten te behalen, hebben investeerders een voldoende krachtige 
investeringsprikkel nodig. Daarmee zijn investeringen in CCS een test-case voor het EU ETS. 
Is het EU ETS in de toekomst in staat om op structurele basis een prikkel te bieden voor de 
introductie van CCS? In Hoofdstuk 2 bouwen we een stochastisch simulatiemodel van het EU 
ETS om deze vraag te beantwoorden. 
De resultaten laten zien dat het zeer onwaarschijnlijk is dat het EU ETS op structurele 
wijze een prikkel kan bieden voor de introductie van CCS. De barrière die investeringen 
tegenhoudt is de onzekerheid over de groei van het emissieniveau in Europa. Als de 
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economische groei tot 2030 relatief hoog is, stijgt het emissieniveau navenant, en zijn er veel 
investeringen nodig om de CO2-reductiedoelstelling te kunnen halen. In een dergelijk scenario 
zou de CO2-prijs hoog genoeg kunnen worden om de introductie van CCS te ondersteunen. 
Echter, als de economische groei tot 2030 relatief laag is, hoeft er veel minder geïnvesteerd te 
worden om diezelfde emissiereductiedoelstelling te halen. Investeerders die vandaag besluiten 
om te investeren in CCS lopen daarom vaak een omvangrijk risico: de investeerder weet vaak 
pas geruime tijd na de investeringsbeslissing en planningsfase of de investering het voorziene 
rendement daadwerkelijk kan leveren. Mede door de omvang van de gerelateerde 
investeringen en de lange lead times van het CCS ontwikkel- en bouwproces, lijkt het niet 
aannemelijk dat het  EU ETS - met  sterk fluctuerende prijzen van de emissierechten en ook 
op termijn een vrijwel niet te voorspellen prijstrend daarvan -   voldoende steun kan bieden 
om op structurele wijze investeringen in deze technologie te stimuleren. 
Daarnaast laten de resultaten zien dat het terugbrengen van het aantal te verstrekken 
emissierechten de investeringsonzekerheid voor CCS niet zal verminderen. Een lager 
emissieplafond ondersteunt wel de gemiddelde CO2-prijs. Echter, één neerwaartse 
economische schok kan voldoende zijn om een dergelijke opwaarts effect volledig te niet te 
doen.  
Het advies aan beleidsmakers is daarom om niet te focussen op maatregelen die enkel 
het gemiddelde niveau van de CO2–prijs ondersteunen. In plaats daarvan zou men zich 
moeten richten op het terugbrengen van de onzekerheid rondom het gemiddelde. Maatregelen 
die dit effect sorteren kunnen veel vormen aannemen, maar een voorbeeld is het introduceren 
van een minimum- en maximumprijs voor emissierechten. Zo kan de CO2-prijs stabiliseren en 
een sterkere prikkel bieden voor investeerders, ook op de langere termijn. 
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Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 introduceren de lezer met beleidsinteractie. Beleidsinteractie 
verwijst naar de interactie die plaatsvindt tussen, enerzijds, het emissiehandelssysteem en 
anderzijds alle andere instrumenten die door beleidsmakers zijn geïntroduceerd om 1) CO2 te 
reduceren, 2) energie efficiëntie te behalen, of 3) om investeringen in hernieuwbare 
elektriciteit te stimuleren. Omdat deze andere instrumenten parallel naast het EU ETS zijn 
geïntroduceerd, noemen we deze categorie ‘parallelle instrumenten’ (i.e. parallel instruments). 
Omdat parallelle instrumenten net als een emissiehandelssysteem zorgen voor een lagere 
CO2-uitstoot, zijn parallelle instrumenten vaak een substituut voor een 
emissiehandelssysteem. Als de CO2–uitstoot van EU ETS sectoren daalt door parallelle 
instrumenten (bijvoorbeeld middels subsidies voor isolatie en hernieuwbare 
elektriciteitsopwekking) dan is er minder noodzaak om CO2 te reduceren via het 
emissiehandelssysteem om de CO2-reductiedoelstelling te halen. Dit effect vertaalt zich in een 
lagere CO2-prijs: hoe meer CO2 wordt gereduceerd via parallelle instrumenten, hoe lager de 
vraag naar emissierechten en hoe lager de CO2-prijs. Hoewel dit effect al vaak is beschreven 
in de literatuur (zie bijvoorbeeld Hindsberger et al., 2003; Morthorst, 2003), is het vooralsnog 
onduidelijk hoe gevoelig het EU ETS hiervoor is. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoeken we onder welke condities het EU ETS ‘overvloedig’ 
wordt door de introductie van parallelle instrumenten. Het EU ETS is overvloedig als de CO2-
prijs permanent 0 euro is doordat er geen schaarste is op de markt voor emissierechten. Het 
kwantificeren van de condities waaronder het EU ETS overvloedig wordt helpt om een inzicht 
te krijgen in de kracht waarmee parallelle instrumenten het EU ETS ondermijnen. Met die 
informatie kunnen beleidsmakers een betere inschatting maken van de potentiele voor- en 
nadelen die kleven aan het introduceren van een parallel instrument. 
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In de analyse maken we onderscheid tussen twee verschillende typen parallelle 
instrumenten: Type 1 en Type 2 instrumenten. Type 1 instrumenten zijn gedefinieerd als 
parallelle instrumenten die gericht zijn op bedrijven in EU ETS sectoren en daarmee 
verbeteringen in de CO2-intensiteit van de productie teweegbrengen. Een voorbeeld van een 
Type 1 instrument is een verplichting voor kolencentrales om biomassa bij te stoken. Type 2 
instrumenten zijn gedefinieerd als parallelle instrumenten die gericht zijn op niet-EU ETS 
sectoren, maar desondanks de vraag verlagen naar producten die worden geproduceerd in ETS 
sectoren. Een voorbeeld van een Type 2 instrument is een subsidie voor de installatie van 
zonnepanelen op een woonhuis. De installatie van zonnepanelen zorgt ervoor dat de vraag 
naar elektriciteit van centraal geproduceerde elektriciteit (bijvoorbeeld in een kolen- of gas 
centrales) daalt. Deze bedrijven halen daardoor een lager productieniveau, stoten minder CO2 
uit, houden emissierechten over en kunnen deze verkopen. Door dit hogere aanbod van 
emissierechten op de market zorgen ook Type 2 instrumenten voor een lagere CO2-prijs. 
De resultaten laten zien dat Type 2 instrumenten (bijvoorbeeld subsidies voor 
particulieren voor de installatie van zonnepanelen) een groter neerwaartse effect hebben op de 
CO2-prijs dan Type 1 instrumenten (bijvoorbeeld een biomassa bijstookverplichting voor 
elektriciteitsbedrijven). Dit kan worden verklaard doordat Type 2 instrumenten de 
verplichting wegnemen bij ETS-bedrijven om CO2 te reduceren, terwijl deze bedrijven wel al 
hun CO2-reductie opties in tact houden. Het ETS bedrijf houdt, met andere woorden, meer 
vrijheidsgraden over voor de toekomst: het ETS bedrijf kan altijd nog zelf besluiten om 
biomassa bij te gaan stoken om de CO2-uitstoot verder te laten dalen. Het feit dat Type 2 
instrumenten de vrijheidsgraden van ETS-bedrijven in stand houden, terwijl Type 1 
instrumenten dit niet doen, reflecteert zich in een sterker gedeprecieerde CO2-prijs, doordat 
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toekomstige CO2-reductie nog steeds relatief goedkoop kan worden behaald en de marginale 
kosten van de meest efficiënte beschikbare optie de prijs bepalen. 
Als de gezamenlijke impact van Type 1 en Type 2 instrumenten groter is dan 40 
MtCO2 per jaar, dan is het zeker dat het EU ETS overvloedig zal worden. Als de 
gezamenlijke impact van Type 1 en Type 2 instrumenten groter dan 20 maar kleiner dan 
40 MtCO2 per jaar, dan hangt de toekomst van het EU ETS ook af van de van de economische 
groei. Hoe lager de economische groei, hoe groter de kans dat het EU ETS overvloedig raakt. 
Als de impact van Type 1 en Type 2 instrumenten lager is dan 20 MtCO2 per jaar, dan is het 
onwaarschijnlijk dat het EU ETS overvloedig zal raken. Niettemin kan de CO2-prijs in 
dergelijke gevallen wel sterk depreciëren als gevolg van de introductie van parallelle 
instrumenten.  
De genoemde grenswaarden gelden alleen als bedrijven blijven geloven in de goede 
werking en houdbaarheid van het EU ETS. Zo niet, dan liggen de grenswaarden vermoedelijk 
significant onder de gerapporteerde 20 en 40 MtCO2 per jaar. Als bedrijven niet 
gecommitteerd zijn aan het EU ETS zouden ze hun emissierechten kunnen gaan dumpen, 
terwijl beleidsmakers zouden kunnen aanzetten tot dergelijk gedrag door 1) de toekomst van 
het EU ETS in twijfel te trekken, 2) maatregelen te nemen met een dergelijk effect, of 3) juist 
niet maatregelen te nemen op het moment dat daar behoefte aan is. 
Als beleidsmakers willen voorkomen dat het EU ETS overvloedig raakt zou men 
bijvoorbeeld kunnen overwegen om een plafond in te stellen op het gebruik van parallelle 
instrumenten. Door een plafond in te stellen dat ruim onder de 20 MtCO2 per jaar ligt kan 
overvloedigheid en daarmee de kans op een extreem lage CO2-prijs worden verminderd. 
Hoewel een dergelijk plafond om politieke redenen moeilijk uitvoerbaar zal zijn, zou het wel 
de toekomst van het EU ETS waarborgen. Tegelijkertijd worden beleidsmakers in Europa zo 
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gedwongen om de voor- en nadelen van verschillende parallelle instrumenten kritisch tegen 
elkaar af te wegen, alvorens tot introductie over te gaan. Op die manier kan een mix van 
instrumenten worden ontwikkeld die beter samenhangt, doelgerichter is en waarbij 
overvloedigheid zo veel mogelijk kan worden voorkomen.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 4 gaan we dieper in op het onderwerp beleidsinteractie. Nadat we in 
Hoofdstuk 3 hebben vastgesteld dat parallelle instrumenten de potentie hebben om de 
prestaties van het EU ETS sterk te beïnvloeden, doen we nu een casestudie om beter te 
begrijpen in welke mate het EU ETS daadwerkelijk wordt beïnvloed door parallelle 
instrumenten. 
De resultaten in Hoofdstuk 4 laten zien dat de combinatie van feed-in tarieven voor 
hernieuwbare elektriciteitsproductie (afgekort FITs) en de uitfasering van nucleaire 
productiecapaciteit (NPO) in de Duitse elektriciteitssector de gemiddelde CO2-prijs met 
ongeveer €5 laat dalen (ofwel -14% in vergelijking met hetzelfde scenario zonder FITs en 
NPO). Als we, met een ruwe schatting, alle andere parallelle instrumenten meenemen die in 
Europa geïntroduceerd zijn, daalt de CO2-prijs met €20 (ofwel -50% in vergelijking met 
hetzelfde scenario zonder parallelle instrumenten). De resultaten laten bovendien zien dat 
overvloedigheid van het EU ETS  ( en dus een zeer lage prijs voor de emissierechten) een 
mogelijk resultaat is. Dit zal echter alleen gebeuren wanneer zowel 1) de economische groei 
langdurig laag is en, 2) de relatieve brandstofprijzen in het voordeel zijn van brandstoffen met 
een lage CO2-intensiteit (bijvoorbeeld prijzen waarbij gasgestookte productie van elektriciteit 
goedkoper is dan productie op basis van (bruin)kolen). Bovenop lage economische groei 
kunnen dergelijke brandstofprijzen voor verdere uitval van de vraag naar emissierechten 
leiden. 
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Op basis van deze resultaten is het advies aan beleidsmakers om de huidige mix aan 
doelen en instrumenten op het gebied van energie- en klimaatbeleid te heroverwegen. 
Vereenvoudiging en herkalibratie van doelen en instrumenten kan, zoals in deze studie 
aangetoond, veel bijdragen aan het versterken van de investeringsprikkel die uit gaat van het 
EU ETS.  
We benadrukken dat de twee onderzochte instrumenten in de Duitse 
elektriciteitssector (FITs en de NPO) goed in lijn liggen met de doelen waarvoor ze zijn 
geïntroduceerd.  Een NPO is een erg effectieve manier om een volledige uitfasering van 
nucleaire productiecapaciteit te bewerkstelligen, terwijl ook de introductie van FITs een erg 
effectieve manier is om investeringen in hernieuwbare productietechnieken te stimuleren. 
Gegeven dat er politieke doelen zijn gesteld voor nucleaire uitfasering en groei van 
hernieuwbare productietechnieken in de Duitse elektriciteitssector, kan de keuze voor deze 
instrumenten daarom eenvoudig worden verdedigd. Voor zover dit representatief is voor alle 
parallelle instrumenten in Europa, raden we beleidsmakers aan om eerst te focussen op het 
reduceren van het aantal interacterende beleidsdoelen op het gebied van energie- en 
klimaatbeleid. Dit advies geldt voor beleidsmakers op alle politieke niveaus: Europees, 
nationaal, regionaal en lokaal. Als alternatief kunnen parallelle beleidsdoelen worden 
bijgesteld naar een lager ambitieniveau, zodat negatieve beleidsinteractie enigszins wordt 
voorkomen. Daarna zouden beleidsmakers moeten focussen op het opnieuw kalibreren van de 
gekozen instrumenten, zodanig dat negatieve beleidsinteractie met het EU ETS wordt 
voorkomen.  
 
